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Preface
Many of us would say that rapid economic growth in Korea is one of the astonishing and successful 
cases of Korea’s SOC. In the meanwhile, a few or more among us would argue that such a success 
came from a certain amount of sacrifice and pain.
From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, the Korean government had been a powerful planning 
state, so that the central government’s planning dominated the market, civil society and local 
governments. Yet, as time went by, in particular after the late 1980s, as the country became more 
democratized, the hitherto dominated private sectors, and local entities geared up to raise their 
suppressed voices. There have been uprising issues for the self-interests of social classes and regional/
local communities, which then in turn caused social conflicts on national scale development projects 
and the authoritarian planning decisions.
In such a retrospect, this intensive reading can be regarded as a self-reflection of the Korean 
territorial policy and planning, of which concerns are on what we have missed and what we have 
mistaken. Again, Korea has been faced with various types of social conflicts in the process of 
“compressed growth”. 
Maybe we have been reluctant to talk about our undeniable civil strifes. The consenting readers 
of this reading would be able to find that the level of Korea’s social conflicts is much higher than that 
of other countries. Yet, against all the odds which are there to beat, we Koreans are still trying to go 
another mile for more desirable future. Our pride would not be laid on what we have achieved, rather 
on what we are trying to head toward.
Publishing this intensive reading on the Korean social conflicts, I would like to express a deep 
appreciation to the contributors to this book. First, this publication cannot be possible without 
generosity of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, which owns the original copyright of the 
Korean version of this book. Also, a similar amount of gratitude should be sent to Dr. Wonbae Kim, 
the chief editor, and to the editorial board members Mr. Soonup Park, Ms. Hyuna Lee, Ms. Hyojung 
Yun, and Ms. Minkyung Pyo.
Yet, most importantly, the bigger and deeper appreciation and gratitude will be shouted out 
for somebody else. As you can notice, I mean all the parties involved in the middle of the conflict 
presented in this book, the “people.” Without their tears, pain and sacrifice, there would not have 
been any conflicts and, in turn, conflict resolution and social progress. Then we would have nothing to 
learn, and nothing to share with our global friends. A thousand thanks to all.
December 2013
Jeong Ho Moon
Director, GDPC, KRIHS
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the Path to National Development
1. Context for Reviewing Conflict Cases of National Projects
1) Current Status of Social Conflicts in Korea
The Republic of Korea (Korea hereafter) achieved both industrialization and democratization 
in a short span of time and is the only country to transform itself from an aid recipient to an aid 
donor. Thanks to such strength, Korea hosted the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010 and led the 
collective initiative to adopt the “Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth.” As such, Korea 
is well on its way to join the ranks of advanced countries in the globalization era. In this journey, 
however, Korea faced several obstacles, one of which is the issue of mediating social conflicts that are 
being expressed in various ways in all parts of society. For Korea to become an advanced country, it 
is necessary to wisely resolve social conflicts and achieve social integration by reducing the causes of 
conflicts. 
In retrospect, Korea has been faced with various types of social conflicts during the so-called 
“compressed growth and development” era, which began in the 1960s. Going through the 
development dictatorship era and up until the mid-1980s, conflicts over political democratization 
took up the largest share of social conflicts. Following political democratization in 1987, a variety of 
social conflicts erupted and spread throughout the society, incurring immense social costs. At the 
same time, however, they also presented social learning experience and lessons for Korea. So far, 
Korea experienced the era of compressed conflicts, where the strife between public agencies and 
civil groups, and between regions, classes, generations, and ideologies simultaneously emerged in 
a complex manner over issues, such as land development and environmental conservation, wealth 
distribution among classes, ideologies and values. Even today, social conflicts over different interests 
and values still arise in various sectors of society. 
The level of Korea’s social conflicts is much higher than that of other countries’. Following Turkey, 
Poland, and Slovakia, Korea ranked fourth in terms of the severity of social conflicts among the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member nations. Korea’s conflict 
index (0.71) is 61 percent higher than that of the OECD average (0.44). Unfortunately, Korea’s overall 
capacity for conflict management is weak compared to that of other OECD member countries.1)
Figure1-1  International Comparison of Social Conflicts Index
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Source :  Park Jun and others. “Korea’s Social Conflicts and Economic Costs.” Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2009. p7.
2) Social and Economic Costs of Conflict
Every year, Korea had to pay high costs for conflicts emerged in various sectors of society. From 
1990 to 2008, a total of 624 cases of conflicts occurred, averaging about 33 cases per year. Over 90 
percent of the cases involved conflicts of interest. Specifically, labor conflicts took up the largest share 
(30 percent), followed by regional conflicts (19 percent). Regional conflicts were mainly triggered by 
location selections for preferred or unpleasant facilities. PIMFY (Please in My Front Yard) phenomenon 
1) Park Jun and others. “Korea’s Social Conflicts and Economic Costs.” Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2009. 7.
1
| Chapter 01 |  Conflicts Over National Projects and the Path to National Development
14
2. Major National Projects that Overcame Conflicts to Become a Driving Force for National Development
15
occurred when residents tried to promote preferred facilities that benefited their region and NIMBY (Not 
in My Back Yard), when they opposed controversial facilities from being built in their neighborhoods. 
Class conflicts over redevelopment projects accounted for 18 percent of the total, and environmental 
conflicts due to conflicting values in land development and conservation took up 14 percent. Public 
conflicts lasted for 829 days on average and approximately 20,000 people were involved in each 
conflict. In particular, environmental conflicts lasted the longest with 829 days on average and regional 
conflicts continued for about 530 days.2)
According to the analysis of the Samsung Economic Research Institute3), a 10 percent decrease in 
the social conflict index has an effect of increasing the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita by 7.1 
percent. Thus, lowering Korea’s social conflict index to the OECD average can raise the nation’s GDP 
per capita by 27 percent, or by more than 5,000 dollars than the current level.
3)  Path to National Development Found in Conflict Experiences and Lessons of National 
Projects
Among the issues of social conflicts in Korea, major national land development projects for the 
purpose of constructing Social Overhead Capital (SOC) are the most deep-seated and thorniest. In 
retrospect, most of these projects turned out to be a success. However, some experienced setbacks 
and others instigated controversial debates on overinvestment. Many of the successful projects 
entailed far-sighted insight and great leadership. The prime examples are the Gyeongbu Expressway 
Construction Project at the early stage of economic development and the Incheon International Airport 
Construction Project of late. These projects were successful, owing to the leaders’ far-sighted insight 
and strong commitment to boost national development and competitiveness. On the other hand, 
there were other major national projects that suffered from conflicts in the beginning but eventually 
succeeded and thus contributed to economic growth and national development as well as secured 
Korea’s global competitiveness.
The following is the list of some of the conflict issues regarding national projects in the past: 
Concerns over environmental damages triggered by large-scale development projects; arguments 
on the lack of economic feasibility and the inability to secure financial resources; conflict of interests 
between regions; objections on grounds of balanced regional development and social equity; concerns 
over high technological dependence on foreign countries; objections by political interests. Amid such 
conflicts, some projects were reasonably carried out by embracing the opposition’s opinion. On the 
contrary, there had been numerous cases where projects were stalled and public opinion was split 
because people were merely opposing for the sake of opposition or were raising irrational demands.
2) Presidential Committee on Social Cohesion. April 6th, 2011. Web. <http://www.harmonykorea.go.kr/>
3) Park Jun and others. “Korea’s Social Conflicts and Economic Costs.” Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2009. 11.
Perhaps time is ripe now to learn from the past experiences and derive lessons for future national 
development. More specifically, the Korean government needs to establish a conflict prevention and 
resolution system that helps avoid the waste of national energy and the division of public opinion. In 
addition, it is necessary to form a social environment where members take responsibility for their own 
assertions and action even after the project is completed. Such a mature society will be essential for 
Korea to become an advanced country. Moreover, it is crucial that the national government takes an 
open stance on national projects by accommodating the issues raised or alternatives suggested by 
the opponents. Project success depends greatly on how the government takes in opposing views and 
solidifies them into the project implementation plan.
Over the past five decades, some national projects were successful, whereas others were stalled 
or failed. This white paper selected the most representative national projects that were controversial 
at first but turned out to be a success. The purpose is to extract lessons and policy implications from 
these projects and seek the desirable path to national development by objectively assessing them. 
Publishing a white paper that includes the lessons and policy implications from failed national projects 
will be left as a follow-up task.
2.  Major National Projects that Overcame Conflicts to Become a Driving 
Force for National Development
Among the major SOC projects and local governments’ projects that were pursued in line with 
strategies to accelerate economic growth and land development after the 1960s, this white paper 
selected and analyzed eight national projects that overcame conflicts and became successful, thereby 
serving as growth engines for national development or are expected to do so in the future. They are 
Gyeongbu Expressway Construction Project, Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project, 
Incheon International Airport Construction Project, Lake Sihwa Reclamation Project, Saemangeum 
Development Project, Seoul Ring Expressway Construction Project, Seoul Cheonggye Stream 
Restoration Project, and Seoul Exclusive Median Bus Lane Project. 
1) Gyeongbu Expressway Construction Project
The Gyeongbu Expressway Construction Project (February 1968-July 1970) was launched during 
the early economic development phase when development conditions were poor. Recognizing Korea’s 
SOC such as roads and ports as the linchpin of economic advancement, the Korean government 
embarked the project with the aim of pushing economic development and bridging regional gaps by 
building a transportation network connecting Seoul, Daejeon, Daegu, and Busan, which was then the 
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major axis of Korea. It only took two years and five months to complete the Gyeongbu Expressway, 
which runs 428㎞ from Seoul to Busan. The project required 42.9 billion won in investment and made 
the best use of Korea’s poor civil engineering skills at that time. It was natural back then that many 
people had negative perceptions about constructing the expressway, which required heavy costs 
but doubtful benefits. Accordingly, in the early stages, the project had to face heavy criticisms and 
oppositions from the political circle and the media. Key issues were low project feasibility and project 
priority, regional imbalance effects, difficulties in securing financial resources, to name a few. Despite 
such obstacles, the project was launched and successfully completed by the strongly committed 
government. In result, the project contributed to the rapid development of Korea’s economy, inter-
regional transportation, and automobile culture. 
Figure1-2  Location of Eight Major National Projects
Lake Sihwa Tideland
Seoul Ring Expressway
Gyeongbu Expressway
Saemangeum
Incheon 
International Airport
Seoul Exclusive
Median Bus Lane
Seoul Cheonggye
Stream Restoration
Gyeongbu
High-Speed Railway
2) Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project
The Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project (1992-2014) was implemented because it 
was impossible to expand the operation of the railway system as the capacity of the Suwon-Daejeon 
section (125㎞) reached its limit in the early 1990s. In terms of economic feasibility, high-speed 
railway was adopted as the best alternative for a long-distance transport network because, first, high-
speed railway’s required area per unit transport capacity only accounts for 29 percent of a four-lane 
expressway and, second, high-speed railway provides a remarkably higher level of safety and punctuality 
compared to other means. The first phase of the project, which took an investment of 12.7377 trillion 
won, was completed in 2004 and the second phase was completed in 2010 with an investment of 
7.9905 trillion won. During the process, the project drew fierce criticism regarding the shortage of 
financial resources, return on investment (ROI), environmental degradation, lack of technological skills, 
and Korea’s high dependency on foreign technology. However, the project eventually overcame various 
difficulties and contributed to the improvement of traffic and transportation conditions between 
regions by making travel within the country possible in just half a day. 
3) Incheon International Airport Construction Project
The Incheon International Airport Construction Project (November 1992-June 2008) was carried 
out in order to construct a new airport in the metropolitan area that can resolve Seoul’s noise pollution 
caused by aircraft and meet the surging demand of air transportation in the late 1980s. After a new 
runway was built in Gimpo International Airport in April 1987, noise pollution in the area rose as a 
social problem. Korea experienced rapid economic development and rising people’s living standards 
in the 1980s, hosted the Seoul Summer Olympics in 1988, and freed up overseas travel regulations 
in 1989. Because of these factors, the annual average number of international passengers in Korea 
rose by more than 13 percent and domestic passengers by more than 30 percent, showing the 
highest growth rate of air transport demand in the world. Due to these conditions and changes in 
demand, a project for building a world-class airport in Yeongjong Island with a capacity of 44 million 
passengers per year and an annual cargo capacity of 4.5 million tons began. In the early stages, this 
project also faced harsh criticism over issues such as excessive scales of development and demand 
forecast, unfavorable accessibility, environmental destruction, land subsidence, and fog. However, by 
overcoming these difficulties, Incheon International Airport was able to emerge as a hub airport of 
Northeast Asia as it ranked top in the service category for six consecutive years. 
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4) Lake Sihwa Reclamation Project
Lake Sihwa Reclamation Project (2002-2016) is a project for building a cutting-edge green 
composite city. The purpose is to supply high-tech industrial land to the metropolitan area by 
reorganizing the tideland that was formed during the Sihwa Seawall Project (1987-1994), which was 
embroiled in fierce controversy at the time. In addition, the project aims to improve the water quality 
of Lake Sihwa and the air quality of the Sihwa and Banwol Industrial Complex and expand support 
functions. A total of 3.5221 trillion won will be invested in the reclamation project and the size of the 
development area accounts for 9.26 square ㎞. Environmental pollution has been the key issue of this 
project for years. Fortunately, the Sihwa Multi Techno Valley Development Project smoothly took off 
by weathering difficulties and reaching a consensus on the development plan through a consultative 
body composed of various stakeholders.
5) Saemangeum Development Project
The Saemangeum Development Project (1991-2020) was contemplated in order to boost food 
security as Korea had to import rice due to continuous droughts, food crises, and cold weather from 
the 1960s to the 1980s. In particular, this project was carried out in order to secure prime farmlands 
that would resolve food problems, to prevent repeated flood damages in the lowland rice paddies in 
the Mangyeong and Dongjin River basins, and to stimulate the regional economy by cutting the travel 
distance and forming a comprehensive eco-tourism belt. The Saemangeum Seawall, which runs 33.9
㎞, is the world’s longest seawall. The government plans to transform the Saemangeum region into 
Northeast Asia’s economic center by forming 283 square ㎞ of land and a freshwater lake that is 118 
square ㎞ in size, within the total area of 401 square ㎞ created by seawall. This area is also on its way 
to becoming a green growth hub of Northeast Asia by completing the construction of the seawall 
and overcoming conflicts regarding the issues of ecosystem destruction, the need to secure farmlands, 
water pollution, and economic feasibility. 
6) Seoul Ring Expressway Construction Project
The Seoul Ring Expressway Construction Project (1988-2006) was initiated to meet the rapidly 
increasing transportation demand in the Seoul metropolitan area, wherein satellite cities expanded 
outward. The project entails a 127-kilometer eight-lane circular beltway that connects Toegyewon, 
Pangyo, Anyang, and Ilsan. This project was crucial in dispersing and detouring the traffic generated 
at the metropolitan periphery, so that it would not pass through the already crowded city center. 
However, the project was subject to strong criticisms and oppositions over issues such as the ecological 
disturbance of wild plants and animals, the violation of the environmental impact assessment process, 
route changes, and burden on traffic congestion. Through lengthy processes of consultation and 
mediation, the project successfully overcame these conflicts and created an eco-friendly expressway. 
7) Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
The Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project (2003-2005) can be regarded as an inevitable 
transition process for the urban development paradigm to resolve downtown development issues 
that were brought up during the industrialization period. Not only did the project remove the 
covered structures and restore the stream, but also invigorated the downtown economy by inducing 
redevelopment in neighboring areas. As the project started to gain a momentum, it provoked 
controversy and conflict among stakeholders. In particular, the confrontation was mainly centered on 
traffic jam caused by the restoration project, business losses of the merchants, and the direction of 
cultural asset restoration. However, the Seoul Metropolitan Government was able to successfully run 
the project and turn Cheonggye Stream into Seoul’s landmark that attracts citizens and tourists. By 
utilizing various conflict management tools, the city government helped resolve complaints and attain 
policy compliance. 
8) Seoul Exclusive Median Bus Lane Project
The Seoul Exclusive Median Bus Lane Project (2004-2012) aimed at setting up an exclusive median 
lane in the major radial and arterial roads in Seoul so that buses, the most representative public 
transportation means, can arrive on time and enhance users’ convenience. Seoul city thus far secured 
107.7㎞ of the exclusive median bus lane in 14 roads by 2010 and plans to operate a total of 214.7
㎞ in 19 roads by 2012. Other metropolitan municipalities are also actively introducing the Exclusive 
Median Bus Lane Project. However, this project also experienced conflicts surrounding the issues of 
its effectiveness, opposition of merchants located nearby bus stops, and difficulties in mediating the 
interests among bus companies. Nonetheless, the project eventually provided a breakthrough for bus 
rapid transit servicing citizens better. 
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Table1-1  Schedule for Eight Major National Projects
Phase 1
1968.2~1970.7
1992.6~2004.4
2002~2014
1992~2001
2002~2008
1987~1994
2002~2018
1991~2010
2010~2020
1988~2001
2001~2007
2003~2005
2004~2012
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Phase 1
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 2
Phase 2
Seawall
Seawall Project
Tideland Development Project
Gyeongbu Expressway
Construction Project
Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway
Construction Project
Incheon airport
Construction Project
Lake Sihwa
Reclamation Project
Saemangeum
Development Project
Seoul Ring Expressway
Construction Project
Seoul Cheonggye Stream
Restoration Project
Seoul Exclusive Median
Bus Lane Project
Development Project
3. Analytical Framework for Conflict Cases of National Projects
This white paper used Otto Hieronymi’s “ICCE Approach” in order to empirically analyze the 
conflict cases of eight major national projects.4) As shown in the diagram below, I (Identity) stands 
for the selection process of the national projects for analysis, C (Conflict) refers to the analysis of 
the opponents’ arguments and grounds. Another C (Cost) is the analysis over economic and social 
costs incurred by conflicts. E (Evaluation) is the process of evaluating the project overall, verifying 
proponents’ and opponents’ arguments, and drawing policy implications. 
In accordance with the ICCE approach, this white paper draws policy implications by synthesizing 
the results of the empirical analysis on the aforementioned eight national projects from the three 
aspects: the opponents’ logic; persuasion strategies to it; and the verification of the proponents’ and 
opponents’ logic, thereby drawing a conclusion of policy implications. 
Regarding the opponents’ logic, this paper grouped their logical basis into three issues of environmental 
feasibility, economic feasibility, and equity, and then reviewed the main characteristics of the opponents’ 
4)  Otto Hieronymi. “Policy Decisions for SOC Investment : Environmental and Planning Issues.” OECD International Futures Programme, 1993.
OECD. “Infrastructure in the 1990s: An Overview of Trends and Policy Issues.” OECD Forum for the Future, 1993.
logic on each issue. With respect to persuasion strategies, this paper, firstly, attempted to suggest evidence 
necessary for resolving conflicts and seeking alternatives and, secondly, discussed the response measures 
that have been used by project agencies to persuade the opposition by classifying them into several types 
such as dialogue with the opponents, consensus building through participation, promotion, and education.
Utilizing the “ICCE Approach” in order to Empirically Analyze National Projects’ Conflict Cases 
and its Verifications
• I (Identify)       : Selection of the national projects subject to analysis
• C (Conflict)     : Analysis of the proponents’ and opponents’ arguments and their logical grounds
• C (Cost)          : Analysis of social and economic costs incurred by conflicts
• E (Evaluation) :  Overall outcome, verification of the proponents’ and opponents’ arguments, and policy 
implications
Figure1-3  Comprehensive Framework for Empirical Analysis on Conflict Cases of National Projects
Outcome
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Project outcome and 
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and opponents' arguments
Conflict resolution
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Environmental, economic, 
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Meanwhile, regarding specific outcomes of the national projects and the validity of the proponents’ 
and opponents’ arguments, this paper used an ex post facto verification method by tapping into 
existing empirical data on analyzing economic and social effects, along with various statistics that have 
been provided after the projects were completed. 
Lastly, based on the results of empirical analysis on the implementation process of the projects, 
this white paper put forward policy implications that can be used for the government to introduce 
future national projects with less resistance in the initial phase. In order to verify the content and 
validity of the opponents’ logic, the authors of this paper investigated and utilized various data from 
books, newspapers on national projects published by government agencies, research institutes, public 
organizations as well as websites of relevant agencies.
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1. Gyeongbu Expressway Construction Project
1 Gyeongbu Expressway Construction Project
1. Project Outline
Project Volume
Total length 428㎞  
(Southern end of Hannam Bridge, Seocho-gu, Seoul - Geumjeong-gu, Busan) 
Construction Duration February 1st, 1968~July 7th, 1970 (2 years and 5 months, 888 days)
Investment Amount 42.97 billion won in total (Approximately 100 million won/㎞)
Major Specification
643 bridges, 6 tunnels, 19 interchanges
Passes major cities such as Seoul, Daejeon, Daegu, Busan
Seoul
Gyeongbu Expressway
Daegu
Daejeon
Busan
Past
Present
Review of Conflict Cases of Major 
SOC Projects2 The Park Chung-Hee administration began to contemplate the construction of expressways to resolve the difficulties of transporting increasing passengers and cargos as a result of the success of the First Five-year Economic Development Plan. Even though the construction of the Gyeongin 
Expressway, which runs from Seoul to Incheon, began in 1967, constructing a nationwide expressway 
network was practically impossible, considering the social and economic conditions at the time. 
However, in 1967, the project began to take shape as President Park pledged to build the Gyeongbu 
Expressway during his election campaign. 
The purpose of building the Gyeongbu Expressway was to support economic growth by linking the 
transportation network for major cities such as Seoul, Daejeon, Daegu, and Busan, and to promote 
economic revitalization by bridging regional gaps. The project took two years and five months starting 
from February 1968 and required a total of 42.9 billion won to build a four-lane expressway that runs 
428㎞, equipped with 634 bridges, six tunnels, and 19 interchanges. 
At the time, many people opposed the construction of the highway. The political circle, media, 
academia, and the business community raised doubts about the feasibility of the project and stressed 
that Korea was not yet prepared. Instead, they insisted that the government invest the funding in 
stabilizing the agriculture and fisheries industry and fostering small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Moreover, they were concerned that the country would have to sacrifice the construction of public 
roads, since the expressway would require an immense amount of investment in a short period 
of time. Furthermore, the opposition criticized that the highway would not only trigger regional 
imbalance, as production and service facilities concentrate in major cities, but also likely become an 
exclusive road for the rich who could own a car. 
Nevertheless, as the nation’s core infrastructure, the Gyeongbu Expressway has been praised for 
heralding the “automobile era” by remarkably cutting the transport time and laying the cornerstone 
for Korea’s economic development, dubbed as the “Miracle on the Han River.” Moreover, the 
Gyeongbu Expressway triggered the construction boom for other highways, such as the Yeongdong 
Expressway. 
Currently, the direct economic impact of the expressway network on the national economy reaches 
305.7 trillion won annually (33.6 percent of the GDP, as of 2006) and the expressway network is 
known to contribute to balanced regional development by reducing regional inequalities. Above all, 
the success of a national project that overcame a host of difficulties delivered pride and “can-do spirit” 
to the people, which is the most invaluable social asset. 
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2. Project Background and Purpose
1) Project Background
The Korean government began to take interest in building expressways, right after when Korea’s 
road technology officials had an inspection tour of the road system in the United States in the mid-
1950s. At that time, Korea, however, could not afford to build highways, as it was preoccupied with 
recovering from the damages of the Korean war. 
Soon after, Japan completed the Meishin Expressway in 1958 and the Korean government found 
out that Japan was on its way to add two more expressways during the 1960s. As the success of the 
First Five-year Economic Development Plan brought transportation problems to the surface, the Korean 
government began to have in-depth discussions about highway construction. With the construction 
of the Gyeongin Expressway that links Seoul and Incheon in May 1967, Korea opened an “expressway 
era.” However, it was natural that few could conceive the idea of building a nationwide expressway at 
the time given the country’s poor social and economic conditions. 
On April 29th, 1967, Park Chung-Hee, who was a candidate at the sixth presidential election, 
pledged to construct an expressway during the Second Five-year Economic Development Plan (1967-
1971). The project emerged at a press conference on May 2nd, 1967, when he announced to build a 
main expressway network connecting Seoul, Incheon, Gangneung, Busan, and Mokpo. 
2) Project Purpose
The Gyeongbu Expressway was carried out for the purpose of supporting Korea’s economic growth 
by establishing a transportation network that links Seoul, Daejeon, Daegu, Busan and boosting the 
national economy by closing regional gaps. 
3) Project Content
A total of 42.9 billion won was invested in constructing the 428-kilometer-long expressway that 
runs from the southern end of Hannam Bridge located in Seocho-gu, Seoul to Geumjeong-gu, Busan.
It took approximately about 100 million won per kilometer at the price of that time .
The construction started on February 1st, 1968 and was completed on July 7th, 1970, taking 888 
days. The Seoul-Suwon-Osong section was opened at the end of 1968, the Osan-Cheonan-Daejeon 
and Daegu-Busan section was completed in late 1969, and with the opening of the Daejeon-Daegu 
section in July 1970, the expressway was completed.
At the time, the expressway was equipped with 634 bridges, six tunnels, 19 interchanges, and its 
width was 22.4 meters in all sections of the four-lane expressway. The asphalt-covered road required 
6.8 million concrete blocks, 473,000 drums of asphalt, 49,900 tons of steel, 19,000 tons of structured 
steel, 8.928 million man-days, and 1.65 million units of equipment.
4) Project Agency
The Park Chung-Hee administration launched the National Expressway Construction Planning 
Investigation Group (hereinafter “Investigation Group”) on December 15th, 1967. The Investigation 
Group was in charge of planning and investigating for the project committee’s matters of 
consideration. To entrust authority to the Investigation Group with its important mission, the president 
directly appointed the members of the Group through a procedure equivalent to naming state 
ministers. The Group continued to perform a vast number of feasibility studies as well as planning and 
investigation activities for the expressway, right up until the ground breaking ceremony on February 
1st, 1968.
The government disbanded the group on January 29th, 1968 and launched the Seoul-Busan 
Expressway Construction Office, an implementation body for construction works, according to 
Ordinance No.48 of the Ministry of Construction.
5) Project Progress
The following is the progress of the expressway since its construction became a campaign pledge in 
April 1967, until the opening of all sections in July 1970.
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Table2-1-1  Progress of the Gyeongbu Expressway Construction Project
Date Content
April 29th, 1967  The plan to construct the expressway during the Second Five-year Economic 
Development Plan (1967-1971) was announced as a campaign pledge
November 20th, 1967 Six organizations submitted the estimated cost of construction to the Blue House
November 23rd, 1967
 A working group was formed at the Presidential Office to compare and review each 
plans. 
November 24th, 1967
Setting up of the Blue House Working Group (4 members, about 20 days)
-  Ordered by the president to review the approximate construction costs, draw a 
route map, purchase sites, organize data, complete standard cross-section model, 
and investigate planned routes
December 13th, 1967
 Establishing the National Expressway Construction Project Committee
-  A policy organization that appointed the prime minister as the chairman of the 
committee to coordinate relevant ministries, establish a close-knit cooperation system, 
and use strong administrative power, and named the Minister of the Economic 
Planning Board and the Ministry of Construction as vice chairs. 
-  First Meeting (December 19th, 1967) : Decision on the basic direction for the 
investigation group
-  Second Meeting (January 24th, 1968) : Review on the basic construction plan for the 
Gyeongbu Expressway in the run up to the ground breaking ceremony on February 1st. 
-  Dissolution on November 23rd, 1968 : Lost its reason of existence as President Park 
directly controlled the investigation group and the subsequent construction office. 
December 15th, 1967
The launch of the National Expressway Construction Planning Investigation Group
-  In name, the group was in charge of planning and investigating the project 
committee’s matter of consideration. However, to entrust authority to the group 
with its important mission the president directly appointed the members in a 
procedure equivalent to naming state ministers. 
-  Performed feasibility studies as well as planning and investigation activities for the 
expressway up to January 29th, 1968, the day before the ground breaking ceremony 
(February 1st, 1968) 
January 29th, 1968
 Launched the Seoul-Busan Expressway Construction Office, an enforcement body for 
construction works (Ordinance No. 48 of the Ministry of Construction)
Confirmed Routes
 Seoul-Daejeon (January 12th, 1968), Daejeon-Gimcheon (October 17th, 1968), 
Gimcheon-Daegu (October 17th, 1968), Daegu-Busan (April 25th, 1968)
February 1st, 1968 - 
July 7th, 1970
Construction under way
6) Project Funding5)
In 1967, after the construction plan of the Gyeongbu Expressway was materialized, the main 
issue that created a stir about the feasibility of the expressway was funding. The only experience 
of constructing an expressway Korea had at the time was the Gyeongin Expressway. However, the 
Gyeongin Expressway paled in comparison to the Gyeongbu Expressway, which was a mega national 
project.
The construction of the Gyeongin Expressway, which was a test bed for constructing the Gyeongbu 
Expressway, began on March 24th, 1967 and saw the completion of the 23.5㎞-long Seoul-Gajwa 
section on December 21st, 1968. Soon after, the 29.5㎞-long section between Seoul and Incheon was 
entirely opened as the 6㎞-long Gajwa-Yonghyeondong, Incheon section of which the paving had 
been delayed, was complete on July 21st, 1969. The total cost of construction reached 3.15 billion 
won, which means a unit cost 105 million won per kilometer.
Thus the construction of the Gyeongbu Expressway which required massive financial resources and 
workforce owing to many tough sections compared to the Gyeongin Expressway was indeed the first 
major national project. That is why it was dubbed as “the largest civil engineering project in the history 
of Korea.”
The initial cost of construction proposed by the investigation group was 38.4 billion won. This, 
however, was adjusted to 33 billion won after the review of economic vice-ministerial meeting. In the 
early stages of planning, organizations and companies that were taking orders from the president 
reported completely different estimated costs. For instance, the Ministry of Construction estimated 
65 billion won, which was later revised to 45 billion won, the Ministry of Finance 33 billion won, the 
Economic Planning Board giving up cost estimation, the Seoul Metropolitan Government 18 billion 
won, the Army Corps of Engineers 49 billion won, and Hyundai Engineering and Construction 28 
billion won. Whether for the government agency or a private company, it was impossible to correctly 
estimate the construction costs.
In this regard, it was no surprise that the actual costs incurred during construction showed a huge 
gap with the estimated costs. The price tag of construction had to be revised due to unexpected 
costs incurred during the construction of sections in Seoul-Osan, Osan-Daejeon, Daegu-Busan, and 
additional costs. Eventually, in March 1969, the Ministry of Construction had to ask for a total of 
42.97 billion won, which was 9.97 billion won higher than the initial budget of 33 billion won.
5)  National Archives of Korea. “Constructing the Nation’s Artery: Gyeongbu Expressway” <http://theme.archives.go.kr/next/gyeongbu/road Statis-
tics02.do>
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Table2-1-2  Comparison of the Initial Budget and the Revised Budget
(Unit: 100 million won)
Item Initial Budget Revised Budget Increased Amount
Construction Cost 282.9 373.9 91.0
Equipment Cost - 4.9 4.9
Land Compensation Cost 12.4 19.6 7.2
Investigation & Design Cost 5.0 4.7 -0.3
Loan Supply Cost 21.9 18.9 -3.0
Foreign Labor Outsourcing Cost 1.1 0.9 -0.2
Test Equipment Cost 0.5 0.4 -0.1
Office Operation Cost 1.2 1.2 -0.02
Extra Cost 4.9 5.3 0.4
Total 330.0 429.7 99.7
Source : ”Seoul-Busan Expressway Construction Form (C11M24673).” 1974. 250
In order to build the expressway, the Korean government requested 3.3 million dollars of loan to the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which turned it down. Hence, President Park 
decided to source the construction funding exclusively from domestic capital. As a means to secure 
financial resources, various ways were proposed, such as introducing foreign capital in the form of 
equipment and grain loans, and securing domestic financial resources, such as raising oil tax, issuing 
government bond, collecting transit tax and toll fees, and receiving military support. The financial 
resources procurement plan for the Gyeongbu Expressway, which was mapped out in February 1968, is 
shown in Table 2-1-4. However, local financial resources accounted for a staggering 95.6 percent of the 
construction costs as the grain-loan claim funds from Japan stood at a mere 1.89 billion won, which 
indicates the difficulties in hosting foreign capital and related political decisions to suspend the loans.
Table2-1-3  Construction Funding Plan for Gyeongbu Expressway (February 1968)
Financial Resources Amount (100 million won)
Gasoline Tax Revenue 139
Transit Tax Profit 60
Grain Loan Sales Revenue 84
Grain-loan Claim Fund 27
Toll Fee Revenue 15
Economic Development Special Account Budget 6
Total 331
Source : Economic Planning Board. “A White Paper on Reparation Fund.” 1976.
Table2-1-4  Investment Breakdown for Gyeongbu Expressway
(Unit: 100 million won)
Fund
Year
Total Ratio (%)
1968 1969 1970
Claim Fund 8.2 10.7 - 18.9 4.4
Local Fund 67.4 243.7 99.7 410.8 95.6
Total 75.6 254.4 99.7 429.7 100.0
Source : Economic Planning Board. “A White Paper on Reparation Fund.” 1976. 279
3. Arguments and Grounds of Proponents and Opponents 
1) Issues and Logic of Proponents and Opponents
The Gyeongbu Expressway Construction Project revealed conflicts from the early stages of 
discussion. The feasibility of the expressway construction, an issue of giving priority to the Seoul-Busan 
section, imbalanced regional growth, and damages to tradition and customs are among such issues. 
The arguments and grounds of the proponents and opponents are as follows.
(1) Feasibility of the Expressway Construction
• Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents of the Gyeongbu Expressway were concerned that other roads would 
lack investment as an immense amount of funding would be poured into the Gyeongbu 
Expressway in a short period of time. Given Korea’s economic conditions at the time, the 
opposition party and American officials stressed that the Korean government should invest in 
stabilizing the prices of agricultural products and fostering small and medium-size enterprises, 
rather than constructing the highway.
• Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The proponents argued the need to build the Gyeongbu Expressway since it would provide 
favorable conditions in developing industries, promoting regional development, and expanding 
the spheres of daily life. That is because roads had a higher investment efficiency and a higher 
possibility of resolving transport issues with a limited amount of funding, compared to railways 
and ports.
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 The review of the IBRD’s research group, from November 1965 to June 1966, stating that 
Korea’s railway, marine, and airway conditions were reaching their limits and in particular, the 
Gyeongbu Line was expected to become saturated in the near future, providing ammunition 
for the proponents’ argument of constructing the Gyeongbu Expressway. During the First Five-
year Economic Development Plan, Korea saw an annual economic growth rate of 8.3 percent, 
while experiencing a 13.5 percent annual increase rate of transportation and a 40 percent rise 
of Gyeongbu rail cargos.
(2) Issue of Project Priority to Seoul-Busan Section
• Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The political circle, the media, the academia, and the business community opposed the 
construction of the Gyeongbu Expressway arguing that it was premature for Korea. In 
addition, the decision to give priority to the Seoul-Busan section triggered objections that the 
government gave poor treatment to the Honam area, or Jeolla Province.
• Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The proponents stressed that the Seoul-Busan section should be constructed first because 
the Gyeongbu axis connecting Seoul, Daejeon, Daegu, and Busan, accounted for 80 percent 
of the total transportation volume, and Busan and Incheon port took up 40 and 20 percent 
of marine exports, respectively. In addition, they emphasized the fact the Seoul metropolitan 
region could make a full use of both the Gyeongbu Expressway and the Gyeongin Expressway. 
In particular, they underscored that the Gyeongbu Expressway had the highest profitability, 
so the toll revenue could be used to build other highways or repay the principal. The fact 
that regions adjacent to the Gyeongbu axis accounted for 45 percent of the nation’s land, 
44 percent of the national population, 46 percent of Gross National Product (GNP), and 81 
percent of corporate production, served as evidence to the proponents’ arguments.
(3) Imbalanced Regional Growth and Damages to Traditional Custom
• Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents argued that the economy of small and medium-sized cities could be 
undermined, once the production and service facilities were concentrated in major cities. On 
top of that, the active exchanges between cities and rural areas based on the fast mobility 
of the expressways could lead to an excessive urbanization of consumption behavior in rural 
areas and hindrance to preserving local folk cultures.
• Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The proponents claimed that the Gyeongbu Expressway could bring positive effects, such 
as preventing the concentration of population and industries in major cities and promoting 
balanced development of small and medium-sized cities and joint development of agriculture 
and industry. They also mentioned benefits incurred by the Expressway such as increased 
income for farming and fishing communities that could arise from shortened distribution 
processes and the stimulation of tourism industry.
2) Persuasion Strategy
In order to alleviate the conflicts surrounding the construction of the Gyeongbu Expressway, the 
government used persuasion strategies such as forming public opinion and proposing objective 
grounds through economic feasibility studies.
(1) Forming Public Opinion
The government aimed to resolve the lack of public awareness on the expressway by forming 
public opinion. Above all, it concentrated on stressing the need to construct an expressway. For 
instance, on December 5th 1967, the government distributed to media the Thesis on the Validity of 
the Seoul-Busan Expressway Construction Project. According to the thesis, the construction funding 
of the expressway would be gathered from user charges, and thus construction and maintenance 
costs would be self supported from the toll revenue for 20 years.Furthermore, the February issue of 
Generation in 1968 listed four reasons why the expressway should be built. The reasons are as follows.
• Characteristic of the expressway : Emphasis on highway safety
•  Reasons why expressway construction should precede railway construction : Emphasis on the 
convenience of roads over railways
•  Reasons why the construction of an expressway that connects north and south is crucial : 
Construction and maintenance of the Gyeongbu Expressway will be supported from the toll 
revenue for 20 years
•  Proposition on the maximization of defense benefits and effects
(2) Economic Feasibility Study
Apart from forming public opinion, the government recognized the need for providing convincing 
arguments. Hence, to show the feasibility of constructing the expressway in quantitative terms, the 
government announced “the Outline of National Expressway Construction Plan”, which included a 
study of Gyeongbu Expressway’s economic feasibility carried out by the investigation group.
First, in terms of economic growth, constructing a national expressway is a crucial long-term 
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national project as it is the best way to solve transport problems brought by rapid economic growth. 
Korea’s average annual economic growth rate from 1962 to 1968 was approximately 8.3 percent, 
whereas transportation growth rate was 13.5 percent. Currently, the transportation capacity of 
railways, roads, and shipping is low, and the transport share of automobiles is too small. It will be hard 
to achieve economic growth without road development, and over one billion won worth of losses per 
year will be incurred due to the lack of paved roads. Furthermore, it is predicted that the capacity of 
Gyeongbu railway, the main railway line, will reach saturation in the foreseeable future.
Second, it is valid to begin with the Seoul-Busan expressway since high traffic volume gives it 
higher profitability compared to the Daejeon-Mokpo or Seoul-Gangneung expressway. The areas 
adjacent to the Gyeongbu Expressway account for almost half of the entire Korean population and 
GNP, while taking up 61 percent of industrial production. It is also the main artery that connects 
Busan and Incheon port, which makes up roughly two-thirds of Korea’s total export and import 
cargos. Because of these reasons, it is possible to recover construction funds from user charges. The 
Gyeongbu expressway, after completion, can also provide increased revenue from related taxes, which 
can be used as a means to secure financial resources for constructing other expressways. In terms of 
strengthening transport capacity, the Gyeongbu Expressway is the best alternative compared to other 
transport modes and general national roads. Unlike railways, which can only transport special cargos 
between points, expressways enable items to be delivered door to door. Even if the government 
invests 10 billion won in improving national roads, it is still a mere 20 percent of passenger capacity 
and 30 percent of cargo capacity of expressways. Moreover, national roads are far less effective in 
improving safety, such as lowering accident rates, since it is impossible to remove mixed traffic and 
surface crossings. Travel time by national roads also takes 1.5 times longer than expressways.
Third, the Gyeongbu Expressway will bring direct benefits to the citizens’ life. Whereas road 
functions lag behind the advancement of car performance, a modernized expressway can contribute 
to price stability of essential commodities through its fast speed, low price, and safety. Speedy 
road transport remarkably drops inventory investment―30 percent of production investment―
which increases capital ratio, promotes the export industry, reduces cargo damages, and saves 
packaging costs. Transport costs can also be reduced by improving transport equipments; improving 
car performance, using trailers and containers. In addition, the Gyeongbu Expressway provides the 
estimated direct gains of 17 billion won for the first five years and 90 billion won for the 15 years after 
completion from saving operating costs (fuel, tire wear) and transport costs inclusive of maintenance 
and repair, time saved, accident reduction.
Fourth, the expressway can contribute to developing farming and fishing communities and bridging 
regional gaps. It also prevents population and industries from concentrating in major cities, stimulates 
balanced development of small and medium-sized cities, promotes joint growth for agriculture and 
industries, expands urban areas, and increases income for farmers and fishermen, thanks to the 
accelerated distribution process. As of 1966, the population growth rate of three major cities was 
over six percent and a mere two percent for small and medium-sized cities, when the nation’s overall 
population growth rate was 2.5 percent. Thus, regional differentials were wide. The construction of 
the expressway can bring many benefits: it expedites the dispersion of factories into other provinces 
and the creation of firms; develops the dairy industry, promotes high-grade vegetable farming and 
fishing industry due to the ease of door-to-door transport; advances the processing industry; increases 
the usage of cultural facilities; and promotes the tourism industry.
Fifth, the construction project brings huge benefits such as employment increase and industrial 
development through the mass-production of construction materials. During the construction 
process, it can lead to increased job opportunities and mass-production of construction materials, the 
promotion of automobile and machinery industry, and the modernization of industrial composition. 
More specifically, the project can create 60 billion won in increased production, as it has an 
employment effect of 21 million man-days, provides over 15 billion won in wages, and promotes six 
billion won in construction material production and automobile industry development.
Sixth, the project adds to national defense benefits, such as strengthening national defense power 
through the enhancement of military mobility. Moreover, the expressway can resolve the rising 
transport volume by doubling the transportation capacity, making civil links easier, and enabling the 
mass use of large modern weapons. Another merit is that highways can be used as a runway in 
emergencies.
4. Economic and Social Costs From Conflicts
Against all odds, the construction of the Gyeongbu Expressway Seoul-Busan section was completed 
in only two years and five months, which was unprecedently short time, under the strong will and 
action of the country’s leader. Thus, the Gyeongbu Expressway suggests no need for analyzing 
economic and social costs from conflicts.
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5.  Verification and Evaluation of Proponents’ and Opponents’ Arguments
1) Expressway Construction Feasibility
The Gyeongbu Expressway that enabled faster travel time opened the automobile era and laid the 
cornerstone for Korea’s economic development, dubbed as the “Miracle on the Han River.” As a result, 
the direct effect that the expressway network had on the nation’s economy as of 2006, was estimated to 
reach 305.7 trillion won (33.6 percent of the GDP) annually. Moreover, the increase in the number of cars 
using expressways has provided Korea an opportunity for manufacturing automobiles. The Gyeongbu 
Expressway also contributed to resolving unemployment issues and increasing national income with an 
employment effect of approximately 21 million man-days throughout the construction period.
Figure2-1-1  Transportation Index Trend After the Opening of Gyeongbu Expressway
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2) Issue of Project Priority to Seoul-Busan Section
According to the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, which carried out a study on 
the effects of the expressway in 2006, the Gyeongbu Expressway had the largest benefits among 
the highways in Korea. Thus, it has been proven that the decision to build the Gyeongbu Expressway 
first was right in terms of economic feasibility. The report suggested that, among all the expressways 
open in 2006, the Gyeongbu Expressway had the largest amount of benefits at 13 trillion won in 
1995, 15.9 trillion won in 2000, and 13.6 trillion won in 2005 respectively. The expressway had also 
contributed to laying the foundation for logistics revolution and economic growth as diverse types 
of industrial complexes began to be located around the Gyeongbu axis. The fact that 79 percent of 
national and local industrial complexes were located within 10㎞ of Gyeongbu Expressway is a strong 
evidence.
3) Imbalanced Regional Growth and Damages to Traditional Custom
Despite the concerns of the opposition, it has been proven that the Gyeongbu Expressway 
promoted industrial development suitable to the region by linking industrial activities with available 
resources. The expressway also proved to substantially narrow regional gaps by developing both 
potential demand and supply areas. Modernized expressway contributed to increased farmers’ income 
by enabling high-value vegetables and dairy industries to grow, and boosted the development of 
farming and fishing communities by directly connecting production sites with consumption sites.
Meanwhile, mobility and accessibility to all parts of the country was remarkably expanded thanks 
to the capability to travel Korea in a day. Accessibility from one region to another has been greatly 
improved and in result regional manufacturing, service industries and, in particular, local tourism 
industries have been invigorated.
6. Project Implementation Effects
1) Analysis on Project Implementation Effects
The effects of the expressway project can be divided into direct and indirect effects. Direct effects 
are the benefits directly obtained by highway users, while indirect effects are the gains that users and 
citizens obtain from the expressway, aside from the direct benefits.
(1) Direct Effects
•  Survey on the Expressway Project Effects (Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 1995)
 The Institute carried out the evaluation with and without the Expressway. Estimated direct 
effects as of 1994 included reduction of: travel distance by 8.7 percent, travel time by 20.4 
percent, gasoline consumption by 18.3 percent, and diesel consumption by 24.9 percent. 
Converted into monetary costs, the direct benefits amounted to 8.2434 trillion won, or 2.72 
percent of the GNP as of 1994.
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• Survey on the Expressway Project Effects (Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 2006)
 The Institute analyzed the project benefits by comparing the cases where all the highways 
were in operation as of 1995, 2000, and 2005 with the case where each highway was not 
in operation. The Gyeongbu Expressway was found out to bring the biggest benefits with 13 
trillion won, 15.9 trillion won, and 13.6 trillion won, respectively for the years of 1995, 2000 
and 2005.
• Fuel Cost Reduction
 As of 2005, the Gyeongbu Expressway had an effect of saving 607 million liters of gasoline 
and diesel per year. When converted into monetary values, it amounted to 270.4 billion won a 
year.
• Travel Time Reduction
 It took more than 15 hours by car to get from Seoul to Busan before the construction of the 
Gyeongbu Expressway. On the contrary, the same distance now only takes four hours and 
twenty minutes via the expressway, which means a 71 percent travel time saving.
(2) Indirect Effects
• Employment Expansion and Economic Development6)
 In 1967, Korea had a population of 30.13 million, an unemployment rate of 3.2 percent, and 
an inflation rate of 12 percent. The GNP per capita was 142 dollars, whereas export volume 
was 320 million dollars and import volume 996 million dollars, with trade deficit of 574 million 
dollars.
Figure2-1-2  Comparison of Major Indicators (1961-1979)
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6) Korea Expressway Corporation. “The History of Gyeongbu Expressway.” 2009.
 The Gyeongbu Expressway had an employment effect of approximately 21 million man-days. 
It was an effective means for helping the unemployed, as more than 15.9 billion won went 
into wages. A mass production system for construction materials was also formed, as the 
demand for materials surged with the construction of the expressway. Moreover, the project 
contributed to the rapid development of the machinery industry, including automobiles, as it 
had a spillover effect of producing approximately 60 billion won worth of cars.
•  Contribution to Bridging Regional Gaps and Balanced Regional Development
 In the early stages of economic development, Korea adopted an imbalanced growth policy. 
The government pursued efficiency by investing minimum amounts in selected areas and 
then attempted to achieve regional equity by developing low-developed, low-efficiency areas. 
During the process, the expressway played a big role.
 Korea’s rural population rapidly decreased as the population and industries moved to major 
cities in the late 1960s. Concerned with the issue of rural depopulation, the government 
attempted to reduce regional gaps by connecting available resources and industrial activities 
through the nation’s main artery. In particular, the modernized expressway contributed to 
increasing farmers’ income by fostering high-value vegetables and the dairy industry and 
stimulating the development of agriculture and fishing industry by linking production sites in 
fishing villages with consumption sites in cities.
 Since the 1970s, various economic and social policies induced the population and industries 
to shift to metropolitan areas and major cities. Nevertheless, the Gyeongbu Expressway was 
known to have invigorated the regional economy, such as farming and fishing communities.
• GDP Investment Effects
 The results of the GDP investment effects for 21 years between 1975 and 1996 are as shown 
the diagram below.
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Figure2-1-3  GDP Spillover Effect of Gyeongbu Expressway
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Source : Korea Expressway Corporation, “Analysus on Business Effect by Expressway Lines.” 1999.
• Spillover Effects on the Manufacturing Industry
 The spillover effects on the manufacturing industry by the construction of the Gyeongbu 
Expressway from 1968 to 1993 are shown in the Figure 2-1-4.
Figure2-1-4  Gyeongbu Expressway’s Effects on Industrial Production
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Source : Korea Expressway Corporation, “Analysus on Business Effect by Expressway Lines.” 1999.
• Stimulation of Overseas Projects
 The Gyeongbu Expressway also contributed to the stimulation of overseas construction 
projects. The 1970s was the era of expressways that began in earnest with the opening of the 
Gyeongbu Expressway in 1970, Honam and Namhae Expressway in 1973, and Yeongdong 
and Donghae Expressway in 1975. The number of construction contracts won overseas grew 
rapidly with the Overseas Construction Promotion Act and the experience of expressway 
construction.
Figure2-1-5  1970s Overseas Construction Trend (1968-1980)
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(3) Other Effects
• Increased Daily Average Traffic Volume and Toll Revenue 
 Toll revenue from the Gyeongbu Expressway rose continuously as the daily average traffic 
jumped by 6.4 fold over 20 years from 150,000 in 1988 to 975,852 cars in 2007.
2) External Evaluation of Gyeongbu Expressway
(1) National Archives of Korea
The National Archives of Korea stated the construction effects of Gyeongbu Expressway under the 
theme “Constructing the Nation’s Artery: Gyeongbu Expressway.”
• Cornerstone of Korea’s Economic Development
 Together with the acceleration of industrial development, the Gyeongbu Expressway played a 
key role in making Korea one of the top ten economic powerhouses.
• Contribution to Korea’s Balanced Regional Development
 The expressway contributed to the smooth circulation of labor and supplies necessary for 
economic development, reduction of regional inequalities, and balanced regional development.
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• Contribution to Korea’s Construction Industry
 Thanks to the technological advancement of the construction industry, the Gyeongbu 
Expressway contributed to the development of the construction industry and strengthened its 
international competitiveness.
• Contribution to Korea’s National Defense
 The Gyeongbu Expressway contributed to strengthening national defense through the 
mobilization of combat forces in emergencies.
• Contribution to Reform of National Consciousness
 The Gyeongbu Expressway contributed to reaffirming the nation’s unlimited potential and 
inspiring a “can-do” spirit.
3) Construction Value of Gyeongbu Expressway
The estimated value of Gyeongbu Expressway amounted to 11.7933 trillion won, including land, 
road paving, bridges, and tunnels.
Total Value Land+road paving+bridge+tunnel values = Approximately 11.7933 trillion won 
Land Value  Average price of publicly notified individual land price per 1㎡ (40,126 won)×area(34,655,000㎡)  
= Approximately 1.3906 trillion won 
Road Packaging 
Value
Reacquisition cost per area(㎡)(807,692 won)×area(9,860,500㎡)
= Approximately 7.9642 trillion won
Bridge Value
Reacquisition cost per area(㎡)(2,354,839 won)×area(910,000㎡)
= Approximately 2.1429 trillion won
Tunnel Value
 Reacquisition cost per area(㎡)(1,556,034 won)×area(190,000㎡)
= Approximately 295.6 billion won
Annotation1 : Land Value: Estimated according to the appraised land value of the relevant region
Annotation2 : Road paving value, bridge value, tunnel value: Used reacquisition cost
※  Reacquisition cost is the cost (material cost+labor cost+construction cost, etc.) required when building facilities at present.  
The government announces the unit area (㎡) price per facility
Source:  Ministry of Strategy and Finance and National Accounting System Review Committee. “SOC Assessment Guide (Draft).” 2010.
4) Contribution to Society, Culture, and Education
(1) Realization of a Nationwide One-day Life Zone
The opening of Gyeongbu Expressway enabled citizens to travel the country in a single day. 
Accordingly, lifestyles and living patterns of one region quickly spread throughout the nation. During this 
process, underdeveloped areas were able to benchmark the cultures of relatively developed areas, and the 
areas with economic dominance began to take interest in other areas’ cultures with traditional lifestyles.
(2) Restoration of Traditional Cultures on the Verge of Decline
Cultures that were confined to certain regions, such as the 12 versions of Pansori, loop fight, 
Gyeonggi folk song, Jeongseon Arirang, traditional lacquer work, and ceramics, were restored. 
Markets and vitality of traditional cultures and inherited lifestyles were also reinvigorated as exhibition 
platforms took place in major cities. In addition, shortened travel time made research on historical 
temples and dinosaur monuments easier including, for example, in-depth studies on tourism and 
cultural resources of Jeju and other islands, which required at least three days to travel by sea.
(3) Diminished Boundaries between Universities in Seoul and the Metropolitan Periphery
After the completion of Gyeongbu Expressway, Dongguk University, Kyunghee University, Dankook 
University, Yonsei University, Korea University, and Sangmyung University opened satellite campuses in 
the central region of Korea. Academic exchanges were invigorated between Seoul and other localities, 
thanks to the easy access through highways.
(4) Boom in Observing Traditional Holidays
After the opening of the Gyeongbu Expressway, a car boom swept the country as people aspired to 
visit their hometowns with family members via expressways. Even though increased demand for cars 
triggered traffic congestion, the expressway contributed to settling in a filial piety culture that stresses 
ancestral ritual formalities, where family members and relatives gather for holidays.
5) Cornerstone for Korea’s “Miraculous History”
(1) Driving Force for Economic Development
The construction of the Gyeongbu Expressway generated significant economic impacts including 21 
million jobs, spill-over effects on industrial production, and the rise of steel, petro-chemical, ship-building, 
automobiles and electronics industry. In result, Korea’s export and domestic market grew rapidly.
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(2) Establishment of Economic Foundation
Based on the success of the Gyeongbu Expressway, Korea shifted from an agrarian society to an 
industrial society in the 1970s. The expressway accelerated region-to-region communication, enabled 
various exchanges of information and culture, and spread agricultural technologies and Saemaeul 
Movement, which helped overcome poverty in rural areas.
The expansion of SOCs such as expressways and the development of heavy chemical industry laid 
the foundation of Korea’s advancement. In the 1980s, Korea saw that the number of cars exceeded 
one million units and export volume reached 60 billion dollars. In the 1990s, the number of cars 
surpassed ten million units and export volume stood at 100 billion dollars.
Figure2-1-6  Comparison of Major Indicators (1970-2009)
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2 Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project
1. Project Outline
Project 
Duration
June 30th, 1992~April 1st, 2004 (Phase 1: 11 years and 9 months) 
June 1st, 2002~December 31st, 2014 (Phase 2 : 12 years and 7 months)
Investment 
Amount
20.4834 trillion won (Phase 1: 12.7337 trillion won, Phase 2 : 7.497 trillion won)
Project Volume Total length 417.5㎞, 6 stations newly built, 4 stations improved
Technical 
Specifications
Maximum speed : 300 ㎞/h, Passenger capacity : 520,000 passengers/day, Railway Vehicles : 46 units
Vehicle Storage Stations : Seoul (Gangmae-dong, Goyang-si), Busan (Danggam-dong, Busanjin-gu)
KTX
Daegu
Daejeon
Busan
Seoul
Past
Present
In the 1970s and the 1980s, infrastructure could not keep up with the rapid speed of economic 
development. As a result, transport and logistics became major problems in the Gyeongbu axis. 
Although the majority of expressway and railway sections reached their capacity limits, Korea’s 
transportation infrastructure and plans were inadequate to solve the problems. An introduction of new 
transport facilities in the Gyeongbu axis was felt inevitable. The high-speed railway was singled out as 
the best alternative. The objective of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project was to 
enhance national competitiveness by resolving the shortage of transport infrastructure associated with 
rapid economic development and to achieve balanced regional development and social integration by 
promoting economic and social exchanges between regions.
The Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway, which connects Seoul-Gwangmyeong-Cheonan·Asan-Osong-
Daejeon-Gimcheon (Gumi)-East Daegu-New Gyeongju-Ulsan-Busan, required a total of 20.4834 
trillion won for 22 years and six months from June 1992 to December 2014.
In 1974, the IBRD proposed the construction of a new railway on the Gyeongbu axis, and this 
was reflected in the Korea’s Fifth Five-Year Plan(1986-1989), which eventually led to the decision 
of constructing the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway in 1989. In 1992, four zones in the pilot section 
(Cheonan-Daejeon) began construction and in 1993, France’s Alstom was chosen as the priority 
negotiator for the supply of vehicles. In 1996, the High-Speed Railway Construction Promotion Act 
was enacted and proclaimed. The first phase was opened in 2004 and the Daegu-Busan section of the 
second phase was completed in 2010.
In April 2004, the opening of the Seoul-East Daegu (248.0㎞) section, which was the first phase 
of the project, enabled passengers to travel Seoul-Busan (417.5㎞) in only two hours and 40 minutes. 
Later on, the East Daegu-Busan section (127.2㎞) of the second phase opened on November 1st, 
2010. The completion of the construction lowered the travel time to two hours and 18 minutes. As a 
result, the project generated spillover effects such as balanced regional development, accumulation of 
related technologies, ability to travel the country in half-a-day and the realization of green growth by 
minimizing environmental pollution.
From the planning stage, the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project aroused 
various types of conflicts related to the issues such as balanced regional development, technological 
dependency, investment efficiency, environment and culture, and, as a consequence, incurred 
heavy economic and social costs. To alleviate such conflicts, the government and the project agency 
mobilized scientific means or various persuasion strategies such as forming consultative bodies, 
running public relations campaign, filing lawsuits and reaching agreements.
2. Project Background and Purpose
1) Project Background
Resolving the difficulties of transportation and logistics in the Gyeongbu axis was the main reason 
for carrying out the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project. As of 1995, 73 percent of 
the total population and 70 percent of regional production were concentrated in the Gyeongbu axis. 
In addition, among the inter-regional transportation volume, the axis accounted for 66 percent of 
passengers and 70 percent of cargos.7) It was forecasted that the axis would see 3.6 percent and 4.3 
7)  Passengers: Nationwide 7.3 million passengers/day, Gyeongbu axis 4.8 million passengers/day; Cargo: Nationwide 1.23 million tons/day, Gyeo-
ngbu axis 860,000 tons/day
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percent of annual passenger and cargo traffic increase, respectively.
Moreover, thirty eight percent of traffic congestion occurred in the Seoul-Suwon, Cheonan-
Daejeon, and Gimcheon-Daegu sections of the Gyeongbu Expressway. As the number of cars jumped 
5.9 fold from 2.04 million units in 1988 to 12.06 million units in 2000, the area of congested sections 
was expected to grow in spite of the expressway extension. In the case of railways, capacity shortage 
in all sections was pointed out as a major issue. For instance, as of 1997, the Suwon-Daejeon section 
already reached its limit. Although south of Daejeon did not have many problems, the capacity 
shortage of the Suwon-Daejeon section made it impossible to run additional operations. It was 
estimated that the capacity would reach its limit between 2000 and 2003 even if there was a 15 
percent increase of capacity through the electrification of original railways.
Regional development focused on the Gyeongbu axis made it difficult to solve the traffic and 
logistics issues with the existing transportation infrastructure and expansion plans alone. It was thus 
inevitable to introduce new transport facilities in the axis. The high-speed railway was singled out as 
the best alternative of all, since it required land, only 29 percent of a four-lane expressway per unit 
transport capacity, and had high levels of safety and punctuality.
Table2-2-1  Capacity Status of Gyeongbu Railway (1997) 
(Unit: times/day)
Classification Seoul-Cheonan Cheonan-Daejeon Daejeon-Daegu Daegu-Busan
Railway Capacity 138 134 123 134
Operation Status 138 134 94 96
Remaining Capacity 0 0 29 38
Source :  Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs. “Overcoming Environmental Conflicts of the Gyeongbu High-Speed 
Railway Second Phase: Mt. Cheonsung Passageway.” 2010. 1.
2) Project Purpose
The primary purpose of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway was to boost national competitiveness 
by accelerating efficient industrialization through resolving transport infrastructure shortages caused by 
economic development. An allied objective was to achieve balanced regional development and social 
integration by promoting economic and social exchanges among regions through reduced travel time.
3) Project Content
The Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project connects Seoul-Gwangmyeong-
Cheonan·Asan-Osong-Daejeon-Gimcheon (Gumi)-East Daegu-New Gyeongju-Ulsan-Busan. The 
duration of the project, both phase one and two, would be 22 years and 6 months from June 1992 
to December 2014.8) Out of total investment amounting to 12.738 trillion won in the first phase, 45 
percent was funded from state coffers―contribution 35 percent and loan 10 percent―and 55 percent 
from the public corporation’s own financing. The railway’s maximum speed was planned to be 300㎞
/h and daily passenger capacity up to 520,000 passengers per day. The total number of vehicles was 
planned to be 46 including 12 manufactured overseas and 34 manufactured in Korea. Vehicle storage 
bases were supposed to be located in Gangmae-dong, Goyang-si and Danggam-dong, Busanjin-gu.
With the opening of the Seoul-East Daegu section (248.0㎞) in April 2004, it took two hours and 
forty minutes for the Seoul-Busan section (417.5㎞). After, the completion of the East Daegu-Busan 
section (127.2㎞) on November 1st, 2010, travel time between Seoul and Busan was reduced to two 
hours and eighteen minutes. The second phase of the project would require 7.991 trillion won, and 
an additional line will be constructed between downtown Daejeon and Daegu by 2014.
Table2-2-2  Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway’s Project Content by Phase
Classification Phase 1 Phase 2
Project 
Section
Construction of the Seoul-Daegu section,Electrification of 
downtown Daejeon and Daegu and the existing Daegu-
Busan section
Construction of downtown 
Daejeon and Daegu and the 
Daegu-Busan section
Total Cost 12.738 trillion won 7.991 trillion won
Project 
Duration
1992-2004 2002-2014
Source : “About Phase Two of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project.“ Korea Rail Network Authority, Web
8)  The East Daegu-Busan Section of the second phase was opened on November 1st, 2010. The new section (40.9㎞) in downtown Daejeon and 
Daegu is scheduled to open in 2014.
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4) Project Agency
In 1989, the High-speed Railway Planning Office was established under the Korea Railroad and was 
expanded into the High-Speed Railway Project Planning Group in 1991. In 1992, the project began in 
earnest with the launch of the Korea High-Speed Railway Construction Corporation. In 1996, the High-
Speed Railway Construction Planning Group under the Ministry of Construction and Transportation 
led the project, and the Korea Rail Network Authority (KRNA) has been promoting the construction 
projects for the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway and the Honam High-Speed Railway since 2004.
5) Project Progress
It took 36 years to complete the entire section from the time when the need for the Gyeongbu 
High-Speed Railway Construction Project was first raised in 1974. The following table summarizes the 
detailed progress of the project.
Table2-2-3  Progress of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project
Date Content
June 1974
 Under the request of the IBRD, a French and Japanese Investigation Group proposed the 
construction of a new railway in the Gyeongbu axis
June 1981 Reflected in the Fifth Five-year Plans of South Korea (1982-1986)
November 1984
 Feasibility study on the long-term transportation investment and high-speed railway 
construction in the Gyeongbu axis
May 1989 Decision on the direction for constructing the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway 
December 1989 Establishment of High-Speed Railway Planning Office under the Korea Railway
June 1990 Final decision on the project plans and routes
February 1991
 Expansion of the High-Speed Railway Planning Office into the High-Speed Railway Project 
Planning Group
March 1992
 Establishment of the Korea High-Speed Railway Construction Corporation. Dissolution of the 
High-Speed Railway Project Planning Group
June 1992 Construction of 4 zones in the pilot section (Cheonan-Daejeon)
August 1993 Selection of the priority negotiator for the railway vehicle (France’s Alstom)
November 1996
 Establishment of the High-Speed Railway Construction Planning Group under the Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation
December 1996 Enactment and proclamation of the High-Speed Railroad Construction Promotion Act
July 1999 Designation of the official name of the high-speed railway system (KTX)
November 2000 Completion of the pilot section (57.2㎞). Test speed : 300㎞
April 2004 Opening of phase 1 of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway
August 2004 Temporary suspension of the Mt. Cheonseong section (Wonhyo Tunnel) construction
October 2010 Completion of phase 2 of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway
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3. Arguments and Grounds of Proponents and Opponents
1) Issues and Logic of Proponents and Opponents
The Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project experienced various types of conflicts 
from the planning stage. The conflicts were categorized into balanced regional development (equity), 
safety, technology level and dependency (technological feasibility), investment efficiency (economic 
feasibility), environment and cultural asset (environmental feasibility) issues, and other matters. The 
arguments and grounds of the proponents and opponents are as follows.
(1) Balanced Regional Development (Equity)
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway argued that industrial development in 
the country was concentrated in the Gyeongbu axis because of biased development of SOCs 
such as railways, roads and harbors there. They claimed that, if the high-speed railway was 
built along the axis, then Korea would be unable to avoid the vicious cycle of overpopulation, 
over-concentration of industries, and environmental damages. Moreover, the Gyeongbu high-
speed railway would bring an over-concentration of population and industries in the Seoul 
and Busan metropolitan area, choking off the nation’s main artery. The opponents stressed 
that constructing the Gyeongbu high-speed railway, in a situation where other regions were 
experiencing an absolute shortage of SOCs, would not only accelerate regional imbalance 
but also make the national economy too dependent on the Seoul metropolitan area and 
the southeastern area. In addition, they pointed out that the opening of high speed raliway 
would weaken the power of areas in between those two metropolitan areas, just as Japan’s 
Shinkansen further strengthened the role of Tokyo and Osaka regions.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The proponents who supported the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway argued that the project 
would invigorate the local economy by accelerating the dispersion of population and the 
relocation of firms, which in result would contribute to the nation’s balanced development. 
The proponents explained that, in the case of Japan, population of small-and-medium-
sized cities, where the Shinkansen Line passes through, increased more than ten percent 
and the establishment of companies increased more than 30 percent, whereas other cities 
only experienced five to twenty percent increases. They further suggested that high-speed 
rail would reduce information gap between regions, as information can spread out from the 
metropolitan areas to other areas through people-to-people exchanges using the high-speed 
rail. They also emphasized that the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway could contribute to the 
revitalization of leisure and tourist industries with the increased number of people visiting 
tourist sites along the Gyeongbu Line.
(2) Safety, Technology, and Dependency Issues
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 At the time, the opponents’ main argument was that, once a high-speed railway was built, 
it would be difficult to make changes, even with the arrival of a new technology. While 
criticizing the exclusion of the magnetic levitation (maglev) propulsion train option, the next 
generation technology, for the reasons of Korea’s technology level and safety during the 
policy-making process, the opponents claimed that wheel-type trains would become junks 
by the time of the project’s completion. They also added that the government did not take 
Korean companies’ level of technology into account because it was solely concerned about 
the speed. In result, the project would be primarily led by foreign companies, in disfavor of 
Korean companies. Further claims were made that a construction method, which undermines 
the participation of Korean engineering teams, could make Korea dependent on foreign 
technologies, and as a result, Korea’s machinery industry would lose growth opportunities.
 Concerns for safety continued to linger even during construction. In fact, the Gyeongbu High-
Speed Railway in Cheonan-Daejeon pilot section, and the Seoul-Cheonan section was found 
to have been poorly constructed according to the safety inspections conducted in 1997 by 
Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates (WJE), an American company. Even though the strength 
of concrete, which is the most important factor in construction, did not have any major 
problems, safety problems were found in some parts of construction that required high-level 
technical skills. 9)
 There were conflicts on safety measures regarding the construction. Claims were made that 
the Mt. Cheonseong region is an active fault area which the tunnel has a high possibility of 
collapse not only during construction, but also even after construction due to regular and 
continuous vibration that occurs in the process of train operation. The opponents argued that 
it was problematic to carry out the tunnel construction rather than to seek alternative routes, 
given other instances in which routes have been changed due to the risks of the tunnel’s 
collapse. Valleys and wetlands were argued to be destroyed if tunnel construction triggered 
underground water leaks through the fault zones.
9) Yeonhap News. April 16th, 1997
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 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The proponents stressed that the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway would have a great 
ripple effect throughout Korea’s technologies and industries, such as technology transfer, 
technology development, and advancement of existing technologies, because it would 
be a comprehensive system that includes cutting edge technologies like civil engineering, 
machinery, electricity, and electronics. The proponents expected that, through the high-speed 
railway system technology, there could be improvements in comprehensive design capability 
of public and mass transit, such as railway, subway, and light rail.
 In regard to safety issues of the tunnel construction, the proponents confirmed that there was 
neither displacement continuously occurring nor active fault zone displaced recently in the 
construction section. They explained there was not an instance where routes were changed 
due to risks of the tunnel collapse. The Sangri Tunnel section, of which route was altered in 
November 1996, was due to concerns over the roadbed’s safety caused by cavitation　after 
a mine abandoning. According to a geological survey and a detailed survey on changes in 
natural environment, which were conducted during designing the original and alternative 
construction plan for the Mt. Cheongseong Tunnel, the region’s bedrocks were found to be 
solid, strong, and deeply distributed from the surface with excellent water tightness. The 
proponents further argued that there was not the remotest possibility of underground water 
leakage through the fault zone, since the Mt. Cheongseong Tunnel runs parallel to the middle 
section between the Yangsan and Dongrae fault zones, unlike the opponents’ argument that 
the tunnel traverses across.
(3) Investment Efficiency Issues (Economic Feasibility)
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents also brought up problems related to the project’s investment priority and 
efficiency. At the time, the amount of required investment of SOCs for the next ten years for 
the whole country was estimated to be 69 trillion won, but only 36 trillion won was available. 
Accordingly, the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) officially proposed to reexamine some 
of the construction projects, such as the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway and the Seohaean 
Expressway projects. At the same time, some argued that more time for reexamination was 
needed to determine which projects were more economical in terms of investment efficiency, 
since the number of cars would continuously increase regardless of high-speed railway. Thus 
the FKI recommended that funds be diverted to large-scale road construction projects with 
immediate results instead of high-speed rail. The opponents also pointed out that, compared 
to other countries, high-speed railway projects in Korea had low cost efficiency due to 
mountainous areas and deep valleys that would drive up construction costs.
 Assuming the expected opening date of the project, the uncertain payability of passenger 
service was also subject to criticism. Railway’s payability depends on how far it reaches and 
how much it carries. Thus, even if taking the growth of national income into consideration, the 
opponents came to a conclusion that there would be insufficient demand for high-speed rail 
to operate in the economic scale, given the structure of Korea’s traffic network and the spatial 
structure. Although it was claimed that the direct and indirect economic effects obtained from 
the reduced traffic congestion of the Gyeongbu axis would be huge, the opponents pointed 
out that there was no reference to the superiority of high-speed rail in comparison with other 
modes. In relation to securing funds, the opponents argued that the cost of the Gyeongbu 
High-speed Railway construction would be astronomical, which, in turn, would place a great 
burden on the nation’s economy.
 Criticism was also laid on the effectiveness of transportation. The opponents argued that 
the high-speed railway’s contribution to solving freight transport problems, which should 
take a top priority for the transportation in the Gyeongbu axis, would only be modest. They 
suggested that it would be more effective to enhance and expand the existing railways, since 
traffic congestion would become worse without a large-scale expansion of road network in 
the Gyeongbu axis. Specific routing suggestions were also made: the Daegu-Miryang-Busan 
route with a branch line would bring the least environmental degradation instead of the route 
detouring to Gyeongju without significant losses to passenger volume and the Gyeongju 
business community.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The proponents expected large economic benefits of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway 
including increased transport capacity, relieved traffic congestion on the Gyeongbu Expressway, 
other economic and social benefits, and reduced traffic accidents. They predicted that the 
Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway would bring about substantial changes in all aspects of life 
including politics, economy, society, and culture, because travel time between Seoul and Busan 
would be shortened to two hours, enabling citizens to travel the country in half a day. With 
the completion of the second phase of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway, the proponents 
expected that Daegu-Busan line’s passenger-carrying capacity would increase by four times 
and the existing Gyeongbu Line’s container transport capacity by eight times, since the high-
speed railway would be designated for passengers and the existing Gyeongbu railway would 
mainly carry freight. For example, the number of passengers was predicted to increase from 
180,000 to 620,000 per day and the number of containers from 390,000 to three million per 
year. The conversion of passengers from car to high-speed rail would relieve traffic congestion 
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on highways. As a consequence, an estimated 1.85 trillion won worth of economic and social 
benefits would be obtained from reduced time and operation costs, as of 2005.
 It was also pointed out that, although the construction cost of high-speed rail is about twice 
more expensive than four-lane highways or conventional double-track railroads, high-speed 
rail has two or three times of efficiency than highways or double-track railroads in terms of 
unit construction cost and per hour transportation. With its huge energy-saving effects,10) 
high-speed rail was expected to contribute to environmental protection due to reduced 
emission of air contaminants, such as CO₂. Furthermore, high-speed railway is highly efficient 
in terms of land use since it requires only 29 percent of a four-lane highway per unit transport 
capacity. Together with safety and punctuality, high-speed rail was considered to be the best 
alternative in comparison with other means of transportation.
Table2-2-4  Transport Efficiency Comparison of High-Speed Rail and Expressway
Classification
High-Speed 
Railway (A)
Expressway 
(B)
Double-Track 
Railroad (C)
A/B A/C
Construction Cost
(100 million won/㎞)
382 262 250 1.46 1.53
Transport Capacity
(10,000 persons/day)
52 25 27.5 2.08 1.89
Travel Time
(Time: min)
1:56 5:20 3:50 △ 2.70 △ 1.98
Transport Efficiency
(based on expressways)
3.93 1.00 1.60 - -
Annotation :  Vehicle expense excluded from construction cost ;  
Transport Efficiency = Transport Capacity/(Travel Time×Construction Cost)
 With respect to the issue of routing, the proponents were reminded that the decision for the 
current route via Gyeongju was based on various technical surveys over a period of about 
three years from July 1989 to February 1991. The survey results suggested that although the 
Daegu-Miryang-Busan route shortened travel time by seven minutes due to a shorter distance 
by 30㎞ when compared to the Daegu-Gyeongju-Busan route, its economic feasibility would 
fall short of the latter because of lesser areas to benefit from high-speed rail. Moreover, route 
changes into Miryang or others would suffer from serious consequences arising from not only 
civil petitions of the residents in Gyeongju and Ulsan region, but also regional confrontations 
between the North and South Gyeongsang Provinces.
10) TGV and Shinkansen have energy consumption rate per passenger and per kilometer only 19 to 24 percent of cars or airplanes.
 Furthermore, when a new route were to be considered or selected, the construction period 
would be delayed by seven years and the high-speed railway would be open in 2016. If then, 
an estimated 18.2 trillion won worth of economic and social benefits would be lost due to 
increased travel time and operation costs. More specifically, if the railway were to be only 
operated with the existing line from 2010 to 2016, about 24-million passenger demand 
would not be met, and the operating revenue for the seven years, which was estimated to be 
about 3.8 trillion won, would evaporate. In particular, if the Busan New Port opened in 2011, 
it would become difficult to handle 14 million TEU of cargo volume due to the lack of logistics 
infrastructure. Concerns were also expressed regarding the incurrence of penalty for breach of 
contract and sunk cost, which waspredicted to be around 130 billion won.
 As for the new Daegu-Busan Line, it was concluded that, with a newly-constructed Gyeongju 
Station, user preference for high-speed rail would increase and, in result, raise the number of 
passengers by 1.4 times from 200,000 to 280,000 per day. Consequently, an additional annual 
revenue of 800 billion won from passenger ridership would be secured and thus improve 
operating balance. Considering the possible increase of cargo volume of the Busan New Port 
and nearby industrial complexes, passenger transport and cargo volume were expected to 
increase by 3.6 and 4.3 percent per annum, respectively. And thus the conclusion was made that 
it was an absolute necessity to build a new Daegu-Busan high-speed rail to meet the demand.
(4) Environment and Cultural Asset Issues (Environmental Feasibility)
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 Starting in July 2002, Monk Ji-yool, then an affiliated member of the Naewon Temple, and 
environmental and civic organizations including Environmental Preservation Countermeasure 
Committee for Mt. Cheonseong, Buddhist Environmental Solidarity, and “Korean Salamanders 
and Friends” began holding protests against the Mt. Cheonseong Tunnel construction, 
arguing that the construction would cause damage to the whole alpine wetland area’s 
natural ecology and disturbance to ascetic practices of the temple. The protest began with 
50 Buddhist nuns of the Naewon Temple making a “three steps and one bow” walk, which 
spread into an all-night sit-in hunger strike of environmental organizations and monks. As a 
result, political circles, including the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party, promised 
to review the Mt. Cheonseong tunnel construction as a presidential election pledge at the 
end of 2002. The government, hence, put the construction on hold, reviewed the route from 
March to September 2003, reached a conclusion which confirmed that the suggested route 
was the most adequate option, and resumed the construction. Regarding the Gyeongju 
section that passes through the city, the opponents went against it on the grounds of damage 
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to cultural assets, which led to alterations of the section route later on.
 As for the legitimacy of environmental impact assessment, the opponents raised questions 
about not conducting the environmental impact reassessment or carrying out renegotiation 
procedures even though the construction did not begin within seven years after receiving the 
environmental impact assessment in November 1994. They argued that there was a need 
for reassessment, since unforeseen problems, such as designating a Natural Ecology Special 
Protection Area and Wetland Conservation Area or the discovery of new fault zones, arose 
after consultations for the environmental impact assessment were made. Questions were 
raised about the credibility of the environmental impact assessment, which was conducted in 
November 1994, based on the fact that it lacked descriptions on more than 30 endangered 
animals and species, and 22 wetlands.
 In regard to the contamination and depletion of underground water, the Green Korea United’s 
2003 survey results showed that the whole area of Jangjae-ri in Baebang-myeon, Asan, 
South Chungcheong Province, where the Cheonan-Asan Station was built, appeared to have 
suffered the most. Groundwater was also found to be depleted in Jangjae-ri 2-gu, Mungok-ri 
in Buyong-myeon, Cheongwon-gun, North Chungcheong Province, where the Biryong Tunnel 
passes through, and Iljik-dong and Soha-dong in Gwangmyeong, Gyeonggi Province, where 
the Gwangmyeong Tunnel and the Iljik Tunnel were built.11) Also in 2006, residents of Junam-
ri in Ungsang-eup, Yangsan, South Gyeongsang Province, filed a civil complaint, saying that 
the amount of underground water decreased at the Wonhyo Tunnel construction site, Mt. 
Cheongseong section.
 Conflicts surrounding noise occurred frequently. The residents of Seondugu-dong in 
Geumjeong-gu, Busan, raised voices that they were suffering from train noise ever since 
the opening of the high-speed railway’s second phase section, urging for countermeasures. 
According to the residents, they were suffering from unbearable noise because high-speed 
trains passed by the town 74 times both ways on average per day. Furthermore, the residents 
of Taegi-ri and Bangokha-ri in Eonyang-eup, Ulju-gun reported that they were also suffering 
from terrible noise incurred by 46 high-speed trains passing by a day.
 The protection of cultural assets was another source of conflicts. The opponents argued that 
the section that runs underground of the Mitaam Temple, which is registered as a traditional 
Buddhist temple, went against the traditional temple compound’s approval procedure under 
the Act, since it did not get the approval of the temple’s representative and the Minister 
of Culture and Tourism. As for the problems related to the disruption of the temple’s 
ascetic practice environment, the opponents claimed that if the tunneling work were to be 
11) Hankyoreh Shinmun. September 2nd, 2003.
proceeded, the landscape, and the peaceful and pleasant environment of the temple would 
suffer  great damage.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 With regards to the legitimacy of environmental impact assessment, the proponents defended 
that there was no need to reconsider or carry out the evaluation again because there were no 
particular changes such as route alteration. They also explained that additional detailed surveys 
were conducted on the changes in natural environment before the construction began. Since 
the environmental impact assessment for the high-speed railway construction project was 
specifically conducted on sections that were expected to have direct damages, the proponents 
pointed out that there was a distinction between the impact assessment and the survey on 
the entire region of Mt. Cheonseong proposed by Monk Ji-yool.
 As for the potential damages to wetlands and surrounding ecosystem, the proponents added 
that the tunnel line that would pass through Mt. Cheonseong was not a subject of negotiation 
because it would not directly pass through the Mujechi Wetland or Hwaeom Wetland.
 Regarding the complaints of Junam Village residents about the underground water depletion, 
Yeongnam Regional Headquarters of KRNA explained, “the residents’ claims about the 
underground water depletion has no credibility, since it is currently a low-water season and 
the stream is an intermittent spring.”
 On the issue of noise, KRNA argued that the equivalent sound level, which quantifies the 
noise environment as an average value of sound level for an hour, fell short of the Noise and 
Vibration Control Act’s standard level with a day average sound level at 70 decibels and a 
night average sound level at 60 decibels. “In some areas of Seondugu-dong, the background 
noise was measured to be higher than the train’s lowest level of noise due to the noise created 
by cars that pass through the national highway,” said a KRNA official. “However, it is difficult 
to come up with countermeasures, such as building soundproof walls, as of now, because the 
train’s sound level does not exceed the legal standard level.”12) the official added. In response 
to the problems related to Ulju-gun, the official said, “Recently, the noise level was measured 
by an external agency and I was informed that the noise level was lower than the standard 
level of 63 decibels. However, KRNA will come up with adequate measures based on accurate 
research findings since the noise level complained by the residents is too high.”13)
 In reference to the claims that the construction violated the Preservation of Traditional 
Buddhist Temples Act, KRNA argued that the construction did not intrude into the precincts 
of the traditional temple because the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway’s route lay away from 
12) The Busan Ilbo. December 3rd, 2010
13) The Segye Times. November 28th, 2010
60
| Chapter 02 |  Review of Conflict Cases of Major SOC Projects
61
2. Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project
the Mitaam Temple by 405 meters of vertical distance and 250 meters of horizontal distance. 
As for the invasion of the temple’s ascetic practice environment, cutting-edge construction 
methods were applied in designing the tunnel, and the expected vibration level was measured 
to be 0.027 centimeters per second when blasting the tunnel and 0.0011 centimeters per 
second when operating the train. Since the vibration levels were far lower than the vibration 
standard level of 0.2 centimeters per second, which was applied to all sections of cultural 
assets, it was concluded that the ecosystem and important structures would not be affected 
by noise and vibration.
(5) Other Issues
 • Conflicts Over Hosting Stations
 High-speed railway stations have great economic and social effects on surrounding regions, 
but they cannot be established as much as regular railway stations can be in terms of 
efficiency. As a result, there was an acute competition between local governments for hosting 
a station to their localities, which inevitably led to conflicts. Such conflicts occurred not only 
during the planning stage, but also during operation. On October 6th, 2010, around the 
time of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway second phase’s opening, the Ministry of Land, 
Transport, and Maritime Affairs (MOLTA) announced that the KTX train would make a stop 
at Yeongdeungpo Station. Against this announcement, Gwangmyeong City, along with six 
neighboring cities including Gwacheon, Gunpo, Siheung, Ansan, and Uiwang, formed a 
civil committee. The committee visited the Korea Railroad Corporation to protest, held sit-
in demonstrations, and filed petitions to the Korean Presidential Office, National Assembly, 
MOLTA, and Korea Railroad Corporation. After the announcement, the Ministry visited 
Gwangmyeong city to discuss ways to vitalize the Gwangmyeong Station. During the visit, 
the Ministry declared that KTX train would only make two stops a day at Yeongdeungpo 
Station and that such plan would go unchanged until 2014. The Ministry added that it would 
renegotiate the plan after the opening of Honam High-Speed Railway. Gwangmyeong city, 
however, did not trust the Ministry. In addition, the response of Yeongdeungpo-gu residents 
was mixed with some welcoming the idea, while others expressing disapproval.
 • Conflicts Over Station Names
 There were disputes about naming of stations. Local governments competed with each other 
over the naming because adding a name of a railway station to maps and road signs could 
raise the visibility of the locality and thus a large promotional effect. Conflicts erupted when 
deciding station names especially for Osong, Gimcheon (Gumi), New Gyeongju, and Ulsan 
Stations. The residents did not hesitate to act as a group to maintain pride for their cities, but 
the Korea Railroad (KORAIL) decided on the name of the stations by forming the Station Naming 
Review Committee, in which civic groups, local lawmakers, and professors participated. There 
were even cases where station names were decided only three months prior to the stations’ 
opening due to the collision of interests between different localities. As for Gimcheon (Gumi) 
Station, Gimcheon city has been in conflict with Gumi city over the course of seven years, 
but both cities could not reach an agreement. Gimcheon demanded the station to be named 
after Gimcheon, whereas Gumi wanted to name it as Gimcheon-Gumi Station. Cheongju City 
and Cheongwon-gun stood against each other as well; Cheongju demanded the name to 
be Cheongju-Osong Station in consideration of Cheongju and Cheongwon’s administrative 
district integration, whereas Cheongwon demanded the name to be Osong Station since the 
station is located at Osong-ri, Cheongwon-gun. Cheongju eventually gave in to Cheongwon. 
Ulsan (Tongdosa) Station was also in disputes because Christian groups resented the fact that 
the Buddhist temple name of Tongdosa was inserted in the station name.
2) Persuasion Strategy
The government applied various persuasion strategies in order to ease tensions regarding the 
Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project. Such strategies were categorized into scientific 
method, formation of consultative group, nationwide public relations, and lawsuit and settlement.
(1) Scientific Method
In regard to the problems over faulty works, KRNA conducted a detailed safety inspection with WJE 
on 148 locations, notified the inspection results and repairing methods to the construction company, 
and monitored the repair work. Moreover, KRNA organized a special task force to prevent all types of 
failures that were pointed out in the inspection results. As for the sleepers, for which the repair work 
had in fact been completed, KRNA conducted a verification test to check the safety and conducted 
another detailed inspection to reaffirm the safety.
Regarding environmental problems, the government requested the Korea Society of Geological 
Engineering to conduct a detailed survey on changes in natural environment from June 2002 to 
December 2003 before the actual construction began. This was necessary because some of the 
animals and plants were listed as protected species, and some of the wetlands were designated 
as “wetlands protection area” after an environmental impact assessment. In response to potential 
damages to the wetlands and the ecosystem, an environmental conservation monitoring was 
outsourced. The objective was to estimate the impact of the tunneling work on wetlands and valleys, 
to resolve conflicts with environmental organizations, and to construct objective data. According to 
the results, the tunneling work did not have an impact on the wetland’s ecosystem. However, as a 
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means to prepare for all eventualities, an automatic underground water level measuring system was 
installed in the course of construction to automatically monitor changes in underground water level.
In reference to the problems related to the disruption of the temple’s ascetic practice environment, 
a detailed inspection was conducted and it confirmed that the tunneling work was not causing any 
problems. Inspection results suggested that the Naewon Temple did not suffer any damages from 
noise and vibration since the high-speed railway tunnel’s construction section was horizontally located 
2,260 meters away from the Naewon Temple. The vibration level that reaches the hermitage was 
measured to be 0.027 centimeters per second when blasting the tunnel and 0.0011 centimeters per 
second when operating the train because the construction section’s vertical and horizontal distances 
from the Mitaam was 405 meters and 250 meters, respectively. The measured vibration levels only 
accounted for 0.5 to 13 percent of the cultural assets’ vibration standards, and it was explained that 
civil complaints were not raised even during construction in regard to noise and vibration damage.
(2) Formation of Consultative Group
As for the conflicts over Mt. Cheonseong and Mt. Geumjeong, the government exerted efforts 
to earn public trust on a joint inspection through a fair and transparent inspection. It formed and 
operated a route review committee in 2003 to reconsider the Mt. Cheonseong Tunnel route so as to 
resolve conflicts through dialogue and participation, and finally decided on the original route at the 
National Affairs Coordination Meeting in September 2003. Furthermore, the government agreed to 
conduct a joint environmental impact assessment with Monk Ji-yool and her associates in February 
2005 in order to settle the origin of conflicts. In result, a joint environmental impact assessment team 
was formed in 2005 and concluded the joint assessment in November 2005.
Each local government also came up with plans to address problems through consultative groups. 
Daejeon operated the “Private-Public Joint Cooperation! 25-Hours Civic Administration Task Force 
Team”, which was composed of resident and citizen representatives, environment experts, urban and 
construction specialists, Daejeon Metropolitan City, and KRNA officials, to settle civil complaints in real 
time regarding the high-speed rail section passing through downtown Daejeon. Daegu also formed 
a High-Speed Railway Planning Group as a consultation channel with the government, which helped 
promote the efficiency of government funding, build or improve 16㎞ of service road, 17㎞ of green 
buffer zone, 20㎞ of soundproof walls, construct or improve 13 multi-level crossing facilities, repair 
and develop railways’ vicinities, and prepare data on how to minimize damages for local residents. 
Busan was also added to the list in coming up with measures; it formed a private-public consultative 
group to discuss problems related to Mt. Geumjeong section of the project.
(3) Nationwide Public Relations
Beginning in 1992, the government produced report materials and visual images, published 
promotional brochures, established public information centers, ran a promotional website, and held 
symposiums and discussion forums to collect opinions extensively from experts at home and abroad 
for the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway. Moreover, the KRNA promoted the high-speed railway 
by frequently providing information to journalists from broadcasting companies and newspaper 
companies (27 companies, 55 journalists), and daily newspaper’s cultural and sports section reporters 
(19 companies, 20 reporters).
Table2-2-5  Cases of High-speed Railway Promotion Programs
Target Program
Press
 Distribute report materials about high-speed railway‘s opening, hold press interviews, 
press conferences, and journalist meetings to promote high-speed railway’s merits
Customers  Raise awareness of the high-speed railway by holding special events for customers
Local Residents
 Hold various activities to resolve conflicts over the level of noise pollution that is causing 
harm to residents residing near railways and stations, promote high-speed railway‘s 
contribution to the development of local communities and tourists
Employees
 Publish company newsletters, play in-house broadcasting, provide in-house training, and 
collect diverse opinions
Information 
Agencies
Carry out lobbying activities, manage public opinion
Public Organizations 
and others
 Arrange programs that promote effective communication with social and environmental 
organizations, banks, teachers, students, and agencies
Source :  Ministry of Construction and Transportation, “A Study on the Establishment of General Plan for Designing the Intermodal 
Transportation System for the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway.” 2003.
The government made efforts to broadcast expected changes in citizens’ life in the high-speed 
rail era through television drama by actively utilizing media outlets, such as broadcasting programs, 
and encouraging special media coverage on the subject. Moreover, the government continuously 
promoted high-speed railway trial ride events, produced souvenirs, and distributed them as a means 
of direct nationwide promotion. The high-speed railway’s website went through a complete overhaul 
for strengthened promotion, and banner ads were posted on the Internet.
However, the government was unable to come up with a systematic promotion strategy when 
carrying out the second phase of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Project. Instead, when important 
political events came up, it made various promotional pamphlets to distribute to related agencies 
including community administration centers in a bid to persuade the public. In particular, the government 
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emphasized the economic feasibility of the railway line’s second phase, but when it encountered 
opposition from civic and religious groups, it shifted its focus to environmental soundness and safety. 
In April 2003, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation and KRNA published the “Response 
Letter to Publicly Written Questions from the Opposing Committee of Civic and Religious Groups 
against the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project: Mt. Geumjeong and Mt. Cheonseong 
Passageways,” in which not only the economic feasibility of the project but also the environmental 
soundness, safety, future orientedness, and participatory principles were equally emphasized. On January 
7th, 2004, after the establishment of KRNA, the government shifted its promotion strategy towards a 
direction which emphasized the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway’s environmental compatibility, and it 
continued to hold its accommodating stance of listening to the opinions of environmental organizations. 
By that time, promotion strategies regarding the soundness of wetlands were conducted meticulously.
(4) Lawsuits and Settlements
Since the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway route was revealed to the public in 1994, the Beomeo 
Temple and environmental organizations had constantly held rallies and filed civil complaints and 
lawsuits against the government for about ten years. The Beomeo Temple and the Busan Metropolitan 
City continuously demanded underground construction of the Geumjeong Tunnel section on the 
grounds that the high-speed rail, if constructed on the surface, would destroy the landscape and cause 
noise and vibration. The Ministry of Construction and Transportation was not in a position to accept such 
demands at the time. However, considering the Beomeo Temple’s considerable status in the Buddhist 
community, the government changed the design by extending one kilometer of the Geumjeong Tunnel 
section, including the underground construction of a 320 meter-long bridge section of the Beomeo 
Temple, with an additional construction cost of 23 billion won.14) In October 2003, Monk Ji-yool, who 
staged a hunger strike, applied for a provisional injunction on behalf of the “Korean Salamanders and 
Friends”, but the case was dismissed by the court. After about four years of wrangling, the conclusion 
was made that the construction had no relationship with the destruction of ecosystem.
With regard to the noise issue, the Environmental Dispute Mediation Committee under the Ministry 
of Environment ordered the developer called “D” company, KORAIL, and KRNA to compensate 77 
million won for causing noise damage to 526 residents of the “S” apartment complex in Dong-
gu, Daegu. Apart from compensation for noise damage, the committee also ordered related railway 
companies to prepare soundproof measures so as to bring the noise level down to under 65 decibels, 
the standard level for railway noise. As for the conflict over whether to build the high-speed railway 
line that passes through the downtown Daejeon aboveground or underground, Daejeon city finally 
agreed in May 2004, after almost 14 years of disputes to build the railway aboveground, under the 
14) The Busan Ilbo. July 26th, 2005.
condition that the improvement of poor living conditions around the railway would be accomplished 
as part of the construction project.15) The committee further ordered the construction company to 
compensate 100 million won for causing death of pigs that were being raised in the pig farm nearby 
the construction site in Gyeongsan, North Gyeongsang Province.16)
4. Economic and Social Costs From Conflicts 
The Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Second Phase construction for Mt. Cheonseong and Mt. 
Geumjeong was halted twice for 189 days as agreed with Monk Ji-yool. However, construction for 
the cut-and-cover tunnel and the bridge, and engineering works continued during the construction 
suspension period. The project was completed and opened as scheduled thanks to measures to 
shorten the delayed construction such as the deployment of additional workforce. In result, there were 
no additional costs due to the delay. The construction company that built the Wonhyo Tunnel at the 
time estimated the direct losses to be about 14.5 billion won. However, according to the Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation and the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s 2005 report, 
the actual economic and social losses were approximately 2.5 trillion won when the construction got 
suspended for about a year.
5.  Verification and Evaluation of Proponents’ and Opponents’ Arguments
1) Aspects of Balanced Regional Development
After the opening of the KTX Line, exchanges between Seoul and other regions increased, but 
population concentration in the metropolitan area did not occur. The same goes for the Shinkansen 
in Japan, and it was analyzed that the temporary straw effect in the beginning of the high-speed 
railway’s opening would be offset by regional development in the long term. The station area is 
currently undergoing development, which is expected to translate into the development of center 
and subcenter of cities, revitalizing land use of the entire region. The development of Cheonan-Asan 
Station and Gwangmyeong Station areas is in full swing, and the station area development plan is 
being promoted in most of the cities which house a station. High-speed railway station areas are 
15)  If environment improvement projects like building ten meters of road and green buffer zone, along with soundproof wall installation in the 6.5-
kilometer section between Panam-dong IC in Dong-gu and Ojeong-dong in Daedeok-gu were to be proceeded, the estimated budget would 
be about 600 billion won. Thus, if the cost for aboveground construction were to be added, 1.5 trillion won would be sufficient, which was sub-
stantially lower than that for the underground construction. Such an agreement was reached, thanks to Dong-gu and Daedeok-gu residents’s 
understanding and willingness to make concessions.
16) YTN. October 31, 2008.
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expected to contribute to balanced national development, spreading the population to provincial 
regions, by functioning as the hub of regional development and the catalyst of regional economy. 
Such phenomenon was previously seen in other countries’ cities adjacent to stations, such as in France 
and Japan. In particular, short-term regional advancement of the tourist industry is being observed.
2) Technological Aspects
Wheel-type trains turned out to be the most adequate for the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway. If 
the maglev propulsion train had been chosen, the opening of the high-speed railway would still be 
impossible. The maglev propulsion train, which is currently undergoing tests in Germany and Japan, is 
yet to be considered as a reliable technology by industrial and academic circles. It still needs verification 
tests due to its uncertain economic feasibility.17) In terms of transport capacity, the wheel-type train 
has more merits compared to the maglev propulsion train. So far, even the largest of its kind, the TR-
06, can only accommodate 192 passengers maximum per two coaches, whereas the wheel-type can 
accommodate 800 to 1,000 passengers per vehicle.
3) Investment Efficiency
The high-speed railway construction at the time was proven to be a future-oriented investment 
rather than an over-investment. After the construction began in 1992, the first and second phase 
of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway was completed in April 2004 and October 2011, respectively, 
leading the green growth era. In retrospect, high-speed railway construction is proven to be a forward 
looking investment, at least 20 years ahead of time. The government is currently pushing forward 
a strategy that transforms the national transport system to be centered on the high-speed railway. 
Furthermore, the high-speed rail is proven to be effective in improving the industrial competitiveness 
of Korea by making inroads into foreign markets through accumulated technologies. Engineering and 
construction projects over long time made it possible to create demand through new construction 
methods and upgraded management capacity, which, in turn, strengthened national competitiveness.
4) Environment
The environment monitoring results indicated that the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway construction 
did not cause water level fluctuation. Moreover, changes in water levels and flows for the Mujechi 
Wetland and the Big Daeseong Wetland were found to be highly correlated with seasonal changes 
and the amount of precipitation. The results showed that the construction did not cause noise or 
vibration damages because the construction site’s horizontal and vertical distances were measured to 
17)  The maglev propulsion trains became commercialized in China (Pudong Airport-Shanghai section, 30.5㎞) in 2004, but long-distance travelling 
maglev propulsion trains are still undergoing tests in Japan.
be relatively far from the Buddhist temple. Changes in the ecosystem, such as the wetlands near Mt. 
Cheonseong, were not found either. A field survey conducted in 2011 found out that the number of 
Korean salamander eggs has not changed after the construction. On the contrary, it was found out 
that the high-speed railway service has contributed to green growth nationwide, reducing 4.2 million 
tons of greenhouse gas emissions in 2009.
6. Project Implementation Effect
1) The Cornerstone of Balanced National Development
The Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway construction is evaluated to bring the same effect of building 
four Gyeongbu Expressways. It is expected to increase distribution and transport efficiencies by cutting 
down travel time between regions, make the efficient use of national land possible, and accelerate 
balanced regional development. It is also expected to develop underdeveloped areas nearby station 
areas. Taking this into account, a plan to develop station areas as a hub for regional economy is 
underway. Moreover, small-and-medium-sized cities and rural areas near stations would become bases 
for larger living spheres, and easier access to high-speed railways would promote the emergence of 
polycentric metropolitan areas, which are formed around a few key stations. In this newly-formed 
areas, city service function such as manufacturing, distribution, education, and culture would be 
strengthened, and expanded living spheres would increase the interconnectivity with neighboring 
regions. In the polycentric metropolitan areas, central management functions would be reorganized 
around small-and-medium-sized cities including cities with high-speed railway stations and nearby 
industrial, educational, cultural, and commercial cities. As a result, it is expected to decentralize diverse 
economic, social and cultural activities away from the Seoul metropolitan area to other regions.
2) Technology Localization and Export Promotion
Since high-speed railway construction was new to Korea at the time of the first phase construction, 
Korea had to depend on foreign technical staff including that of France’s SYSTRA and INGEROP and 
Germany’s DEC, during the design and construction process in order to resolve technological problems 
arising from long-span bridge and tunnel construction and the structural problems embedded in high-
speed. However, it is not an exaggeration to say that the second-phase construction was completed 
with domestic technology based on accumulated know-hows during the first-phase construction 
period. Based on its experience, Korea was able to achieve the localization of high-speed railway 
technologies and is now exporting the technologies overseas. Thus, contrary to concerns on the 
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dependency on foreign technologies, it did not occur.
The KTX Sancheon, which was solely built with domestic technologies, boasts world’s best on-time 
arrival rate, the rate of trains arriving within five minutes of estimated arrival time, of 97.6 percent 
with a maximum speed of 350㎞ per hour. However, continuous technological development with 
economic considerations is still needed in order to commercialize technologies such as multi-tiered 
train operation, signal system for train interval and train control, and turnouts.
3) Realization of a Nationwide Half-a-day Life Zone
The length of time for business was extended with reduced travel time. High-speed rail enabled 
one-day business trips and cut down business expenses. In particular, the extended departure time of 
the last high-speed train in a day allowed business travelers to have more time to work during business 
trips. Reduced travel time by KTX removed barriers of time and space in Korea, enabling citizens to 
travel the country in half a day. Furthermore, travel time reduction for long-distance travel from Seoul 
to East Daegu and from Seoul to Busan delivered customer satisfaction. Customer preference for KTX 
recorded high, since train tickets were sold out not only during the peak seasons such as the Lunar 
New Year’s and Chuseok holidays, but also during the vacation season and weekends. According to a 
survey, passengers prefer KTX because it is safe, fast, punctual and free of congestion.
The number of daily passengers for KTX increased from 70,000 in 2004 to 102,000 in 2009, an 
annual total of 37.48 million passengers. In 2009, KTX’s passengers and revenue accounted for 32 
percent and 69 percent of the total long-distance travel passengers and revenue, respectively. The 
construction of KTX enhanced cultural exchanges among regions with reduced time and economic 
distances and in result contributed to reducing the cultural gap between Seoul and the rest of the 
country. The expansion of exchanges in cultural, art, and social activities between regions enabled 
by high-speed railway will broaden mutual understanding, and, in turn, contribute to the sense of 
emotional unity.
Table2-2-6  Travel Time Reduction Effect of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway
Section 2003 2004 2010 Reduced Time
Seoul-Busan 4:10 2:40 2:18 1:52
Seoul-Ulsan - 3:46 2:01 1:45
Seoul-East Daegu 3:03 1:35 1:38 1:25
Seoul-Daejeon 1:31 0:49 0:49 0:42
Busan-East Daegu - 1:05 0:39 0:26
Annotation :  Calculation was based on the sections with the fastest travel time. Referenced from KORAIL’s train schedule, released 
reports, and standard for two stations.
Reference
•  Construction Economy Research Institute of Korea. “Calculating Delay Damages in Large-scale 
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3 Incheon International Airport Construction Project
1. Project Outline
Construction 
Duration
Phase 1 : November 1992~March 2001, Phase 2 : November 2002~June 2008
Total Cost 8.6011 trillion won
Project 
Volume(as of 
2010)
· Site Area : 21.292 million ㎡ 
-  Runways : 3 in total (capable of simultaneous take off and landing of jumbo jets such as A380), 
4,000 meter-long runway (1) and 3,750 –meter-long runways (2)
-  Passenger Terminal (496,000㎡), Traffic Center (250,000㎡, stations of Incheon Airport Railroad 
Express and a maglev propulsion train are located on the premise)
- Annual Handling Capacity : 44 million passengers, 4.5 million tons of cargo, 410,000 flights
- Mooring Facilities : 2.437 million ㎡ for passenger flights, 737,000㎡ for cargo flights
-  Free Trade Area (opened in March 2006) : 230,000㎡ of cargo terminal, 990,000 ㎡ of airport 
logistics complex
Incheon 
International Airport
Past
Present
2. Project Background and Purpose
1) Project Background
After the 1980s, economic growth, increased national income, and overseas travel liberalization 
of Korea increased the number of international and domestic passengers by more than 13 and 30 
percent on annual average, respectively, showing the world’s highest growth rate for air transport 
demand. To meet rapidly rising demand, the government added a new runway in the Gimpo 
International Airport in 1987, which was unable to expand further due to noise pollution in nearby 
residential areas, topographical constraints, and increasing passengers and cargo traffic. Thus, the 
government completed the four rounds of feasibility studies in 1990 to select a site to build a new 
airport in the Seoul metropolitan area. Among 22 candidate sites, Yeongjong Island was chosen to 
be the most suitable location. Various factors, such as topographic conditions, weather conditions, 
constraints posed by obstacles, noise, construction costs, and accessibility were integrated in the 
decision making process. The ultimate goal was to not only meet rising international air transport 
demand of the 21st century, but also actively respond to changing nature of air transport demand.
2) Project Purpose
The purpose of Incheon International Airport construction project was to respond to the 
continuously rising air transport demand and maximize the use of Korea’s geopolitical position to 
secure a hub airport in highly competitive Northeast Asia. Incheon Airport construction was a national 
project that aimed to keep abreast with rapidly changing trend of the airport transport industries by 
building a new, around-the-clock, all-weather airport of the future in the Seoul metropolitan area in 
accordance with the global one-day life zone era and to build a cutting-edge hub airport of the future 
in Northeast Asia.
3) Project Content
(1) Airport Construction Project
Incheon Airport construction project was planned to develop a site of 56.1 million square meters 
on reclaimed tideland, located between Yeongjong Island and Yongyu Island in Unseo-dong, Jung-gu, 
Incheon. The construction was designed to proceed in four phases from 1992 to 2020. The first phase 
construction began with a feasibility study and a basic design in 1989, seawall construction in the 
north and south of the site in November 1992, the construction of key airport facilities in June 2000, 
and ended the completion of the first phase construction in December 2000 by injecting 5.632 trillion 
won of total construction costs. Incheon Airport then underwent numerous comprehensive test runs 
and inspections through virtual training that mobilized passengers, cargos, and jets. And the airport 
finally opened on March 29th, 2001.
A total construction cost of 2.9 trillion won was invested in the second phase construction, which 
continued from November 2002 to June 2008. During this period, 8.25 million ㎡ of land underwent 
site construction to build the third runway and expand mooring facilities. The tariff free area of 
990,000㎡ and the international free trade area of 165,000㎡ within the airport zone were developed 
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to attract trading and logistics companies.
Incheon Airport’s initial size during the first phase construction was 11.715 million ㎡ of the site 
and 496,000㎡ of a passenger terminal, but it was changed to 47.428 million ㎡ and 1.146 million 
㎡, respectively. Thus, Incheon Airport’s goal was to be able to handle 34.98 million passengers and 
3.42 million tons of cargo by 2011. The future plan is to transform Incheon Airport into a world-class 
airport that can handle 100 million passengers and 10 million tons of cargo after 2035.
Incheon Airport went into the second phase of construction in earnest in 2002, a year after its 
opening, to satisfy air transport demand in a timely manner, which recorded an annual average 
growth rate of six percent, and to gain an edge for Northeast Asia’s hub airport over competing 
airports in neighboring countries such as China and Japan.
As part of Incheon Airport’s strategy, a 4,000 meter-long runway was built to accommodate 
jumbo jets such as A380 and to prepare for global warming. Moreover, the state-of the-art airport 
infrastructure such as a 88-kilometer express luggage processing system and unmanned automated 
trains that connect passenger terminals with passenger concourses was installed to meet future air 
transport demand.
Table2-3-1  Project Content of Incheon Airport by Phase
Classification
Phase 1 & 2
(1992-2008)
Phase 3
(2009-2017)
Accumulated 
Total
Final Phase
Facility 
Size
Site Area (㎡) 21.292 million 1.105 million 22.397 million 47.428 million
Runway 3 - 3 5
Passenger Terminal (㎡) 496,000 350,000 846,000 1.146 million
Concourse (㎡) 166,000 - 166,000 166,000
Handling 
Capacity 
(per year)
Flight (10,000 times) 41 - 41 74 
Passenger 
(10,000 persons)
4,400 1,800 6,200 10,000
Cargo (10,000 tons) 450 130 580 1000
Source :  Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs. “Notification No. 2009-416 of the Ministry of Land, Transport and 
Maritime Affairs.” 2009. Publicity Material of Incheon International Airport Corporation
(2) Access Transportation Facilities Projects
The Incheon Airport Expressway, the 40.2 kilometer-long New Airport Highway that directly leads 
to Incheon Airport, began its construction in 1995 with private capital, underwent foundation work 
and bridge post construction, and opened on November 21st, 2000 as a six-to-eight lane highway. In 
addition, a total project cost of 3.2956 trillion won was injected into the Airport Railroad construction 
project of a 61-kilometer-long double track railway between Incheon Airport and Seoul with ten 
stations. The 40.3 kilometer-long Gimpo International Airport Station-Incheon Airport section opened 
on March 27th, 2007, whereas the Gimpo International Airport Station-Seoul Station section opened 
in late 2010. Travel time for the entire section takes about 40-minutes.
Meanwhile, the 21.38 kilometer-long Incheon Bridge, which connects Incheon Airport with Songdo 
Island, opened in October 2009 with an investment of 2.468 trillion won, and the bridge enhanced 
the accessibility of Seoul and the southern Gyeonggi Province to Incheon Airport. It is also connected 
with Gyeongin Expressway Two and Three, and Seohaean Expressway, contributing greatly to the 
improvement of traffic and logistics environment of the Seoul metropolitan area.
(3) Current Status of Key Facilities
Take-off and landing is convenient in Incheon Airport since it has the world’s third largest 100.4 
meter-high and 179 square meter-wide control tower, two 3,750 meter-long and 60 meter-wide 
runways, and a 4,000 meter-long runway. All of the runways are equipped with cutting-edge 
facilities to ensure the take-off and landing of jumbo jets. In addition, passenger terminals, traffic 
center, concourse A, and other ancillary buildings have various amenities such as 229 elevators, 231 
escalators, 129 moving walkways, and four cart-carrying facilities, as well as commercial facilities like 
duty free shops, snack corners, and VIP lounges.
4) Project Implementation Agency
Right after Yeongjong Island was designated as the final site in June 1990, the government 
established the New Airport Construction Planning Group under the Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation to carry out tasks related to the general plan of the construction. Then, the project 
kicked off after the New Airport Construction Authority was established in January 1992 under 
the Korea Airport Corporation. However, with increased workload and the need to reinforce the 
organization, the Corporation for New Airport Construction in the Seoul Metropolitan Area was 
established in September 1994. This corporation supervised the new airport construction until the 
Incheon International Airport Corporation (IIAC) was established in February 1999. After its opening in 
2001, the IIAC began recorded profits for the first time in 2004. It continued to achieve surplus for six 
consecutive years and grew into a public corporation that specializes in global airport management.
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5) Project Progress
(1) Planning Process
After Gimpo International Airport was designated as an international airport in January 1958, it 
continued to expand. However, the need for a fundamental measure came to the fore due to the 
rapidly growing air transport demand and the operation of jumbo jets in the late 1960s. In order 
to address such issues, the government conducted the first feasibility study from 1969 to 1970 on 
a new airport in the Seoul metropolitan area with 220,000 dollars of AID loan. Around 1980, the 
government began to review a new international airport construction project in earnest to replace 
the Gimpo International Airport. The government at first considered two different options; an 
expansion of the Gimpo International Airport or construction of a new airport, with the assumption 
that the Gimpo International Airport’s capacity would reach its limit by the mid-1990s. The option to 
expand the Gimpo International Airport was dismissed in the early stages for two reasons: first, it had 
aircraft safety-related issues due to an obstacle―Mt. Gyeyang, 360-meters high―near the airport, 
and, second, it would cause serious noise problem to the nearby residential area of some 100,000 
households. Among the locations that are within the 100-kilometer-radius of the Seoul downtown 
area that can be reached within an hour, the government began to search for a new airport site 
that would not incur noise problem to nearby areas. In June 1989, the Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation conducted a feasibility study to select a new airport site near the Seoul metropolitan 
area. Three to four candidate sites including Yeongjong Island and Sihwa district were selected. After 
extensive reviews, the government finally decided on Yeongjong Island as the new airport site based 
on its high scores on all criteria such as weather conditions, noise level, accessibility, and ease of 
expansion, and made the official announcement in June 1990.
(2) Project Progress
The following is the project’s main progress from the planning to the launch of its construction.
Table2-3-2  Incheon International Airport Construction Project Progress
Classification Project Implementation Content
1989
 The Ministry of Construction and Transportation reported the urgency of a new airport 
development in the Seoul metropolitan area 
June 1989-April 1990 Conducted a feasibility study to select a new airport site
July 1989 Formed the New Airport Promotion Committee
June 1990  Finalized the new airport site selection at the third New Airport Construction Promotion 
Committee
November 1990-
December 1991
Began designing the basic plan
December 1990
 Established the operational rules of New Airport Construction Technical Advisory 
Committee
May 1991 Proclaimed the New Airport Construction Promotion Act
July 1991 
 Requested the Ministry of Environment to write an Environmental Impact Report and seek 
consultation
August 1991 Announced a compensation plan
January 1992 Established the New Airport Construction Headquarters
May 1992
 Public Water Reclamation License acquired by the Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation from Incheon city
 Environmental Impact Assessment Report and consultation completed by the Ministry of 
Environment
Announced the confirmed New Airport Basic Plan
November 1992 Held a ground-breaking ceremony, began site construction
November 1995 Announced the altered New Airport Basic Plan
March 1996 Finalized the name of the new airport (Incheon International Airport)
May 1996 Began passenger terminal construction
December 1996 Began runway construction
April 1997 Began traffic center construction
November 1997 Completed site construction for seven sections
June 1998 Began high-level road construction at passenger terminals 
August 1998 Decided on a policy for the unification of airport construction and management
April 1999 Began field test for comprehensive information and communication system
June 2000 Completed construction for airport basic facilities
July 2000 Began comprehensive test runs
October 2000 Began test operation
March 2001 Opening of Incheon International Airport
76
| Chapter 02 |  Review of Conflict Cases of Major SOC Projects
77
3. Incheon International Airport Construction Project
3. Arguments and Grounds of Proponents and Opponents 
1) Issues and Logic of Proponents and Opponents
(1) Investment Cost Issues
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents of Incheon Airport claimed the feasibility study was not conducted correctly 
and that the Incheon Airport construction project required too much budget. According 
to a feasibility study for the new airport site conducted in April 1990, the expected total 
construction cost was calculated to be 2.3 trillion won, but the actual project plan in 1991 
reported that the cost jumped to 10 trillion won, and the cost for the first phase construction 
alone was calculated at 3.4 trillion won.
 In the basic planning of 1992, while the first phase construction cost remained the same, the 
size of the total project was slashed into half; the number of runways was reduced to one 
from the initial two, the size of the airport terminal site was reduced to 244,200 from 462,000 
square meters, and the construction plan for a double-track railway was excluded. Afterwards, 
the number of runways went back to its original plan to two and the first phase construction 
cost was adjusted again to 5.7 trillion won. Since about 1.3 trillion won was already invested 
into the construction in late 1997, it meant that even though the construction continued 
according to the government’s calculation, at least 4.3 trillion won should be additionally 
injected in order to complete the first phase of the construction. The opponents, however, 
criticized that the country would go into bankruptcy if the government were to be dragged 
into the project, since the expected total construction cost would be more than 30 trillion 
won, not ten trillion won.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The government and proponents argued that the Yeongjong Island Airport Construction Draft 
Plan was a national project to expand the nation’s airport capacity for the 21st century, since 
the Gimpo International Airport had reached its limit due to a rapid increase in air transport 
demand in the 1990s. Although the project requires an immense amount of national budget 
of more than ten trillion won, the government and proponents argued that, in the long run, 
it is not only desired but essential investment for Korea to secure a position of hub airport in 
competition with China and Japan in Northeast Asia.
 Two additional points were made : first, large portion of investment can be secured through 
the inducement of private capital, and second, airport infrastructure investment will generate 
positive direct and indirect financial spill-over effects. In other words, if the new airport begins 
to accommodate Asia-Pacific region’s passenger demand, which accounts for ten percent 
of the world air transport demand, it would bring economic benefits that would more than 
compensate for the entire investment cost by securing the hub airport position in Northeast Asia.
(2) The Issue of New Airport’s Size
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents criticized the excessively large size of the Incheon Airport’s required site area 
of 56.1 million square meters, which was twice the size of Chicago O’hare International 
Airport and five times bigger than London Heathrow Airport and Osaka Kansai International 
Airport. The project cost over ten trillion won was said to be too much due to extra costs for 
reclamation and sea dikes, and thus a lesser size of an airport with the 16.5 million ㎡-site 
would be sufficient to build the world’s largest airport. While criticizing the lack of plans how 
to utilize the excessively vast site of Incheon Airport, the opponents raised strong doubts about 
the government’s plan to build a city with a population of 100,000 on the site considering 
the lack of transportation and water, weak soil foundation, and noise pollution. They further 
pointed out the rarity of success examples in other countries with regard to building a city 
with a population of 100,000 around the airport, which is distant from the mother city.
Table2-3-3  Size of Major International Airports
Classification
Service Frequency 
(10,000 times)
Number of 
Passengers 
(10,000 persons)
Cargo 
(10,000 tons)
Site Area 
(10,000 m2)
· Domestic Airports
- Gimpo International Airport
- Cheongju New Airport
- Yeongjong Island (candidate site)
1,386 46 204 
400 
1,700
· Top 3 Airports in the World
-  Chicago O’ Hare International Airport
-  Hartsfield–Jackson Atlanta 
International Airport
- Los Angeles International Airport 
764,000
751,000
563,000
5,677
4,590
4,440
71
96
860
460
478
· Top 3 Airports in Europe
- London Heathrow Airport
- Paris Orly Airport
- London Gatwick Airport
330,000
184,000
180,000
3,751
2,242
2,086
61
24
19
355
464 
230
· Top 3 Airports in Asia
- Tokyo Haneda Airport
- Osaka International Airport
- Narita International Airport 
168,000
128,000
108,000
3,221
2,012
1,724
13
38
120
143
96
320
Source :  Korea Airports Corporation. “Airports around the Globe.” 1990. 
Noboru Makino. “1990 nendai no Nippon.” Mitsubishi Research Institute Inc. 1990. 
Kim Jeong-uk, Kwon O-hyeok. “The Location of New Airport in Seoul Metropolitan Area.” 1993. 56. 
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 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The government explained that the size of 56.1 million square meters was to be developed 
when the completion of the fourth phase of the new airport construction in 2020. The size of 
the airport with a site area of 19.8 million ㎡ for the second phase construction is explained to 
be similar to that of other competing airports. The government also stated that the third phase 
construction project would be carried out after reviewing the airport’s development potential to 
grow into a hub airport from 2008. It emphasized, however, that the future airport should not 
simply focus on the airport functions, but consider creating high value-added trading centers 
and securing international and industrial business complexes around the airport. In addition, 
the government stressed the necessity of securing spaces, which would allow the government 
to flexibly deal with long-term changes in air transport demand, since it would be impossible 
to have another airport due to a saturated demand within the Seoul metropolitan area.
(3) Issues of New Airport’s Potential as a Hub Airport and Demand
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The government proposed that Incheon Airport should be able to transport 100 million 
passengers annually including transit passengers, since the goal was to build East Asia’s core 
airport for next-generation supersonic air transportation, which flies between continents within 
two to three hours. However, the opponents criticized Incheon Airport because of its size twice 
bigger than the then largest airport in the world, Chicago O’ Hare International Airport.
 Opponents also pointed out the low possibility for Incheon Airport to become the hub airport 
of East Asia, referring to professor Robert Simpson of MIT at the Incheon International Airport 
International Symposium, saying that “a new airport in the Seoul metropolitan area should be 
considered as a destination airport, not a transit airport.” They added that the current trend of 
world’s air transport was not to transfer at a continental core airport, but to directly connect 
the departing airport with the arriving airport. Furthermore, there is no single airport in the 
world with a plan to become the continental hub airport, and the expansion projects of key 
international airports do not indicate any plans to become the continental transfer airport.18) 
The global trend was to build a few international airports, rather than one, in one city for 
various destinations in order to disperse cargo volume and allow convenient access. Therefore, 
quoting these airport experts’ opinion, opponents criticized that the plan to build a continental 
hub airport seemed highly unrealistic.
18)  London has two airports, Heathrow Airport and Gatwick Airport, and Paris has Orly Airport and Charles de Gaulle Airport. New York has three 
airports of relatively similar in size to handle air transport. There are two airports in Tokyo, Haneda Airport and Narita International Airport, and 
in the southern-central region of Japan, the existing Osaka International Airport and the new Kansai International Airport share cargo volumes.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The proponents argued that the trend of direct connection between airports should be backed 
by stable demand for air routes, but such demand was low for airports in Southeast Asia 
or China. Thus, a “Hub and Spoke” strategy of selective concentration still had a successful 
prospect in Northeast Asia. The proponents explained that countries like Japan, China, and Hong 
Kong were building new airports or undergoing expansion of the existing airports to compete 
against each other so as to become hub airports, which was in line with fierce competition 
for hub airports in Europe and America. In this respect, Yeongjong Island’s new airport would 
be more competitive than any other airport in Northeast Asia in terms of airport location and 
capacity and therefore had a high possibility of becoming a hub airport of Northeast Asia.
(4) Problems Related to Site Selection and Accessibility
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents questioned the Incheon Airport’s role as a core airport in Korea due to its 
remote location. Yeongjong Island is located in the northwestern end of Korea with the worst 
nationwide accessibility, where one must go through traffic-congested Seoul and Incheon. 
Incheon is the least accessible city in the country and even difficult to reach within the Seoul 
metropolitan area. Its poor accessibility from Seoul, in turn, would worsen traffic conditions 
in the western part of Seoul. The opponents also argued that Incheon Airport could not have 
any competitive edge over Narita International Airport, since Yeongjong Island’s distance from 
Seoul was 54.5㎞ by highway and 60㎞ by the Airport Railway. Therefore, the opponents 
criticized that even if a new airport expressway was built, it would not guarantee reduction in 
travel time and distance.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The proponents explained that Yeongjong Island was selected after conducting numerous 
feasibility studies on various candidate sites in the Seoul metropolitan area, and argued that 
areas with better accessibility would cost much more with astronomical compensation costs. 
In particular, Sihwa District I, which was a potential contender, had higher noise damage 
level, deeper water level of reclamation area, and worse topographical conditions than those 
of Yeongjong Island. It was also farther from Seoul, 70㎞ away, and compensation expenses 
would be astronomical when building the connecting road since it would pass through old 
sections of cities such as Anyang, Guro, and Ansan. In contrast, Yeongjong Island’s accessibility 
problem, according to the proponents, could be resolved through Incheon Airport Expressway 
and Airport Railway, and the Island was better located in preparation for the inter-Korean 
unification era in the future.
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Table2-3-4  Major International Airports’ Distance to a Nearby Downtown
Major Airports Distance (㎞) Major Airports Distance (㎞) 
Europe
Schiphol, Amsterdam
Main, Frankfurt
Heathrow, London
Charles de Gaulle, Paris
Rome
15
12
24
24
35
Asia
Changi, Singapore
Narita, Tokyo
Haneda, Tokyo
Yeongjong Island 
(candidate site)
20
66
16
54.5
USA
O’ Hare, Chicago
Fort Worth, Dallas
Los Angeles
Kennedy, New York
36
27
24
23
San Francisco, USA
Toronto, Canada
25
29
Source: Kim Jeong-uk, Kwon O-hyeok. “The Location of New Airport in Seoul Metropolitan Area.” Haewoo, 1993. 40.  
(5) Balanced Regional Development Issues
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents, while pointing out the accessibility problem associated with the remote 
location of Yeongjong Island, criticized that it would further increase the concentration of 
key facilities in the Seoul metropolitan area, and thus, pose an obstacle to balanced regional 
development. Moreover, the opponents claimed that the new airport and the Gimpo 
International Airport should be located in opposite directions from Seoul to provide more 
options and increased accessibility, but the overlapping directions would undermine both 
airports’ efficiencies.
 Furthermore, it would be difficult to create industrial complexes near the airport because the 
infrastructure of Seoul-Incheon area was already deteriorated with poor conditions of available 
large-scale land and environment. An international airport is known to be a prerequisite 
for developing high-tech industries, and thus building the Incheon Airport in the Seoul 
metropolitan area would deprive the opportunity of other cities such as Daejeon, Cheongju 
and Gwangju to develop high-tech industries. Together with its negative effects on balanced 
regional development, the Incheon Airport is criticized to be disadvantageous for future 
unified Korea because of its low accessibility from inter-Korean transport network.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 In regard to the balanced regional development, the government explained that one new 
airport alone could not foster and develop high-tech industries in local areas. Instead, a better 
solution is to develop local areas by revitalizing local airports through connections with the 
airports in the Seoul metropolitan area. It was further explained that since the development 
and success of a hub airport is primarily concerned with the efficiency principle, it should be 
differentiated from the balanced regional development stressing the equity principle.
(6) Environmental Impact Issues
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents argued that fog will inhibit the operation of aircraft at Incheon Airport since 
the number of foggy days in Yeongjong Island was estimated to be 49. Gimpo International 
Airport where foggy days recorded most among international airports provided an evidence. 
They also predicted that airplanes and airport facilities located on the west coast of Korea 
would be damaged and destroyed due to a high risk of tidal waves triggered by climate 
change.
 Yeongjong Island region is also known to be one of four major habitats for migratory birds 
in Korea, where more than 100,000 migratory birds pass through the region all year long. 
Potential bird strikes could pose a threat to the safety of aircraft operation. Moreover, since 
Yeongjong Island is a travel stop for all kinds of migratory birds including snipes, the globally 
protected species, the new airport construction would destroy the habitat of protected species 
and in result face criticisms from the international community by violating the Convention on 
Biological Diversity.
 The opponents also warned that Yeongjong Island could possibly lose all of the airport facilities 
if a dangerous tidal wave from a typhoon or an earthquake in the west coast hit the island. 
This was because even though the new airport was protected by sea walls from flooding, its 
ground level was lower than the water level at a full tide. Therefore, rising sea level due to 
climate change or tidal waves could fatally damage airport facilities since the height of its sea 
dikes was just between 8.4 and 9.4 meters.
 Furthermore, the opponents expressed concerns over the spread of marine pollution caused 
by the airport construction because the airport site was a tideland, where the low and high 
tide difference amounted to more than nine meters. The mud flat in this area facilitated 
self-purification of Han River’s waste water and mitigated coastal pollution. The region also 
boasted well-preserved beautiful natural landscape and coastal resources such as beaches, 
which were something of rarity in the regions near the metropolitan area.19) Thus the 
opponents argued that the Yeongjong Island and Yongyu Island area was not fit for airport 
construction in environmental and meterological terms. Instead, the area deserved preserving 
as a leisure and resort place for the residents of the metropolitan area.
19) Yeonhap News. July 18th, 1992
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 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The government explained that all airports had problems related to bird strikes, but most of 
the damages were minor with almost no human casualties. They went on to explain that such 
problems could be minimized by creating a new habitat for migratory birds and by preventing 
birds’ habitation in the airport area through the mobilization of manpower and various 
equipments.
 As for the problem related to the number of foggy days, the government explained that 
it could be resolved through a state-of-the-art flight guidance instrumentation device. An 
explanation was added that the analysis of about 60 typhoons that arrived onshore in the last 
80 years from 1904 to 1985, revealed little damage of typhoons due to their weakened power 
by the time they reached Yeongjong Island. The government reassured that the seawalls 
would fully protect the airport against tidal waves because they were one to two meters 
higher than the bank protections and seawalls in the nearby coastal area.
Table2-3-5  International Airports’ Average Number of Foggy Days Per Year
International Airport Number of Foggy Days International Airport Number of Foggy Days
Yeongjong Island 
(candidate site) 
Gimpo 
Sihwa District
49
54
50
Heathrow, London
Frankfurt
Kuwait
8
30.1
10.5
Changi, Singapore
Narita, Tokyo
Bangkok
Amman
Reykjavík, Iceland
17.4
4.2 
16.4
2.3 
13 
Washington
Chicago
Detroit
Kennedy, New York
Los Angeles
31.1
15
20.9
30.9
39.2 
Source : Kim Jeong-uk. Kwon O-hyeok. “The Location of New Airport in Seoul Metropolitan Area.” Haewoo. 1993. 117.
(7) Runway Problems caused by Weak Foundation
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents expressed concerns about the differential settlement of ground at takeoff and 
landing, since Incheon Airport’s site was a reclaimed land of mud flat and its sedimentary layer 
of the mud flat was 24 meters deep on average. In particular, the reclaimed land, where the 
airport’s runways would be built, was a mud flat, of which deposits piled up in tens of meters. 
Therefore, the ground was expected to become bumpy due to the differential settlement of 
the ground, which implied the malfunctioning of the runway.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The government explained that the differential settlement of ground in Yeongjong Island 
could occur less than expected, since the airport would be built on a bedrock after reclaiming 
only 5 meter-deep tideland, whereas the Kansai International Airport reclaimed 20 meter-
deep tideland. Furthermore, the airport’s foundation could be successfully maintained if 
the differential settlement of ground was to be minimized by using cutting-edge fill-up 
construction methods, such as sand compaction pile method, paper drain method, pack drain 
method, and pre-loading method.
(8) Issues of Political Nature
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 Building a new airport on the ‘limited readjustment zone’ was, according to the opponents, a 
violation of the Seoul Metropolitan Area Readjustment Planning Act (hereinafter “Metropolitan 
Area Readjustment Act”). The Metropolitan Area Readjustment Act was enacted in 1982 
and was put in force to control the overpopulation of the metropolitan area and to pursue 
balanced regional development. Since Yeongjong Island and Incheon region belong to the 
limited readjustment zone, the opponents argued that allowing Incheon Airport, a facility 
that induces population and industries, in such limited adjustment zone is a violation of 
Metropolitan Area Readjustment Act. Moreover, such action would cause confusion in the 
metropolitan area’s long-term plan. The opponents also pointed out that certain chaebols, 
Korea’s family-controlled conglomerates, might benefit from Incheon Airport’s construction 
and that the feasibility study carried out by the private contractor was far from satisfactory.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The government took a different position, arguing that the construction of Incheon Airport 
should not be viewed as a new facility building that induces population, but as an expansion 
and a transfer of the existing facility that exceeded its capacity. The government refuted 
that it is absurd to apply the principle of balanced regional development to the project, if 
one fully understands the nature of a hub airport, which can only be succeeded by selective 
concentration, and that Incheon Airport is a national project being carried out as a long-
term development plan. The government further refuted the opponents claim of a hasty 
implementation of the Incheon Airport project because the feasibility study began in 1969.
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2) Persuasion Strategy
(1) Emphasizing the Need to Secure a Hub for Northeast Asia’s Air Transport
The government reminded the fact that a vast area of land could be acquired from Yeongjong 
Island and that it had a great potential to become the hub airport of Northeast Asia since 43 cities 
with a population of more than one million are clustered within a three-hour flight distance. Following 
the establishment of diplomatic ties with China, the government emphasized the need to secure a 
hub airport position in Northeast Asia by building the Incheon Airport as soon as possible.
It also reminded that Japan, Hong Kong, and Thailand were planning large-scale expansion projects 
of their existing airports because the Asia-Pacific region was experiencing rapid demand increase 
for air transport. More specifically, by mentioning Japan and Hong Kong’s plan to complete the 
construction of Kansai International Airport and Chek Lap Kok International Airport in 1994 and 1997, 
respectively, the government emphasized that a new airport was the only solution not to fall behind 
other international airports in Northeast Asia. The government stressed the logic of competition. For 
example, if the new airport construction project would be delayed by being embroiled in controversy, 
Korea would lose the chance of becoming a hub airport in Northeast Asia in competition with Japan 
or Hong Kong, and thereby, it would just remain as a small air transport country.
(2) Emphasizing the Need to Prepare for Exchanges with China
An emphasis was also laid on the need for an early construction of the new airport, since 
exchanges of people and goods were expected to rise rapidly after the establishment of diplomatic 
ties with China. Given its geographical proximity to China, Yeongjong Island was the best location 
for a new airport. Since the establishment of Korea-China diplomatic ties, global airline companies 
had begun to compete against each other to secure new flight routes connecting third countries with 
Seoul and Beijing. Thus, the government called for the urgent need for a new airport to absorb such 
high air transport demand.
(3) Emphasizing the Potential Opportunity of Balanced Development
The government actively appealed that the new airport could be used as a base for accelerating 
the development of the west coast as well as a hub for the Korean peninsula due to its close proximity 
to North Korea. In addition, it stressed that the airport would substantially contribute to balanced 
regional development by enhancing links with other local airports such as Pohang, Gimhae, Gwangju, 
and Ulsan.
(4) Emphasizing the Need to Prepare for Gimpo International Airport’s Capacity Limit
The Gimpo International Airport exceeded the optimum level of capacity in terms of passenger 
and cargo handling ability even before the mid-1990s. The government called for a new airport to be 
built as a matter of urgency in order to meet the unsatisfied air transport demand. Since the Gimpo 
International Airport was causing serious aircraft noise damage to nearby areas, where a large number 
of residential areas were clustered, it was argued that it would be difficult to increase the number 
of inbound and outbound flights, which would incur damages to the economy including the tourist 
industry due to more frequent delays in flight departures and arrivals.
(5) National Land Expansion and Other Issues
The new airport construction would expand the national land because an additional land had to 
be created by reclaiming two islands with an area of 56.1 million square meters. An easy access to the 
airport was noted as another merit due to a straight-line distance of 50㎞ from Seoul. The government 
added that noise issue would be naturally resolved, as tideland in the shallow waters was to be reclaimed.
5.  Verification and Evaluation of Proponents’ and Opponents’ Arguments
1) Airport Size and Cost Issues
The second phase facility expansion project was carried out in time to meet an increasing demand, 
gradually improving the airport’s passenger and cargo handling capacity. The increased number of 
international passengers had helped secured financial resources and thus enabled the third phase 
construction. Furthermore, contrary to the concerns over low economic feasibility, Incheon Airport 
is currently operating with surplus. The airport achieved its first surplus in 2004, and its net income 
reached 266.8 billion won in 2009.
2) Overcoming Criticisms on Northeast Asia’s Hub Airport
Incheon Airport is serving as a hub airport by ranking eighth in international passenger service 
and second in international cargo transport, along with steadily increasing number of flights to cities 
around the world. In particular, Incheon Airport has become the economic center and the global 
gateway that handles 24 percent of Korea’s trade volume worth 164.1 billion dollars as of 2009. In 
2009, the airport adjusted flight schedules, which increased the number of connecting flights by 30 
percent compared to the previous year, and in turn increased the number of accumulated passengers 
by 17.6 percent compared to 2008, surpassing the five-million-accumulated-passenger mark.
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Incheon Airport is also getting out of the concerns about its overestimated handling capacity of 
passengers and cargos. The accomplished handling of passengers was 33.48 million persons in 2010, 
increasing by an average of 8.3 percent a year since 2002. At the end of July 2010, the highest record 
for daily passenger number was 115,901 (Outbound passengers 61,345 and Inbound passengers 
54,556), and cargo handling capacity increased to 2.68 million tons in 2010, recording the world’s 
second largest cargo volume.
3) Accessibility Issues
The construction of KORAIL Airport Railroad, Incheon Airport Expressway, and Incheon Bridge 
allowed the airport to be reached mostly within an hour from the Seoul metropolitan area, resolving 
the airport’s accessibility issues. Traffic problems in the metropolitan area still exist, but Incheon 
Airport’s accessibility has not yet been questioned.
In particular, the construction of the Incheon Bridge is contributing to the enhanced accessibility of 
the southern part of Incheon, where the initial plan was to build an undersea tunnel. Concerns have 
been raised regarding the lack of demand for the transportation facilities connected to Incheon Airport 
because the government has been providing subsidy to private investors due to lower traffic volume 
than expected. Meanwhile, it is expected that other regions would not experience many difficulties in 
using the hub airport because the nationwide accessibility to the airport would be improved when the 
KTX is connected to the Incheon Airport rail.
4) Projects Related to the Development of Airport Area
Since the opening of the Free Trade Area in March 2006, which is comprised of airport logistics 
complex (990,000㎡) and cargo terminal (1.1 million square meters), Incheon Airport has attracted 
67 leading companies from home and abroad and has reached an occupancy rate of 76 percent. The 
second phase development of Free Trade Area (920,000㎡) is currently underway in order to timely 
expand the site and capacity of the airport logistics complex, and to set conditions for handling more 
cargo volume. In addition, the IIAC is preparing to attract airline companies and facility maintenance 
companies by building the Aviation Town. To this end, the IIAC consulted with international aircraft 
and engine manufacturing companies and global facility maintenance companies, concluded 
partnership agreements to jointly induce foreign investment, and set a foundation for promoting the 
Aviation Town development project.
On the other hand, the corporation is currently promoting the Dream World Project comprised of 
six clusters on a 14.45 million ㎡ site near Incheon Airport to develop it into the Air City as well as 
shopping malls, leisure towns, tourist and recreational facilities.
5) Airport’s Efficient Operation and Safety Issues
Contrary to the concerns raised by the opponents, bird strikes did not cause serious damages to 
the airport. The IIAC established a regional wild birds and animals management plan to prevent wild 
birds from approaching the airport area, and is currently operating a wild bird extermination team 
and a monitoring office. Twenty-one persons are divided into three teams, and each team works two 
shifts a day. To prevent bird strikes, 17 different devices with a total number of 83 items of equipment 
are being used, such as sonic bird repellent devices. In addition, two stations were built in order to 
eliminate wetlands around the airport and monitor birds. Incheon Airport has experienced about 80 
bird-strike incidents since its opening, but none of the incidents has affected flight operation.
Flight cancellations due to fogs have been reported less than expected, because Incheon Airport is 
equipped with a cutting-edge instrumentation system which enables aircraft to take off and land as 
long as the minimum visibility of 100 meters is secured. Damages related to tidal waves have not yet 
been reported. Regarding the ground settlement, only 0.86 centimeters of ground has sunk in the 
past decade, confirming the concern was unfounded.
6) Environmental Issues
(1) Noise 
Damages to habitats for migratory birds and coastal environment have not yet been identified. 
The IIAC installed ten aircraft noise monitoring stations, which can continuously measure noise levels 
around the clock, in the areas near the airport.
Despite the increased number of flights, Incheon Airport is maintaining its yearly noise level under 
the legal standard level by changing air routes and promoting noise reduction measures. As a result, 
although the number of flights increased by 18 percent in 2007, the average noise level in eastern 
Jangbong Island, a noise-sensitive area, increased only by a small margin.
Table2-3-6  Aircraft Noise Level Measurement Results (2010)
Classification
Airport Neighboring Area (Standard Value of 75WECPNL)
Ganghwa
(Hwado)
Ganghwa
(Seokmo)
Ganghwa
(Yangdo)
Jangbong
(West)
Jangbong
(East)
Jangbong
(Ongam)
Mo Island Si Island Sin Island
2010 36.1 41.1 53.8 56.1 64.3 71.9 69.2 53.1 61.3
Classification
Airport Neighboring Area (Standard Value of 75WECPNL) Airport Region
Muui 
Island
Eulwang-
dong
Nambuk
-dong
Deokgyo
-dong
New City
Standard
(1 North)
Standard
(1 South)
Standard
(3 South)
Standard
(3 South)
2010 44.6 63.4 49.9 49.4 42.3 80.6 88.0 85.9 84.5
Annotation1 :  Standards for expected aircraft noise damage area and aircraft noise-damaged areas, determined by civil aeronautics 
law : 75WECPNL
Annotation2 :  WECPNL: Standard measurement for noise 
Source : 2010 Aircraft Noise Level Measurement Results, <www.airport.kr>
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(2) Marine Ecosystem
Surveys on five different sites in the airport region are being conducted, focusing on zooplankton, 
phytoplankton, fish eggs, maurolicus muelleri, and intertidal marine organisms. The following is the 
recent survey results.
Marine Ecosystem Survey Results
·  Phytoplankton: The standing distribution of phytoplanktons in 2010 was 55 in summer (July), 
276,744 cells/L on average, and 50 in fall (October), 423,656 cells/l on average
·  Zooplankton: The standing distribution of Zooplanktons in 2010 was 13 in summer (July), 
3,392 ind/㎥ on average, and 23 in fall (October), 1,244.5 ind/㎥ on average.
※ ind/㎥ : Number of zooplanktons per ㎥
Source : Incheon International Airport Corporation. “Post-Environmental Impact Assessment Report.” 2010.
(3) Terrestrial Ecosystem
Surveys are being conducted twice a year on flora and fauna on Yeongjong Island, Sangbok Island, 
Yongyu Island, and Sinbul Island, directly affected by the Incheon Airport construction. The following 
is the recent survey results.
Terrestrial Ecosystem Survey Results
·  Flora : The standing distribution of plants in 2010 was 186,728 tons with a net production 
amount of 43,487 tons.
·  Fauna : 6 and 8 mammals were found in the first and second half of 2010, respectively, with 
4 amphibians and 6 reptiles. 33 and 55 different kinds of insects were found in the first and 
second half of 2010, respectively.
Source : Incheon International Airport Corporation. “Post-Environmental Impact Assessment Report.” 2010.
(4) Birds
Between 2001 and 2008, the condition of habitat for water birds and the current condition 
of snipes and plovers, which inhabit the mud flats, came out differently depending on the survey 
environment, but only insignificant changes were found in terms of the number of species and birds.
Bird Habitat Survey Results
·  70 different kinds of birds, 22,446 in number, were observed in spring and autumn, 2010. The 
most observed birds, in order of frequency, were snipes, plovers, seagulls, and natatorial birds.
Source : Incheon International Airport Corporation. “Post-Environmental Impact Assessment Report.” 2010.
6. Project Implementation Effects
1) World Recognition for Incheon International Airport’s Excellence
For the past decade, Incheon airport has made great strides of progress, and has emerged as one 
of the best international airports in the world, serving as an exemplary model for more than 1,000 
international airports. Incheon Airport is drawing the world’s attention not only for its remarkable 
quantitative growth, but also for being recognized as the best airport in terms of service quality. The 
following is Incheon Airport’s main award record.
Table2-3-7  Main Award Records of Incheon International Airport
Classification Awards
2005-2010
 Won Best Airport Worldwide at the Airport Service Quality (ASQ) awards for six consecutive years by 
the Airport Council International (ACI), and listed in the Hall of Fame
2009
 Won Best Airport in Asia-Pacific Award, Best Airport by Size Award (25 to 40 million passengers), 
ASQ Special Recognition Award
-  The result was based on the 1:1 customer satisfaction survey of 250,000 airport users. The survey 
was divided into 34 categories, including 7 service sectors, 27 facilities, and management, and 
was conducted in each quarter of 2009 by ACI.
2006-2010  Won Best Airport in the World at GT Tested Awards by USA’s Global Traveler for five consecutive years
2008 Won 2008 IATA Eagle Award, World’s Best Airport Award
2008
 Won Best Cargo Airport 2008 by Air Cargo World, the biggest airport cargo magazine in USA
-  Every year. airports around the world get evaluated on 4 different categories: reliability, customer 
satisfaction, disposal facilities, and management facilities
2009
Named World‘s Best Airport for 2009 by U.K.’s Skytrax
Won Best Airport in the World at GT Tested Awards 2009 by Global Traveler
Won International Airport of the Year 2009 at CAPA Aviation Awards for Excellence
Achieved 70,000-hour continuous operation of the navigation safety facility
Table2-3-8  Incheon International Airport’s Rank and Score (maximum five-point scale)
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Rank 6 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Score 3.92 3.98 4.16 4.47 4.66 4.78 4.91 4.99 4.96
Source : Incheon International Airport Corporation. Annual Report
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2) Incheon Airport’s Enhanced Operation Performance and Operating Income
The number of flights has increased from 86,000 in 2001 to 214,000 in 2010, while the number 
of passengers has gone up at an annual average of 8.3 percent, increasing from 14 million in 2001 to 
33.48 million in 2010, surpassing the accumulated total of 200 million passengers as of March 2009. 
Currently, international passenger transport of the airport ranks eighth in the world with 72 percent of 
Korea’s total outbound and inbound passengers using Incheon Airport.
Cargo transportation has increased at an annual average of 8.5 percent since 2002 from 1.19 
million tons in 2001 to 2.68 million tons in 2010, the second largest cargo volume in the world, 
exceeding the accumulated total of 10 million tons as of June 2006. Incheon Airport is an international 
gateway for 24 percent of Korea’s total trade volume and emerging as an economic hub.
With the passenger transfer ratio of 18.5 percent and cargo transshipment ratio of 47.2 percent, 
Incheon Airport is becoming more important as a Northeast Asian hub airport, outperforming Narita 
International Airport in Japan and Shanghai Pudong International Airport in China. Its operating 
income already swung to black in 2004 with continuously growing net income from 123.9 billion won 
in 2005 to 266.8 billion won in 2009.
Table2-3-9  Operation Performance of Incheon International Airport
Classification Unit 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
No. of Flights 10,000 13.0 16.0 16.1 18.2 21.1 21.1 19.8 21.4
No. of Passengers 10,000 1,979 2,408 2,605 2,819 3,123 2,997 2,855 3,348
Vol. of Cargo
10,000 
tons
164 213 215 222.7 255.6 242.4 231.3 268.4
Source : Incheon International Airport Corporation. Annual Report 
3) Korea’s Gateway, Contribution to Increasing Global Passenger and Cargo Transportation
Despite the global economic recession, Incheon Airport established the “Kangaroo Route” by 
attracting a Finnish airline, Finnair Plc, and an Oceanian airline, Aircalin. As a result, the number of 
transfer passengers to Europe and Oceania increased by 20 to 50 percent, and arterial and feeder lines 
were also enforced. Continuously inducing new airlines and adding new routes in service, it hosted 59 
airlines, and served 41 destination countries and 133 cities in 2005, which increased to 70 airlines, 53 
countries, and 176 cities in 2010.
In particular, transfer time between flag carriers was recently shortened to 45 minutes from 55 
minutes in 2007, a 10 minute-drop, promoting passengers’ convenience. The airport boasts the 
world’s shortest immigration and border control wait time: 18 minutes for departure and 13 minutes 
for arrival, about one quarter of the recommendation by the International Civil Aviation Organization’s 
60 minutes and 45 minutes, respectively. This was possible thanks to Incheon Airport’s decision to 
quickly apply Korea’s advanced IT technology, such as the passenger forecasting system.
4) Increased Capacity of Airport Facilities responding to Demand
Following the completion of second phase expansion project in 2008, Incheon Airport built a 
4,000 meter-long and 60 meter-wide runway and raised its annual passenger capacity from 30 million 
to 44 million. A concourse of 166,000㎡ was added, and annual cargo capacity increased from 2.7 
million to 4.5 million tons. The airport’s facilities include passenger terminals, cargo terminals, mooring 
facilities, navigation safety facilities, and transportation systems. The passenger terminal building 
complex, the largest freestanding building in Korea measuring 496,000㎡, has 270 check-in counters, 
120 immigration counters, and 28 security checkpoints with departing passenger capacity of 6,400 
persons per hour. Its cargo facilities with a capacity to simultaneously park 24 aircraft are capable 
of handling 1.7 million tons of cargo per year. Incheon Airport’s mooring facilities, measuring 1.089 
million square meters, are capable of simultaneously mooring 60 aircraft.
The 22-story control tower is 100 meters tall. Runways are equipped with automated landing 
control systems and aerodrome markings, designed for landing with the visibility of only 200 meters. 
With Incheon Airport at the center, residential areas in Yeongjong Island will be home to about 6,200 
households. In public facility areas, educational facilities and parks will also be constructed.
Upon the completion of the final fourth phase in 2035, Incheon Airport is expected to have five 
runways, the passenger terminal as large as 1.312 million square meters, the number of passengers at 
100 million per year, the cargo volume of 10 million tons, and the number of flights at 740,000.
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Table2-3-10  Incheon International Airport’s Status of Facilities
Total Site 56.06 million ㎡ Equivalent to 7,800 international standard soccer fields
Runways 3 runways
Capable of simultaneous take-off and landing of jumbo jets, such 
as A380
(1 on the 4,000m runway, 2 on the 3,750m runways)
Aprons
Passenger Apron  
(2.44 million ㎡)
Cargo Apron  
(740,000㎡)
144 aircraft can be parked simultaneously
(108 passenger flights, 36 cargo flights)
Passenger 
Terminal
500,000㎡
Passenger terminals can park 44 aircraft and concourses can park 33, 
simultaneously
Equivalent to 60 international standard soccer fields
Concourse 1 170,000㎡ Concourse 1 can simultaneously park 3 A380s
Traffic Center 250,000㎡
Stations of Incheon Airport Railroad Express and a maglev 
propulsion train are located on the premise
Parking area for 4,758 cars (long-term parking, 5,427 vehicles)
Navigation Safety 
Facilities
Control Tower/Radar/ 
Aerial Communication
Asia’s first airport capable of CAT IIB operations
Non-stop operation of 70,000 hours
Free Trade Area
Cargo Terminal  
(230,000㎡)
Airport Logistics Complex 
(990,000㎡)
Opened in March 2006
Houses branch offices of global distribution companies such as 
DHL, AMB, Schenker, and KWE
(The second phase will bring additional airport logistics complex of 
920,000㎡)
Source : Incheon International Airport Corporation
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4 Lake Sihwa Reclamation Project
1. Project Outline
Location
& Size
Part of tideland surrounding Lake Sihwa around Siheung City and Ansan City
Project 
Duration
2002~2016 (K-Water)
Total Cost 3.5221 trillion won
Development 
Plan
9.256㎢
Total 
Area (㎢)
Advanced 
Industries
Infrastructure Logistics
School 
Zone
Commercial 
Zone
Residential 
Area
Public 
Area
9.256
(100%)
2.399
(25.9%)
0.383
(4.1%)
0.283
(3.1%)
0.374
(4.0%)
0.868
(9.4%)
0.145
(1.6%)
4.804
(51.9%)
Lake Sihwa Tideland
Past
Present
Upon the completion of a seawall in Lake Sihwa in January 1994, a vast tideland emerged around 
the lake. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy suggested to the Ministry of Construction 
and Transportation in February 1996 that a Multi Techno Valley (MTV) should be built in the northern 
tideland of the lake in advance to ease the shortage of industrial land in the Seoul metropolitan area.
As the large-scale tideland was poorly managed, illegal acts were rampant, such as garbage 
dumping, illegal alteration of land shape and quality, and illegal construction and occupation. In order 
to prohibit such illegal acts, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation additionally designated 
115.12 square ㎞ of the south and north tideland around the lake, along with the already designated 
area of 116.33㎢ in the Sihwa Industrial Complex in Ansan and Siheung City under the Notification 
No. 1998-374 of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation as part of the Banwol Special Area, 
and had the Korea Water Resource Corporation (K-Water) manage the area.
Upon the request from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, the northern tideland 
of the lake was planned to be systematically developed into a future-oriented advanced industrial 
complex, focusing on knowledge-based industries, such as high-tech and venture companies. The 
aim of the complex was to balance various functions including support functions such as R&D and 
logistics, ecological functions such as tourism and leisure, and environmental education functions. In 
August 2001, the Sihwa MTV Development Project was notified in order to secure financial resources 
for the improvement of the lake’s water quality. However, odor complaints in the Sihwa and Banwol 
Industrial Complex and water pollution in the lake stirred environmental movement in the region. 
After the Notification No. 2001-222 of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation concerning 
the development plan of the Sihwa MTV, local civil environmental groups demanded the government 
to cancel the development plan and to resolve environmental issues in the Sihwa and Banwol 
Industrial Complex before pursuing the MTV development. The government and the civic groups were 
in sharp conflict, but they recognized the need for a cooperative relationship to build a framework 
for social consensus on environmentally sound and sustainable development. Thus, in January 2004, 
the Sihwa Sustainable Development Council (hereinafter “SSDC”) was established. Through a four-
year-long consultation, the SSDC designed a road map for special measures to improve Sihwa region’s 
environment, implemented an environmental improvement project for the existing industrial complex, 
and mapped out eco-friendly development measures for the Sihwa Development Project.
2. Project Background and Purpose
1) Project Background
The Sihwa District refers to the area surrounding the Lake Sihwa, which belongs to Siheung, 
Hwaseong, and Ansan City, created by the completion of a seawall in 1994. The district is close to 
major metropolitan cities, about 40㎞ from Seoul City and 20㎞ from Incheon, with good transportation 
accessibility via the Seohaean Expressway and Ansan subway line. In addition, with Incheon Airport and 
Incheon Port nearby, the district has a great potential to emerge as one of Northeast Asia’s industrial 
centers and to meet various development needs of the west coast close to the Seoul metropolitan area.
96
| Chapter 02 |  Review of Conflict Cases of Major SOC Projects
97
4. Lake Sihwa Reclamation Project
The southern and northern tideland, created by the completion of the seawall, garnered attention 
as an alternative to provide the metropolitan area with much needed industrial land. In fact, in 
February 1996, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy requested the Ministry of Construction 
and Transportation to develop the northern tideland. In the process of designing the development plan 
for the MTV project, media reports on the pollution of the lake came out in April 1996, which made 
the district a symbol of environmental pollution in Korea. The media and environmental activist groups 
urged the government to take responsibility for the pollution of the lake and to find solutions. They 
brought the issue to the public’s attention, arranged a series of consultation with relevant authorities 
and advisory conferences, conducted research and due diligence, and prepared the Water Quality 
Improvement Measures for Lake Sihwa worth 532.5 billion won.
K-Water agreed to design improvement measures from a project operator’s point of view, and 
financing for the measures was concluded to come from K-Water’s own fund and the extected profits 
of the MTV project.
Table2-4-1  Water Quality Improvement Measures for Sihwa Lake
Detailed Projects
Cost
(Unit: 100 million won)
Content
Construction of Tidal Plants 3,551
To be completed in 2011  
(Launched in December 2004)
Expansion of Sewage Treatment 
Plants
843
Expansion of sewage treatment plants in Sihwa and 
Ansan
Survey and Maintenance of 
Piping System
20 Repaired 2,651 junctions (1,519㎞)
Reed Wetland Park 293
314,000 pyeong (Traditional Korean unit, approx. 
3.3058㎡) at the upper stream of Lake Sihwa
Algal Ponds 10 Water hyacinth and air blow equipments
Stream Maintenance
(Ansan Stream)
53
Heightened river bed and dredging work in Ansan 
Stream
Storm Drain for Polluted Rainfall 67 11㎞ storm drain, 8 pump stations
Environment Improvement 
Projects 
448 Service contract for sediment treatment
Service Contracts for Lake 
Sihwa’s Development
40
Service contract for water quality improvement 
measures
Seawater Circulation through 
Sluice Gates
- Seawater circulation of 30 million ㎥/day
Lake Aerator - 100 aerator installed around sluice gates
Total 5,325
Source :  Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs, Marine Environmental Policy Division. “Comprehensive Management 
Plan.” 2001.
In addition, from the 1980s to the early 1990s, pollution-causing factories, which were disqualified 
for the Seoul metropolitan area, entered the Banwol and Sihwa Industrial Complex en masse, 
worsening air pollution and odor. Consequently, local communities experienced difficulties in helping 
their residents secure regional identity or sense of settlement. Against this backdrop, a development 
plan has been in discussion for the total area of 10.48㎢, including a 3.31㎢ of the northern tideland 
and a 7.17㎢ of thetideland near Lake Sihwa. For two years from June 1999, the plan had been 
consulted with 22 relevant authorities and was finalized and notified in August 2001, kicking off the 
Sihwa MTV Development Project.
2) Project Purpose
The primary objective of the project is to strengthen industrial competitiveness and the regional 
economy based on complementary cooperation with the existing industrial complex and to prevent 
reckless and sporadic development by utilizing favorable locational conditions and offering well-
planned space. Its secondary purpose is to facilitate the utilization of environmental resources in 
nearby coastal areas by improving air quality in the Sihwa area and securing stable water quality in the 
lake and, at the same time, to develop an eco-friendly composite complex by developing sufficient 
green space.
3) Project Content
The Sihwa MTV Development Project, which centers on knowledge-based industries such as 
high-tech and venture companies, aims to develop a future-oriented advanced industrial complex 
that combines various functions including support functions such as R&D and logistics, and leisure 
functions such as tourism and recreation. The authorities attempts to cover the cost for environmental 
improvement measures in the Sihwa area with development profits in an effort to dramatically 
improve air and water quality of the local environment.
Its basic directions are to complement various infrastructures in line with the development of the 
existing complex, Banwol and Sihwa, to promote long-term development of nearby cities, Siheung, 
Ansan, and Hwaseong City, and to build connectivity with regional transportation system. The project 
plans to nurture a stable and pleasant environment for workers at the industrial complexes and local 
residents, to strengthen the economic foundation of Siheung and Ansan by promoting high value 
added service industries in such a way that does not infringe upon the regional commercial markets in 
Siheung and Ansan, and to promote efficiency in a land usage plan.
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4) Project Agency 
The project agency is the Ministry of Construction and Transportation with K-Water as the operator. 
Since conflicts over the project are all related to the development and usage of the lake’s basin, five 
ministries of the Korean government, Gyeonggi Province and three cities individually reviewed how to 
utilize the lake and its tideland.
Table2-4-2  Usage Plan for Lake Sihwa’s Basin
Planner Plan
Ministry of 
Construction and 
Transportation 
Having designated the southern and northern tideland as large as 1,123.9㎢, composed 
of 425.5㎢ of Lake Sihwa, 118.7㎢ of the northern tideland and 607.3㎢ of the 
southern tideland, as the Banwol Special Area in November 1998, the area is planned 
to be developed into a low density residential and commercial area as well as advanced 
industrial complex
Ministry of Oceans 
and Fisheries
Establishing a plan to build a tidal power plant with the capacity of 240,000 ㎾ and a 
port that can accomodate 90 ships
Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Forestry
With public water reclamation license having been acquired on September 2nd, 1998, 
the reclamation work to develop agricultural land as large as 3,636 ha on the southern 
tideland started. Regarding agricultural infrastructure, Lake Tando, which is 760 ha in 
size, will be formed in order to supply water to the agricultural land of the southern 
tideland.
Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism
Korea’s Natural Monument No. 414, Dinosaur Egg Tracksite in Gojeong-ri of 
Hwaseong, designated on March 21st, 2000, will be developed into a tourist 
destination and the National Natural History Museum will be constructed
Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry 
and Energy
Yeongheung thermal power plant’s transmission circuit will be laid through the lake
Gyeonggi Province
The province commissioned a research service on the development strategies for 
Gyeonggi Province’s west coast including the lake
Ansan City The city plans to build Sihwa ecological park
Siheung City
The city plans to minimize the development of industrial land and secure green and 
leisure space for higher quality of life in nearby residential cities
Hwaseong City
The city plans to develop prehistoric sites such as the Natural Monument No. 414, 
Dinosaur Egg Tracksite in Gojeong-ri of Hwaseong, designated on March 21st, 2000, 
into tourist destinations
5) Project Progress
The timeline of the project including the construction of the Sihwa Seawall and the development of 
Sihwa MTV, according to the development plan of Sihwa District, is as follows.
Table2-4-3  Progress of Sihwa Tideland Development Project
Date Content
September 27th, 1986
 Banwol Special Area was changed into a development district, and a basic plan for Sihwa 
District Development was notified
December 30th, 1986 Site building work for Sihwa Industrial Complex was launched 
June 10th, 1987 Seawall construction was launched
January 24th, 1994
Embankment construction was completed
- Lake Sihwa and its tideland were created
February 9th, 1996
 The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy raised the need for developing and 
expanding Sihwa Complex
-  The northern tideland development was necessary to provide the metropolitan area with 
industrial land
April 17th, 1996
 The Ministry of Construction and Transportation established management measures for 
the tideland
-  Management of tideland: The area was designated as Banwol Special Area to be 
managed until the project launch
- Development of tideland
· Northern tideland: Developed in part of the first phase of expansion construction
· Southern tideland: Developed considering demand for urban and industrial land
November 14th, 1998
 Expansion of Banwol Special Area was notified, including Lake Sihwa and its northern and 
southern tideland
August 29th, 2001 Sihwa MTV Development Plan was notified
January 2002-June 2005 Consultation of environmental impact assessment
January 16th, 2004 Sihwa Sustainable Development Council (SSDC) was formed
February 2004-
November 2006
SSDC designed development measures for Sihwa MTV
February 28th, 2006
Outsourced research to verify the project’s size was completed 
- Research result: Development size, 9.26㎢
March 20th, 2007
The first revision notification of the development plan
- to reflect environmental impact assessment and SSDC’s consultation
June 4th, 2007
 Environmental impact assessment was reflected in the first revision by the Han River Basin 
Environmental Office
- the first revision also included the SSDC’s consultation
August 16th, 2007
 Partial permit of the project by Seoul Construction and Management Administration was 
notified and the project was partially launched
- river, park, green zone, and borrow pit were included in the permit
December 2007 The construction of Sihwa MTV was partially started
April 11th, 2008
 Environmental impact assessment was completely reflected in the second revision by the 
Han River Basin Environmental Office
-  post-environmental impact assessment plan was consulted with a post-management 
team and reflected in the revision
June 23rd, 2008
 Full permit of the project by Seoul Construction and Management Administration was 
notified
- the full area of the project received the permission
November 20th, 2009
Revised Sihwa MTV Development Plan was notified
- SSDC’s consultation was additionally considered
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3. Arguments and Grounds of Proponents and Opponents
1) Issues and Logic of Proponents and Opponents
(1) Civic Group’s Proposal on Tideland Usage vs Long-term Comprehensive Development Plan
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents (Proposal by People’s Coalition for Lake Sihwa)
 Responding to water pollution of the lake and worsening atmospheric environmental issues 
due to the operation of the large-scale industrial complex, local communities opposed the 
project itself and developed a deep distrust against the government’s environmental policies. 
The opponents argued that inappropriate development would destroy traditional local 
communities and create a number of problems. After the water pollution issue of the lake 
came to the fore, individual civic groups demanded to ‘improve water quality first and then 
develop the tideland’, tear down the seawall, circulate the seawater, and form a public-private 
joint consultative group.
Table2-4-4  Water Quality of Lake Sihwa
Classification
National Average Lake Sihwa
1996 2006 1996 2006
Sewage Processing 
Ratio (%)
52.4 81.4 18.0 100
COD (ppm) - - 13.5 4.4
No. of Odor 
Complaints
from 1,479 cases in 1999 to 653 in 2006
Source : Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs
 Since the late 1990s, experts and local civic groups have demanded environmental 
improvement of the lake and reexamination of the existing development plan. In March 2000, 
they proposed an ecological park as an alternative idea. The idea, which assumed that the 
lake remained a seawater lake, was proposed as a ways to effectively utilize its tideland in a 
bid to turn the area into a symbol of sustainable development for regions with environmental 
concerns. During this period, local civic groups waged a strong campaign against the Sihwa 
MTV Development and the construction of Yeongheung transmission circuit. The groups 
judged that their proposal, which incorporated a new regional concept and preservation 
measures and was voluntarily participated by local experts and citizens, did not receive any 
systematic reviews from the central government and the project agency.
 The civic proposal, taking a full consideration of natural conditions in both sides of the region, 
contained the ideas of helping the ecosystem restore itself and focusing on promoting tourism 
business with little harm to the ecosystem’s structure and function, but it did not include 
additional reclamation. On the contrary, a long-term comprehensive plan established by 
the government through a public hearing entailed: first, to build an advanced and venture 
business complex in 10.48㎢ of the northern tideland, for which development notification had 
been already announced to provide much needed industrial site for the metropolitan area; 
and, second, to develop a tourism and leisure complex on a 56.76㎢-wide land out of the 
93.06㎢ of the southern tideland, while excluding 36.3㎢ of designated agricultural land.
 •  Arguments and Grounds of Proponents (Long-term Comprehensive Development Plan for 
Sihwa District)
 The Sihwa Policy Development Conference, participated by the central government, local 
governments, and project agency, established the Long-term Comprehensive Development 
Plan. The Board of Audit and Inspection had conducted an intense audit on development 
progress of the project from September 7th to December 23rd, 1999 and requested the 
Ministry of Construction and Transportation to set up a comprehensive and reasonable 
plan prior to pursuing a large-scale project like the development of the Banwol Special 
Area. Accordingly, in order to establish a government-wide comprehensive direction for the 
development of the lake and its tideland, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation 
formed the Sihwa Policy Development Conference with the members from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry; Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy; Ministry of Environment; 
Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries; Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea; a relevant 
director-general of Gyeonggi Province; a deputy mayors of Siheung, Ansan, and Hwaseong 
City; K-Water; and Korea Agricultural and Rural Infrastructure Corporation. The conference 
compiled the research, which had been conducted for about three years by five research 
institutes including Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, and made it public 
through a public hearing in December 2003. The hearing proposed a blueprint to build an 
advanced city of ecology, tourism, and leisure on the tideland, equipped with a tidal power 
plant. The blueprint suggested creating an advanced comprehensive complex on the northern 
tideland and sites for tourism, leisure, research, and residence on the southern tideland.
(2) Confrontation during Planning Process of Environmental Improvement Measures
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 Civic groups came into conflict with the project operator over the cause of environmental 
issues in the area and the party in charge of resolution. The civic groups argued that K-Water, 
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the project operator, had a primary responsibility for the environmental problems and 
demanded K-Water to fully cover for environmental improvement costs and to carry out the 
improvement measures first, regardless of future development.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The project operator asserted that, considering its moral duties as an operator, it could partially 
share the burden of the environmental improvement costs, even though the central and local 
governments should be held responsible for the cause of environmental issues.
Table2-4-5  Opinions on Environmental Improvement Measures
Classification Content
Government/Project 
Operator (Proponents)
·  Air pollution is a sole responsibility of the Ministry of Environment and local 
governments
·  Government contribution for atmospheric environmental improvement of 30 
billion won according to consultations with the Ministry of Environment
-  It is unfair to ask the project operator to find solutions for all environmental 
issues
Environmental Groups/ 
Local Residents (Opponents)
· K-Water should fully cover environmental improvement costs 
· Without environmental improvement, no additional development 
(3) Confrontation over the Size of Sihwa MTV Development
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The civic groups, while emphasizing tangible and intangible environmental values such 
as protection of the ecosystem, which was reviving after seawater circulation in the lake, 
biodiversity and productivity of tideland, its purifying effect of water pollutants, and ecological 
experience, demanded a limited development for the exposed 3.31 square ㎢ of tideland. 
The conflicts on environmental values continued as there were no direct or objective 
tools to measure the value of the tideland against the value of its development. The civic 
groups maintained that additional reclamation was not acceptable as it would destroy the 
environment and cause additional environmental pollution. They also criticized the antimony of 
improving the environment with development gains derived from environmental destruction.
• Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The project operator insisted upon developing a 10.47㎢-wide tideland into Sihwa MTV in 
order to turn the existing Sihwa and Banwol Industrial Complex into an eco-friendly and 
advanced comprehensive industrial complex.
Table2-4-6  Opinions on the Size of Sihwa MTV
Classification Content
Government, Project 
Operator (Proponents)
 It is inevitable to grow the size of the project up to a certain point to cover the cost of 
environmental improvement at 450 billion won - The minimum size is suggested to 
be 9.26㎢
Environmental Groups, 
Local Residents 
(Opponents)
 The minimum project size of 9.26㎢ should be verified, even considering 
environmental improvement costs
(4) Confrontation over the Land Use Plan of Sihwa MTV Development
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The civic groups called for adjustments to the land use plan such as restrictions on general 
manufacturers in the complex in order to prevent environmental pollution, which might be 
caused by some unqualified firms relocating from the Seoul metropolitan area. In line with the 
title of the project, they argued that the plan should be revised to build an advanced industrial 
complex, which could also upgrade industrial structure in the existing Banwol and Sihwa 
Industrial Complexes.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The project operator refuted the civic groups’ proposal, saying that the unilateral restrictions 
on general manufacturers went against the purpose of a national industrial park, and that it 
was inevitable to invite general manufacturers to the park in order to boost its growth as the 
environmental improvement measures were expected to sufficiently ease pollution issues. It added 
that, considering the linkage between production facilities and intermediate goods, it would be 
impossible to operate a competitive industrial park only with advanced technology firms.
2) Persuasion Strategy
(1) Establishment of System to ease Conflicts
 • Foundation of Sihwa Sustainable Development Council
 In order to ease conflicts stirred during the project’s progress and to seek reasonable development 
plans, the government proposed forming a consultative body with local residents and 
governments to find measures together. Accordingly, the SSDC, a public-private joint partnership 
with civic and environmental groups, was founded in January 2004 in order to ease conflicts and 
collect opinions. The SSDC discussed the development of Sihwa District in the Banwol Special 
Area, environmental improvement related to water and air quality in the Sihwa area, agreements 
made in the SSDC and their implementation, and issues to be included in the project.
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Table2-4-7  Classification of Identified Issues by Subcommittee
Classification Issues
Development 
Subcommittee
1. Reduction in development size of Sihwa MTV
2. Social, economic, and environmental impacts of Sihwa MTV
Atmosphere 
Subcommittee
1.  Status, issues, and solutions of the atmospheric environment of the existing industrial 
complex
2. Survey on odor emitters in Sihwa and Banwol Industrial Complexes
3. Restriction on pollutant emitters applying to be housed in Sihwa MTV
Water Quality 
and Ecology 
Subcommittee
1. Status of water pollution in main water ways in Sihwa area and improvement measures
2. Status of sediment pollution in Lake Sihwa and improvement measures
3. Supplementary measures to build migratory birds’ habitat
(2) Operation of the SSDC
 • Discussion
 The SSDC was operated to seek a consensus of various stakeholders in a discussion framework 
to verify the pros and cons through contemplating the economic and social feasibility, 
including the environmental aspects, and through earnest discussion and learning about ways 
to balance between development and environment. The Council had held 151 rounds of 
meetings from 2004 to 2007 and reached an agreement on the national project, which was 
deemed successful in resolving conflicts.
3) Major Contributors to Resolving Conflicts
(1) Preliminary Discussions
Prior to a meeting at the Council, the agenda and issues to be dealt with were actively discussed, 
preventing unnecessary arguments and helping the discussions proceed smoothly. The members, 
who represented the civic groups, fine-tuned their arguments in collaboration with People’s Coalition 
for Lake Sihwa in advance, while the Ministry of Construction and Transportation and K-Water also 
exchanged their opinions, in preparation for the next meeting.
(2) Sharing Administrative Procedures
Once the agenda was decided, information on related rules and regulations, necessary 
administrative procedures, and legal time requirements were all shared. Necessary procedures were 
decided in order to carry out the project in accordance with the set process of which the schedule 
was also shared. The council provided the general public, who were not familiar with procedures, 
rules and regulations, with information on them, necessary administrative procedures, and legal time 
requirement.
(3) Immediate Implementation of Derived Conclusion
The SSDC made public related reports on the lake and its neighboring regions, and the council 
members participated in local environmental events. They conducted daily monitoring of the water 
quality in the severely contaminated the fourth main waterway, surveyed all of the pollutant emitters 
immediately, and installed a banner to connect participating institutions’ webpages with SSDC’s.
(4) Solution to Disagreement
If there was a disagreement due to unverified fact or insufficient information, the SSDC chose to 
ease it by commissioning research work through an objective survey and confirmation, experts’ advice, 
and collective learning.
(5) Decision Making through Consultations
The SSDC’s decision making process was not a majority vote but a unanimous consensus. Any 
party, who had a different opinion but did not explicitly oppose or did so with strings attached, was 
regarded to agree. And the items in disagreement were listed to be discussed in the future. 
 
(6) Integration between Subcommittee and Plenary Meetings
The SSDC had three special subcommittee meetings of which the agenda were compiled and 
fine-tuned in the plenary meetings, while newly identified agenda in the plenary meeting were also 
discussed in-depth in the subcommittee meetings.
(7) Release of Information
Information was given in a simple but well-organized manner to help some members, who did 
not have expertise, understand professional issues. Additional information was always available upon 
request. After being reviewed, meeting results were posted online for the general public.
(8) Intensive Debate
Aside from regular meetings, a separate meeting was also called upon for an intensive debate, 
which often took place in special venues, such as in the suburbs, in order to encourage new ideas 
and strengthen personal ties. Agenda for the intensive debate were decided when a plenary meeting 
identified current issues and selected agenda to be dealt with later on through free discussion. When 
opinions were sharply divided without rendering an alternative, or an alternative was not agreed on, 
more discussions followed. Issues that were resolved and agreed upon at a meeting were separately 
recorded from those that were not.
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(9) Group Study
One of the characteristics of the SSDC’s operation was a group study in which all its members 
participated. Experts were also invited to give lectures and hold discussion sessions on topics that were 
critical to conducting a discussion or finding a solution, and that required the members to have new 
information or knowledge.
4. Economic and Social Costs From Conflicts
1) Direct Costs
Direct costs include additional construction costs due to the delay and economic costs to the nation 
or local governments caused by delayed production. The project had been delayed for five years since 
its announcement in August 2001, deferring job creation and weakening industrial competitiveness, 
as businesses had to build their own production sites individually in the Seoul metropolitan area. It 
took three years and six months to discuss the environmental impact assessment.
2) Indirect Costs
Indirect costs include environmental damages incurred by delayed environmental improvement 
projects in Sihwa and Banwol and social costs due to conflicts among the central government, local 
governments, local residents, and NGOs. These social and economic costs are incalculable as there is 
no research or estimation data on them.
5.  Verification and Evaluation of Proponents’ and Opponents’ Arguments
The SSDC reviewed and assessed the contrary arguments of the opponents and the proponents 
of the Sihwa Tideland Development Project. Based upon detailed operation guidelines, the Council 
demonstrated a democratic operation and reasonable negotiation process in establishing the best 
practice of eco-friendly development by reaching an agreement on the road map for water and air 
quality improvement, the launch of the southern tideland development plan, the construction of a 
tidal power plant, and the northern tideland MTV development plan.
1)  Agreement on the Road Map for Water and Air Quality Improvement in Sihwa  
(October 28th, 2004)
In the late 1990s, the number of civil complaints about odor exponentially increased, and, in 
particular, soared in 2004 when residents started moving into a large apartment complex in Ansan 
City. This was when the environmental concerns of the Sihwa Industrial Complex expanded to 
become region-wide environmental issues. As a response, the atmospheric subcommittee of the SSDC 
designed the road map for air quality improvement special measures in line with the atmospheric 
environment improvement project.
As the water quality worsened again after 2000, the SSDC’s atmospheric and ecology 
subcommittees formed a task force to compile future plans or on-going measures by various 
institutions for water and ecological environment improvement, and drew a road map of special 
water quality improvement measures suitable for the lake. In October 2004, a workable road map to 
improve water and air quality written by experts on the premise of the development of the Sihwa area 
was agreed. The government proposed using all development profits from the MTV development on 
the northern tideland to finance the improvement measures.
Table2-4-8  Road Map for Special Water Quality Improvement Measures
Road Map Project Cost (Unit: 100 million won)
Total 920
1. Water quality improvement measures for main waterways
- the measure for the fourth waterway to be implemented first
- increasing capacity of temporary storm drain
-  the water quality improvement measures for the first, second, and 
third waterway to be pursued
120
(20)
(40)
(60)
2. Complete enumeration survey on water pollutant emitters 20
3.  Pollutant inflow prevention facilities to be installed at the industrial 
complex
60
4. Ecological streams to be built
- basic plans to restore natural ecological river to be established
- restoration projects to be carried out
200
(6)
(194)
5. Improvement of contaminated sediments 500
6.  Functions of artificial wetland to be enhanced and facilities to be 
improved
- research and experiments of water treatment
- facilities in wetland to be supplemented
20
(5)
(15)
Source : Sihwa Sustainable Development Council. Web. <www.sihwa-sd.com>
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Figure2-4-1  Effect of Environmental Improvement Measures
100%
52.6%
Air pollution, i.e., odor, Water quality in Lake Sihwa
Sulfurous acid gas Other effluvium Before Improvements After Improvements
COD 2ppm
100%
52.6%
·Air pollutants including odor will reduce to 50% of the  
    current level where odor is hardly noticeable in the 
    residential area
·Air pollution including odor will drop to 50% of the current
    level.
·The water quality of the lake will be substantially improved
    from the current COD of 4-5 ppm
·The water quality of the lake is to be improved to the level 
    of the open sea.
COD 4~5ppm
Source : Sihwa Sustainable Development Council
2) Agreement on the Size of Sihwa MTV Development (June 19th, 2005)
The development of the northern tideland of the lake began for the purpose of securing financial 
resources for water quality improvement in the lake. Afterwards, a new consensus was made that the 
size of development should be decided in consideration of economic and social feasibility, in addition to 
securing financial resources for environmental improvement and environmental feasibility. Thus, all the 
parties agreed to have further discussions on the size based on research conducted by a third-party research 
institute. Experts, recommended by the civic groups, participated in the research, reviewing the options for 
the proper size of the project from 3.31㎢ suggested by the civic groups to 10.48㎢ by the project operator 
in terms of environmental, economic, and social aspects. On the assumption that the entire development 
profits would be used for environmental improvement costs in the Sihwa area, the research concluded 
that the appropriate size should be at least 9.26㎢ to meet the necessary costs. Having gone through a 7 
month-long consideration and discussion, the SSDC fixed the size of development at 9.26㎢.
3) Agreement on the Land Use of Sihwa MTV (November 21st, 2006)
In consideration of Sihwa District’s characteristics, the land use plan was revised to increase green 
zones according to the SSDC’s recommendations based on the research on the project size and 
restriction on general manufacturing businesses.
Table2-4-9  Agreements on the Land Use of Sihwa MTV
Classification Original Plan Research Outcome Final Agreement
Industrial Land 39.4% 32.0% 27.0%
Parks and Green Areas 20.3% 27.5% 27.5%
Commercial Land 7.0% 10.0% 10.0%
Back-up Land 13.0% 13.0% 12.0%
Public Land 23.7% 17.5% 23.5%
Source : Sihwa Sustainable Development Council
6. Project Implementation Effects
The implementation effects of the project were the establishment of the eco-friendly land use plan 
by the SSDC through open and frank discussions among the central government, the project operator, 
the local governments, and the civic groups. A ratio of parks and green areas increased from 13 
percent to 27.5 percent. Pollution emitters such as general manufacturing businesses were prohibited 
from operating in the complex, while advanced technology enterprises were encouraged to join the 
park. A waterfront green area plan was also established in consultation with experts on October 2006.
In addition, the plan to reinvest expected development profits in regional environmental 
improvement projects was confirmed. Ninety-two billion won was earmarked for improving water 
quality in the lake, while 355.1 billion won was planned for the use of reducing air pollution including 
the conversion of incineration facilities into public corporation.
What is expected from these efforts is the continuous improvement of water and air quality in the 
area, the revitalization of the local economy, and contribution to the national economic development 
through job creation. The Sihwa project is expected to employ 70,000 persons a year, create a production 
effect worth nine trillion won, upgrade the backward industrial structure of Sihwa and Banwol complex, 
and build an innovative cluster. With the lake at the center, reed wetland, Sihwa MTV, tidal power plants, 
and Songsan Green City are expected to help the region emerge as a hub city of marine culture, turning 
it from the city of environmental pollution to the city of environmental restoration.
Table2-4-10  Economic Ripple Effects : Investment Effect (Construction Effect)
Classification
Production Inducement
(Unit: trillion won)
Added Value
(Unit: trillion won)
Employment
(Unit: 10,000 persons)
Sihwa and Gyeonggi Province 4.2 3.3 5.8
Others 1.3 1.0 1.3
Nationwide 5.5 4.2 7.2
Source : Korea Planners Association. “Research on Sihwa MTV Development.” 2006.
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5 Saemangeum (Development) Project
1. Project Outline
Origin of 
Project Name
With “sae” meaning “new,” “man” is from Mangyeong Plain and “geum,” which also reads 
“gim,” is from Gimje Plain in North Jeolla Province, Korea, meaning the project will create a new 
plain in the region
*  The brand name of “Ariul” was launched for global promotion on January 28, 2010 when the 
Comprehensive Plan was designed.
Size of Area
401㎢ (2/3 size of Seoul, 140 times larger than Yeouido, 5 times larger than Manhanttan, 4 times 
larger than Paris)
Length of 
Seawall
33.9㎞ (the world’s longest seawall)
* The Zuiderzee Seawall in the Netherlands is the second longest at 32.5㎞
Saemangeum
Past
Present
The Saemangeum Development Project is a national project aiming to expand Korea’s territory by 
401㎢ including a 283㎢-wide reclaimed land and a lake of 118㎢ by building the world’s longest 
seawall of 33.9㎢ connecting Gunsan and Buan in North Jeolla Province on the west coast of Korea. 
With a preliminary investigation that began in 1971, the Saemangeum seawall was completed in 
2010. The project was first planned to reclaim land for agricultural use but later transformed into 
a multi-purpose development for industrial, tourism, and economic purposes due to economic and 
social changes.
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2. Project Background and Purpose
1) Project Background
Severe droughts in the late 1960s and the global food crises in the early 1970s forced the Korean 
government to import rice. In a bid to strengthen food security, the government conducted a research 
to find potential sites for reclamation across the country and set up the tideland reclamation project 
on the southwest coast to acquire arable land. The reclamation project was designed to develop 
agricultural land of 4,020 square ㎞ as well as a large-scale comprehensive agricultural development 
project around the Geum River, Pyeongtaek, the Yeongsan River, and the Sapgyo River. The 
Saemangeum area was selected as part of the reclamation project at that time and, in 1971, it became 
part of the Okseo district large-scale agricultural development plan (hereinafter “Okseo Plan”).
The first phase of the Okseo Plan intended to develop the estuary of the Geum River and to 
improve irrigation and drainage around the river. The second phase attempted to reclaim land in 
Gimje, Buan, and Okgu District and to improve irrigation and drainage around the Mangyeong River. 
With IBRD’s aid, the Korean government pursued the first phase, which became the starting point of 
the Saemangeum development project. As reclamation projects aim to create new land from ocean, 
the entire southwest coast filled with well-developed mud flat became the target of the project. In the 
1970s, the self-sufficiency of staple crops was a key national agenda and there was no opposition to 
reclamation projects. Moreover, the success of the Gyehwa Island reclamation project as a part of the 
First Five-year Economic Development Plan made not only farmers but also the general public welcome 
other reclamation projects.
During the second phase of the Okseo Plan targeting Gimje, Buan, and Okgu District around the 
Mangyeong and Dongjin River, rice production was hit hard by a cold wave in the early 1980s. The 
then Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries thus established a long-term development plan for 
the overall reclamation project on the southwest coast in January 1986 by expanding the ongoing 
large-scale agricultural development project. The long-term development plan, which combined 
several tideland reclamation projects, included the Buan District Comprehensive Rural Development 
Project by integrating Gimje, Okseo, and Buan Districts into one project unit. This was when large-scale 
reclamation projects such as Saemangeum were contemplated. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries conducted an internal feasibility study on the project and confirmed it by announcing 
the Action Plans of West Coast Reclamation Project on May 12th, 1987. The Saemangeum Project 
was finally launched in November 1991, having completed a series of legal procedures in the 1980s, 
such as analysis of economic feasibility, environmental impact assessment, consent of local residents, 
consultation with relevant government offices, and issuance of public water reclamation license.
2) Project Purpose
The objective of the Saemangeum Project has evolved over time. From enhancing food security at its 
early stage, the objective has been transformed into easing flood damages and water shortages, expanding 
national land, developing North Jeolla Province and the west coast, planning a new origin of human 
civilization, making a hub for new renewable energy, and developing a creative green waterfront city.
This section reviews the purpose and meaning of the project in terms of national land development 
and economic and social aspects.20) The national land development aspect is as follows.
First, the project can provide land resources necessary for industrial sites and urban land with 
affordable prices in addition to 200㎢ of agricultural land by reclaiming tidelands. Second, the large-
scale reclaimed land can substantially expand the area of cultivated land per household, which was 1.37 
hectares in Korea in 2000, lowest among OECD members, and facilitate an advanced farming system 
in the 21st century by adopting commercial farming and a new scientific farming system. Third, a new 
freshwater lake will be built in the mouth of the Mangyeong River and Dongjin River, which will provide 
farmlands with water and Mangyeong Plain with stable control of drainage. Fourth, poor transportation 
system in Jeolla Province will be substantially improved, as airports, ports, railroads and highways will be 
constructed in and around the reclaimed land in the Saemangeum area. Fifth, a variety of tourism industry 
will be promoted, such as agriculture tourism, industrial tourism, freshwater lake tour and West coast 
tour. Such tourist resources will be used to create a region-wide tourism structure by linking with other 
tourist destinations such as Byeonsan Peninsula, Mt. Naejang and Mt. Deokyu in North Jeolla Province.
On the other hand, economic and social purposes of the project are as follows. First, through raising 
the economic competitiveness of North Jeolla Province and its level of development, the project will 
help this lagging region accelerate economic development and thus contribute to balanced regional 
development. Second, the project will promote regional development by increasing income and jobs. 
Third, the project will help build a front base for continental trade in the era of the west coast. The 
Saemangeum reclaimed area, which is located at the very center of the Pan-Yellow Sea Rim embracing 
the entire Korean Peninsula, the east coast of China and the southern part of Japan, allows it to take 
advantage of its geographical centrality. Fourth, Korea’s economic development concentrated on the 
Gyeongbu axis, which connects Seoul and Busan, could spill over to the west coast by enhancing east-
west connectivity between inland areas and the west coast.
As summarized in the Saemangeum Basic Plan, the project’s goals and meanings are as follows: 
increasing rice production at 95,000 tons a year, securing one billion tons of water resources, improving 
drainage for the frequently flooded 120-square kilometer-wide area in the Mangyeong Plain in Gimje, 
achieving transportation system efficiency by reducing the current 97.3㎞-long coastline to a length of 
31.3㎞, and creating an employment of about 13,000 man-days during the project period.
20) Hong Uk-hi. “Environmental Disputes Cost Three Trillion Won: Saemangeum.” Jiseong, 2004. 70~76.
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3) Project Content
The content of the Saemangeum Project has been changed over time. It includes the 33.9㎞ ㎞
-long seawall, two sluice gates, 283-square kilometer-wide land, and a 118㎢-wide freshwater lake. On 
March 16th, 2011, the Sixth Saemangeum Development Committee announced the Master Plan, which 
describes various plans to build a world-class green waterfront city. The Master Plan also includes the 
promotion of inflow of people, capital and technology through a spatial proximity of work and housing 
and the connection to a new port, the introduction of public transportation zones and Bimodal Trams, 
the active operation of marine transportation such as water buses and taxis, and the development 
of a world-class, green, and water friendly city. A new and renewable energy area, about 20㎢, will 
house a photovoltaic energy and hydrogen fuel complex as well as a new and renewable energy 
technology R&D center in order to make the area a mecca of new renewable energy. An ecological and 
environmental area will also be developed as a repository of clean ecosystem where human and nature 
exist in harmony. Equipped with global competitiveness, agricultural land will be developed into an 
export base of high quality and advanced agricultural products. A complex marine leisure town will be 
constructed in the already created Sinsi-Yami tourism and leisure site. In addition, landmark construction 
will be actively pursued to create a future-oriented city brand for the Saemangeum area.
Figure2-5-1  Land Development and Infrastructure under the Master Plan (March 16th, 2011)
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Others
Bieungdo Port
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Ecological and Environmental Lands
Science and Research Lands
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Table2-5-1  Saemangeum Project Outline
Classification Content
Location · Tideland in Gunsan, Gimje and Buan of North Jeolla Province
Project Duration
· First Phase : 73% of the total area by 2020
· Second Phase : 27% after 2021
Project Owner
·  7 agencies : Ministry of Education, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 
Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime 
Affairs, North Jeolla Province
※  The Saemangeum Development Committee includes the Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance and the Ministry of Security and Public Administration
Total Cost · Total 22.2 trillion won (1.251 trillion won by 1999)
Project Content
· Area to be developed : 401㎢
- Land : 283㎢
- Freshwater Lake : 118㎢
- Sea Dikes : 33.9㎞ from Gunsan to Buan
Sea Dikes
Length
Cost
Term
· 33㎞ (19㎞ completed with 59% constructed)
· 1.73 trillion won (1.251 trillion by 1999)
· November 1991-2003
Saemangeum 
Lake
Lake Size
Basin Size
Total Pondage
Effective Pondage
No. of days
Average Depth
River Inflow
· 96.7㎢ (Mangyeong Lake: 68.1㎢, Dongjin Lake: 28.6㎢)
· 2,924㎢ (30.2 times larger than the lake)
· 535 million tons
· 355 million tons
·  129 days (in normal season), 98 days (with the Geum River water of 20 CMS)
· 5.5m
·  7 Streams and Rivers including the Mangyeong River (57.0㎞), the Dongjin 
River (43.9㎞), and the Jeonju Stream
Internal 
Development 
Project
Total Size
Cost
· 283㎢
· 480 billion won
Source : Saemangeum Master Plan
4) Project Agency
The Saemangeum Project began in 1991 under the supervision of the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries. However, as its purposes multiplied, a host of government agencies such as 
the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the 
Ministry of Education and Science Technology, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, the Ministry of 
Environment, and the North Jeolla Provincial Office formed a project agency. The Ministry for Food, 
Agriculture, Forestry was responsible for building water banks, agricultural land, and rural towns; the 
Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs for building infrastructure, such as roads and ports, 
and sites for multi-functional and hinterland cities; the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism for 
developing a R&D site; the Ministry of Knowledge Economy for setting up a new renewable energy site; 
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and the Ministry of Environment for creating an environmental site. The Saemangeum Development 
Committee, established under the Prime Minister’s Office and the Saemangeum Development Task 
Force, which supports the committee, was responsible for coordinating and fine-tuning the project.
5) Project Progress
The progress of the Saemangeum Project is as follows.
Table2-5-2  Saemangeum Project Progress
Date Content
1971-1986 · Investigation on potential sites for the Saemangeum Project and other basics
1986-1991
·  Analysis of economic feasibility, assessment of environmental impact, legal procedures 
such as collection of residents’ agreement
November 28th, 1991 · Initiation of the Saemangeum Seawall construction
May 1999-August 2000 ·  Initiation of public-private joint research on water quality, tidal flat, economic feasibility
May 25th, 2001
·  Decision of the Korean Government to set up an eco-friendly, gradual development 
direction
August 2000-
March 2006
·  Ongoing litigation against the project  
(The government won the case at the Supreme Court)
April 21st, 2006 · Final closure of the seawall
April 3rd, 2007
·  Establishment of the Saemangeum Land Development Plan  
(farmland 72%, non-farmland 28%)
December 27th, 2007
·  Legislation of the Special Act on Promotion of the Saemangeum Project 
(The Act went into effect on Dec. 28th, 2008)
April 2008
·  Designation of 2,860 ha of the Saemangeum area as a part of the Saemangeum and 
Gunsan Free Economic Zone
October 2008
·  Revision of the Saemangeum Land Development Plan into a complex development at 
a Cabinet meeting
December 2008
·  Approval of the revised Saemangeum Land Development Plan by the Ministry for 
Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
July 23rd, 2009
·  Announcement of a draft of the Comprehensive Plan on Saemangeum Development 
(FDI+International business+tourism and leisure ⇒ development into a high-end 
complex city)
January 28th, 2010
·  Announcement of the final Basic Land Development Plan and Comprehensive 
Implementation Plan on Saemangeum
April 27th, 2010 · Completion ceremony for the Saemangeum Seawall 
March 16th, 2011 · Release of the Master Plan of the Saemangeum Project 
The progress is divided into four phases as follows.
(1) Before the Formation of the Public-Private Joint Investigation Group (1971-May 1999)
Investigation on potential sites and basic items was conducted in 1971 for the Saemangeum 
Project. Since the mid-1980s, the government have gone through a host of preparatory work including 
economic feasibility analysis, basic plan, consultation with relevant government offices, environmental 
impact assessment, public announcement, collection of residents’ consent, issuance of Public Water 
Reclamation Licenses. It launched the construction of the seawall on November 28th, 1991.
The early stage of the project went smoothly until environmental activist groups began stressing the 
need to preserve mud flats in a bid to join the Ramsar Convention21) in 1996. At the same time, Sihwa 
Lake’s water pollution issue aroused concerns about the Saemangeum Project. As the water quality 
of the Mangyeong River, the upper stream river flowing into the Saemangeum Lake, exceeded the 
standards required for agricultural water, it was necessary to improve and protect water quality of the 
upper stream river and the Saemangeum Lake. In addition, the value of mud flat, which has not been 
previously considered in reclamation projects, and the impact of reclamation projects including impact 
on marine ecosystem, came to the fore for public debate.
North Jeolla Province environmentalists’ campaign against the project in 1997 grew into a public 
debate over whether to stop the project, as the voices of civic groups became louder and the 
importance of global environmental protection grew along with the launch of the “Government of 
the People” of the Kim Dae-jung administration in 1998. On April 27th, 1998, the Board of Audit and 
Inspection of Korea initiated a special inspection on the project and released its report on September 
24th. The report estimated that the plan to develop a multi-functional industrial complex, instead of 
an agricultural land, would cost 28 trillion won, which provided a reason for the groups against the 
project to question the economic feasibility of the project.
On January 11th, 1999, Yu Jong-geun, the Governor of North Jeolla Province, said at a press 
conference that the entire project could be reexamined. On the next day, Kim Seong-hun, then 
the Minister of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries also said that he would consider the 
reexamination upon the provincial office’s request. Environmental groups demanded a complete halt 
or cancellation of the project and a public-private joint investigation for a fair evaluation. In response 
to these demands, North Jeolla Province suggested a public-private joint investigation on January 
14th, 1999. The Commission on Protection of the Quality and Supply of Fresh Water Resources under 
the Office of the Prime Minister conducted four rounds of relevant ministry meetings and two rounds 
of private committee meetings on water management policies and finalized a joint investigation plan 
21)  The Ramsar Convention is an international treaty for the conservation and sustainable utilization of wetlands. On February 2nd, 1971, 18 na-
tions gathered and signed the convention in Ramsar, Iran, which took effect on December 21st, 1975. As of 2008, 157 nations joined the con-
vention with Korea the 101th member. In 2008, Korea held the 10th Conference of Parties meeting in Changwon, South Gyeongsang Province.
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for the environmental assessment of the Saemangeum Project on April 22nd, 1999. On May 19th, the 
government formed a public-private joint investigation task force on the environmental assessment 
of the Saemangeum Project and decided to temporarily suspend the construction of the seawall and 
conduct an overall review of environmental impact assessment of the project.
(2)  Public-Private Joint Investigation on Environmental Assessment and Government’s Deliberations 
on Decision (May 1999-May 2001)
The joint investigation task force was mandated to investigate, research, assess, and review 
environmental impact, economic feasibility including the economic value of mud flat and rice paddies, 
modeling outcomes of the Saemangeum Lake’s water quality estimations, and draft protection 
measures of water quality. For about 16 months from May 1999 to August 2000, each subcommittee 
conducted an in-depth review on three aspects including economic feasibility, environmental 
preservation, and the possibility of water quality preservation in the Saemangeum Lake. On August 
18th, 2000, the task force submitted its final report to the Prime Minister’s Office and was dissolved.
As the joint task force was disbanded without having reached a conclusion whether to stop the 
project or not, the Prime Minister’s Office then took over the project from the Ministry for Food, 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Since August 2000, the political circles, the government, and civic 
groups have been in a heated debate whether to continue the project. The Korean Federation for 
Environmental Movement, the Green Korea United, some religious groups, and supportive figures 
from the academic and cultural circles banded together to issue a statement urging the immediate 
halt of the project by shedding a spotlight on its water quality issues and economic value of mud flat. 
In result, the Saemangeum project became embroiled in a nationwide dispute.
Against this backdrop, the Ministry of Environment submitted a report to the Prime Minister’s 
Office in late 2000, which basically said that the water quality of the Saemangeum Lake could not 
be improved to level IV, the standard water quality level with a total phosphorus concentration less 
than 0.10 milligram per liter. The Ministry of Environment, citing the results of the National Institute 
of Environmental Research on the water quality under the scenario suggested by the Ministry for 
Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, North Jeolla Province and the joint investigation task force, 
concluded that regardless of the counter measures, the water quality could not be improved to the 
suitable level for agricultural water, indirectly expressing its opposition to the project.
Upon receiving the report from the ministry, the Commission on Protection of the Quality and Supply 
of Fresh Water Resources at the Prime Minister’s Office immediately ordered relevant authorities to review 
existing water quality protection measures all over again and to design additional measures to lower the 
level of water contaminants flowing into the Saemangeum Lake. In early March 2001, the Ministry of 
Oceans and Fisheries expressed its opposition, citing concerns over severe marine pollution and extensive 
damage to the tidal flat. As such, opinions diverged within the government: the Ministry for Food, 
Agriculture, Forestry and North Jeolla Province argued for the project, whereas the Ministry of Environment 
and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries suggested its suspension. A tug-of-war continued until May 2001.
On May 7th, 2001, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Commission on Sustainable Development 
co-hosted three rounds of public discussions to reach an agreement, which bore no fruit. Considering 
the outcome of the joint committee and the public opinion compiled from the public discussion, 
the government settled on an eco-friendly, gradual development and resumed the project on May 
25th, 2001. The plan was first to develop the relatively cleaner Dongjin River and later to develop the 
Mangyeong River after the reassessment of the water quality improvement effects. In August 2001, 
the government announced detailed action plans, in which the Task Force for Environmental Impact of 
Saemangeum Project was to be set up under the Office for Government Policy Coordination and the 
Water Quality Protection Committee under the North Jeolla Provincial Office in order to monitor and 
evaluate the implementation measures of environmental policies of the project.
(3) After the Government’s Policy Decision (June 2001-April 2006)
The campaign against the Saemangeum Project had been quiet for about a year after the 
government’s policy decision in 2001. With the beginning of Roh Moo-hyun administration, the 
Saemangeum project became once again a social issue in lieu with opposition movements against 
most of the national projects such as the Gyeongin Canal, the Seoul Ring Expressway, Gyeongbu High-
Speed Railway, radioactive waste processing facilities and the Hantan River dam. With the argument 
that a large-scale agricultural land development was no longer needed due to years of good rice 
harvest, some religious leaders and environmental groups led a “three steps and one bow” walk for 
305㎞ from Buan to Seoul, attracting wide media coverage. This, in turn, stirred a serious dispute over 
the project, making it as the most conflictual national project in Korea.
The protesters also filed a lawsuit against the project to stop it. Environmental groups and some 
local fishermen filed a total of five lawsuits such as three administrative litigations, one constitutional 
complaint, and one request for suspension of execution, in order to stop the project’s reclamation 
license (Table 2-5-3).
However, the Supreme Court ruled that “there were no flaws big enough to disturb the 
project’s purpose and as the constitution recognizes the value of not only the environment but 
also development, a balanced, reasonable, and rational approach is needed to resolve the issue of 
conflicting values of environmental protection and development in implementing the project.” As 
such, the legal battle, which had lasted for four years and seven months, came to an end in favor 
of the government. On April 21st, 2006, the successful completion of the last tide embankment 
construction settled the dispute over the seawall construction for the time being.
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Table2-5-3  Lawsuits against the Saemangeum Project
Case Name Plaintiff Defendant Content Progress and Ruling
Administrative 
Litigation
Jeon Su-
jin and 174 
others
(Green Korea 
United)
·  Minister of 
Agriculture, 
Food and 
Rural 
Affairs
·  Minister of 
Oceans and 
Fisheries
 Cancelation of 
public water 
reclamation license
· Filing date: May 4th, 2000
·  Original ruling: July 25th, 2001 - 
dismissed
·  Appeal Court ruling: May 15th, 2003 - 
dismissed
※  The case was ruled unqualified as it 
did not go through administrative 
trial procedures and had unqualified 
plaintiffs
Constitutional 
Complaint
Jo Gyeong-
hun and 
3,538 others
(Korean 
Federation for 
Environmental 
Movement)
·  Prime 
Minister
·  Minister of 
Agriculture, 
Food and 
Rural 
Affairs
 Cancelation of 
the government’s 
policies and plans
· Filing date: August 22nd, 2001
·  Court ruling: January 30th, 2003 - 
dismissed
※ Unqualified constitutional complaint
Request for 
Suspension of 
Execution
Choe Yeol, Jo 
Gyeong-hun, 
Sin Hyeong-
rok and others
·  Prime 
Minister
·  Minister of 
Agriculture, 
Food and 
Rural 
Affairs
 Suspension of 
execution of the 
Saemangeum 
Seawall
· Filing date: June 12th, 2003
·  Original ruling: July 15th, 2003 (decision 
to suspend the execution)
·  Immediate complaint: July 15th, 2003 
(Seoul High Court)
·  Appeal Court ruling: January 29th, 
2004 (reversing of the original ruling)
·  Withdrawal of the suit: January 12th, 
2005 (The government won the case)
Administrative 
Litigation
Jo Gyeong-
hun and 
3,538 others
(Korean 
Federation for 
Environmental 
Movement)
·  Prime 
Minister
·  Minister of 
Agriculture, 
Food and 
Rural 
Affairs
 Cancelation of 
the government’s 
policies and plans
· Filing date: August 22nd, 2001
·  Original ruling: February 4th, 2005 
(Seoul Administrative Court)
·  Appeal Court ruling: December 21st, 
2005 (The government won the case)
·  Supreme Court ruling: March 16th, 
2006 (The government won the case)
※ Final supreme court decision
Administrative 
Litigation
Lee Hwa-sun 
and 60 others
·  Minister of 
Agriculture, 
Food and 
Rural 
Affairs
 Revocation of 
refusal disposition 
of the request for 
the cancelation 
of public water 
reclamation license
· Filing date: July 27th, 2005 
·  Withdrawal of the suit: March 21st, 
2006 (The government won the case)
(4) After the Seawall Construction (April 2006-)
Since the government won the legal battle, the construction of the Saemangeum Seawall 
continued and, in April 2006, the 33.9㎞-long seawall was completely connected. In addition, the 
construction to reinforce cross sections and level up the road was scheduled to be completed in the 
first half of 2011. For the convenience of local residents and tourists, the road on the seawall was 
temporarily opened in April 2010.
The government designed the land development plan with the site mostly developed into farmland 
(72 percent farmland and 28 percent non-farmland) in April 2007. However, in October 2008, the 
government revised the land use plan allocating 30 percent of farmland and 70 percent of multi-
functional land to meet the future demand associated with the idea of Northeast Asia’s economic hub. 
This revision was based on an intensive review including the feasibility study of Korea Research Institute 
for Human Settlements, public hearings, briefing sessions for farmers’ associations, consultations with 
local governments, and Cabinet meeting reports.
Under the revised plan, the government finalized and announced the Saemangeum Basic 
Development Plan and the Comprehensive Action Plan on Saemangeum Development on January 
28th, 2010, which incorporates a broad land usage and infrastructure plan. These plans aimed at 
developing the inland tideland gradually into sites for farming, industries, tourism, new renewable 
energy, and environmental purposes. Based on the spatial planning suggested by the Saemangeum 
Basic Development Plan, the Sixth Saemangeum Development Committee, in March 16th, 2011, 
examined and finalized a comprehensive development plan, which includes more specific land use 
plan for eight sites and an infrastructure building plan.
3. Arguments and Grounds of Proponents and Opponents
1) Issues and Logic of Proponents and Opponents
(1) The Need for Prime Farmland Development
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents argued against the large-scale prime farmland development project, citing 
reasons such as excessive rice inventory, curtailment policies including set-aside payment 
programs for rice paddies, and continuous decrease in farmland and rice consumption. 
Considering such background conditions, the opponents emphasized the weak rationale for 
farmland development.
 They added that it was meaningless to estimate the value of food security amidst the 
current international circumstances and a liberalization trend of global trade. And it was also 
unreasonable to appraise the security value of rice with the Contingent Valuation Method, 
despite the existence of market value for rice. The opponents also argued that the valuation 
method conducted by non-professionals entailed a risk of double calculation of agricultural 
benefits, the creation of a new freshwater lake, and the effect of expanding national territory.
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 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The government had a firm stance that the long-term stable supply of staple crops was 
necessary by securing prime farmlands, considering the extreme weathers worldwide, the 
possibility of food shortages in China, food crisis in North Korea, the domestic food self-
sufficiency rate of 27 percent, and the necessity of farmland restructuring such as the 
utilization of marginal farmland with falling productivity when converted into a farmland.
 Supplemental arguments were made by the government. The world grain market was highly 
volatile, as only a few grain exporters could manipulate grain prices through export restrictions 
and price control. The Presidential Advisory Council on Science and Technology reported that 
global food production had increased 2.3 percent in the 1990s, while the global population 
had increased more than 10 percent, posing serious burden on food supply. The General 
Director of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Jacques Diouf, was quoted to have 
warned of imminent global food crisis due to the shortage of grain inventory and its soaring 
prices. With respect to rice in particular, the International Rice Research Institute was quoted 
to have expected that Asia would experience food shortages in the mid-21st century and food 
security would become more important than military security. The government further argued 
that, with smaller arable land per capita and lower food self-sufficiency rate, Korea would 
need to secure productive farmland in order to gain a foothold in competition for global 
agricultural products amidst the increasingly open global market due to free trade agreements 
and the Doha Development Agenda.
(2) Water Quality Improvement of Saemangeum Lake
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents argued that the project should be cancelled, as it was impossible to improve 
the water quality for the following reasons: possible lawsuits like those related to Lake Sihwa; 
infeasible government’s measures to improve water quality; recent lifting of the greenbelt 
in Jeonju; difficulties in reducing fertilization on farmlands and in attaining the Ministry of 
Environment’s water improvement target.
 With respect to water quality, the joint committee, based on the water quality improvement 
measures suggested in the project plan, predicted the level of total phosphorus (“T-P”) 
concentration of 0.19 milligram per liter for the Mangyeong River and 0.10 milligram per liter 
for the Dongjin River. The Board of Audit and Inspection expected 12.1 milligram per liter 
of Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) level. Even with all the theoretically possible measures 
implemented, Mangyeong River’s water quality would still fall short of the standard level IV, 
estimated at 0.103 milligram per liter of T-P concentration. The estimated T-P concentration 
level would not be critical to agricultural water. However, as hyper-eutrophic conditions were 
expected, it might lead to excessive breeding or extinction of birds and negative impacts on 
the lake’s ecosystem during the process of dissolution, which would make it harder to manage 
water quality in the Mangyeong River. In short, the opponents insisted that the project itself 
could possibly go to waste, failing to achieve its goal to supply agricultural water.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The government held a position that it had already achieved or is nearly achieving the 2012 
forecasted water quality level of the Ministry of Environment, due to reasons such as the 
fundamental differences between Saemangeum Lake and Sihwa Lake, firm implementation 
of water quality measures such as basic treatment facilities, the designation of the green 
belt in Jeonju area, the introduction of a total pollution load management system, and the 
accomplishment of the reduction target of fertilization. It also added that continuous water 
quality management policies would help fully achieve the target quality.
 The government saw it feasible to attain a target to reduce 94.5 percent of livestock manure 
discharged from Wanggung livestock farming estates located in the upper basin of the 
Saemangeum Lake as the target for the Saemangeum area was not exceptional, but similar to 
those of Korea’s major rivers; 95.9 percent for the Nakdong River, 93.9 percent for the Geum 
River, and 93.4 percent for the Yeongsan River. The government added further explanations: 
while total phosphorous can cause hyper-eutrophic conditions, algae caused by hyper-
eutrophic conditions emerges temporarily and limitedly only when external conditions are 
satisfied; and it does not pose serious problems, as lakes have active water circulation and 
receive muddy water when flooded.
 As for Korea’s freshwater lakes located in the estuary of a river, similar to the Saemangeum 
Lake, the Namyang Lake’s T-P concentration level temporarily rose to 0.348 milligram per liter 
in July 2000, but regained its normal level of 0.008 in August. The figure ranged from 0.093 
to 0.679 for the Asan Lake, from 0.079 to 0.248 for the Sapgyo Lake, and from 0.048 to 
0.178 for the Yeongsan Lake. However, they neither have algae formation by hyper-eutrophic 
conditions on a constant basis nor any problems in supplying agricultural water.
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Figure2-5-2  T-P Concentration in Korea’s Freshwater Lakes
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Source : Hong Uk-hi. “Environmental Disputes Cost Three Trillion Won: Saemangeum.” Jiseong, 2004. 160.
(3) Economic Feasibility of Saemangeum Lake
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents asserted that mud flat should be preserved for the following reasons: 1) the 
joint committee’s economic feasibility study was distorted with double-counting; 2) ecological 
value of mud flat is higher than that of agricultural land; 3) the estuary wetland has scarcity 
value; and 4) the area is a global destination for migratory birds. Furthermore, mud flat is 
emphasized as sustainable resources with its growing value over time. New valuation methods 
such as integrated model of ecology and economy would emerge and improve methods to 
measure the value of mud flat. Quoting the estimated ecological value of the estuary mud flat 
worth 9,990 dollars per hectare, which is 100 times more than that of agricultural land worth 
92 dollars, from the Nature journal, the opponents came up with the estimated value of the 
Saemangeum area between 200 to 800 billion won per year if preserved.
 They added that Korea, as a signatory of the Ramsar Convention and a member of the World 
Trade Organization, might ruin its reputation when it damages or destroys the environment. 
Once again, the importance of the Saemangeum tidal flat as an international habitat for 
migratory birds was emphasized.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 Both economic feasibility studies, conducted by the Korea Institute for Industry and Economics 
in 1988 and the joint committee in 2001, were said to be reliable since many experts from the 
academia participated in them. The proponents rebutted that article in Nature journal, often 
cited by environmental activist groups, lacked fairness as it estimated the value of rice fields at 
110,000 won per hectare, while arguing that a vast area of valuable tidal flat still remained.
 From 1986 to 1988, the Korea Institute for Industry and Economics carried out an economic 
feasibility study on three types of development: agriculture-centered development, agriculture 
and fisheries oriented development, and comprehensive development. The study revealed 
that the agriculture and fisheries oriented development, for which the reclamation license was 
issued, was economically feasible, posting the benefit to cost ratio at 1.19 with a 10 percent 
discount rate and the internal rate of return at 11.5 percent. Values for tidal flats and agricultural 
lands differed by experts; the Sejong Institute at Sejong University estimated that the value of 
agricultural land was 2.6 times higher than that of the tidal flat; the Korea Institute for Industry 
and Economics, 1.9 times higher; and Chung-Ang University, 1.4 times higher. Being wetlands 
like tidal flats, agricultural land was pointed out to play various environmental preservation roles 
and was expected to have increasingly higher value in the future than tidal flats.
Table2-5-4  Issues of the Saemangeum Project’s Economic Feasibility
Classification Proponents’ Arguments Opponents’ Arguments Remarks
Land 
Expansion 
Effect
 28,300 ha, 84 times larger 
than Yeouido, Seoul
 Increase in agricultural and fishery 
products, prevention of flood, and 
provision of shelter were already counted 
and thus there existed double counting
 Double counting 
eliminated by a scenario 
analysis
Value of Food 
Security
 Annual benefit of 42.9 
billion won 
 Overstated and abstract value of rice 
security
Same as above
Public Interests 
of Rice Fields
 Annual benefit of 
380.6 billion won: flood 
control, water quality 
improvement 
 Overstated benefit, considering the total 
value of the tidal flat
 Aesthetic and scenery 
value of rice fields should 
be considered
Tourism 
Benefits
 Annual benefit of 143.3 
billion won as of 2030
 Doubts over the reliability of the study -
Value of Tidal 
Flat
 Annual benefit of 242.2-
501.7 billion won
 Omitted value of various biological 
resources and birds, and increasing value 
of tidal flat
Cost Team’s analysis
Rise in Land 
Value of 
Gogunsan
 158-220.2 billion won 
 Calculation of financial benefits from 
public projects goes against academic 
customs
-
Value of 
Fishery Product
 Annual value of 50 billion 
won as of 2013 
 Omitted decrease in fishery products 
around the Saemangeum area
 Cost Team did not 
submit the analysis data
Source :  National Commission on Sustainable Development’s report on the Saemangeum Project, “Inflated Economic Feasibility of 
Saemangeum.” Donga Daily 13 March 2001.: 32
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The proponents refuted the arguments of environmental groups on the grounds that: the Ramsar 
Convention focused on wise utilization of tidal flat for food supply rather than on its preservation; the 
World Trade Organization recognized the multifaceted function of agricultural land;, and the most 
populated habitats in Korea for migratory birds were mostly reclaimed lakes or farmlands such as the 
Cheonsu Gulf and Yeongsan Lake.
Table2-5-5  Value of Saemangeum Tidal Flats vs. Value of Rice Fields
Classification
Korea Ocean Research & 
Development Institute
Korea Institute for 
Industry & Economics
Chung-Ang Univ.
Research Object Tidal flat and farmland
Phase IV of Yeongsan 
river development
Saemangeum Area
Report Date December 1996 July 1998 November 1999
Value of Tidal 
Flat per ha
20.25 million won 9.36 million won 9.01 million won
Value of 
Farmland per ha
6.1 million won 17.37 million won 12.76 million won
Compared 
Economic Value
Value of tidal flat was 3.3 
times higher than that of 
farmland
Value of farmland was 
1.9 times higher than 
that of tidal flat
Value of farmland was 1.4 
times higher than that of 
tidal flat
Remarks
·  Case studies of wetland 
focusing on biological value 
in other countries were 
applied to tidal flat in Korea
·  Farmland was only 
evaluated for its rice 
production
·  Natural disaster control 
and atmosphere clean-
up function was not 
reflected in the value 
of tidal flat
·  Environmental value of 
farmland not reflected in 
other country studies was 
considered
·  Farmland had environmental 
clean-up function, 1.3 times 
higher than that of tidal flat
Source : Hong Uk-hi. “Environmental Disputes Cost Three Trillion Won: Saemangeum.” Jiseong, 2004. 106.
(4) Stoppage of Seawall Construction and Seawater Circulation
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents claimed it was more favorable and economical for regional development to 
stop embankment construction at the mouth of the seawall and to open a part of the fourth 
seawall and build a bridge across the gap so as to let seawater circulate permanently and to 
preserve the tidal flat.
 They also criticized that even if the development took place gradually, it would stop seawater 
circulation, which, in turn, would destroy the intertidal zone and marine ecosystem. Moreover, 
when the Saemangeum waters were desalinated, it was pointed out that the increase in 
chemical oxygen demand would reach a whopping 90 milligram per liter.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The government asserted that, although past reclamation cases showed a partial increase in 
pollution during the process of desalination, it could be effectively eased through sluice gates 
and bottom water removal facilities. For example, the Geumho Lake in South Jeolla Province, 
of which the seawall was completed and the desalination process began in 1996, revealed 
the water quality of 3.2 to 6.9 milligram per liter at an early stage of desalination in 1997 and 
maintained the quality in the range of 3.7 to 6.8 milligram per liter until now, satisfying the 
agricultural water standards.
 The government explained that if the construction was suspended, leaving the 2.7㎞-long 
mouth incomplete, the originally expected outcomes of the project would all have be 
abandoned, including prime farmland and freshwater lakes. It also added that dirt and rocks, 
which composed an already completed seawall, would be washed away by the fast current 
and high waves, which, in turn, would cause enormous environmental damages and massive 
economic losses. If this happened, there would be strong protests by local residents, who 
had expected the project to be completed ahead of schedule, and thus would add social 
confusion.
2) Persuasion Strategy
(1) Parties in Conflict
Parties in conflict surrounding the Saemangeum Project are divided into the proponents, the Korean 
government and North Jeolla Province, and the opponents, environmental activist groups and some 
local fishermen. There were different opinions about the project among ministries, such as the Ministry 
of Environment and the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, as well as among local residents.
The Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries maintained a consistent stance 
that the project should be completed in order to achieve national development and agricultural 
competitiveness, considering the circumstances wherein the country is situated. The ministry took a 
position that decisions on land use will be made after fully reflecting opinions from various sectors 
regarding the study by the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, while carrying out 
environmental measures to improve the quality of the Saemangeum Lake. The Ministry of Environment 
was skeptical about the quality preservation of the Saemangeum Lake, while the Ministry of Oceans 
and Fisheries focused on the preservation of the tidal flat. To the public, these different stances 
certainly looked like discords within the government.
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Figure2-5-3  Parties in Conflict and Arguments
The central government Environmental groups
North Jeolla Province Local fishermen
·Immediate stoppage of the seawall construction
·Seawater circulation and preservation of tidal flat
   - Opposition to completion of the seawall
* Participation of some religious groups and academic figures
·Project completion is necessary
·Plan for an industrial and logistics complex
   - Sizable agricultural land is also required
* Recognized as growth engine for North Jeolla Province's 
   development
·Preservation of tidal flat and continuation of fishing
·Complaint about compensation for the project
   - Measures for livelihood during the project
* Different opinions among local residents
·Pursuing an eco-friendly Saemangeum Development Project
·Reexamination of the Land Use Plan
   - Study conducted by Korea Research Institute for Human 
     Settlements
* Different opinions held by Ministry of Environment and 
   Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries
From the early stages of the project, North Jeolla Province continued to hold a position that the 
Saemangeum project should be completed as a growth engine for the province. Local residents mostly 
thought that the province lagged behind other regions in economic growth. While dissatisfied with 
the movement of environmental groups, who opposed to the project, local residents reacted strongly. 
With a local government at the front, they rolled up their sleeves to improve water quality of the 
Mangyeong and Dongjin River, waging a voluntary clean-up campaign.
Environmental activist groups and some religious groups, which were mainly comprised of members 
of the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement and Green Korea United, demanded an 
immediate halt of the project and made it clear that there would be no dialogue without the promise 
of the stoppage of the seawall construction. While amplifying the core issues of the debate such as 
water pollution of the Saemangeum Lake, the economic value of the tidal flat, and the unnecessary 
development of large-scale farmland, these groups raised consitutional complaints, suspension of 
execution, and administrative litigation along with various campaigns one after another.
As the project emerged as social conflict, local fishermen in the Saemangeum area became the new 
stakeholder. They received substantial compensation as they were in favor of the project at an early 
stage of the development. However, as the project was prolonged due to the opposition movement 
by environmental groups and their compensation was exhausted, some of them turned their backs 
on the project. On the contrary, most local fishermen were hoping for the prompt completion of the 
seawall construction, which would boost the local economy and create new fishing grounds outside 
the seawall so that they could go back to work.
(2) Types of Conflicts
An acute confrontation between proponents and opponents was a cause of conflict in the 
Saemangeum project. Opponents took diverse and active strategies. The types of conflicts came in the 
form of lawsuits, media campaigns, symposiums, academic conferences, and various events such as 
artistic performances. In particular, as environmental issues became a social interest, journalists’ role to 
report the arguments of environmental activist groups had a grave impact on amplifying the disputes 
between the proponents and the opponents.
In addition, media pieces written by scholars majoring in humanities and sociology, who 
recognized the value of environment, made an emotional appeal to the public. Some religious leaders’ 
performance such as a “three steps and one bow” walk,22) had a strong appeal. These movements 
made public recognize the project as a major social conflict by focusing on the problems instead of the 
whole picture of the project.
Another type of strategy often used by groups and individuals who oppose the national projects 
is lawsuits. Regarding the Saemangeum project, although Green Korea United organized a lawsuit 
in defense of future generation and the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement brought a 
constitutional complaint. Even though two administrative litigations were dismissed one after another 
by the court, they brought a similar litigation to the court in another name.
These groups also waged a campaign to make the Saemangeum an international issue by 
participating in international environment-related events and forging solidarity with globally renowned 
environmental activist groups such as Japanese environmental groups against the Isahaya Bay 
Reclamation Project.
22)  ”Three steps and one bow” walk is the most humble and respectable way to practice asceticism and pray with repentance in Buddhism. Prayers 
walk three steps, prostrate, rise and repeat.
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Table2-5-6  Major Issues and Arguments of Proponents and Opponents over Saemangeum Project
Classification
Opponents
(Environmental Organizations)
Proponents (Government)
Concerns 
over Another 
Environmental 
Disaster Such 
as Sihwa 
Project
 Considering the fact that, 
compared to Lake Sihwa, 
Saemangeum Lake is shallower 
in depth and 1.3 times 
larger in per unit population, 
accommodating 8 times 
more Korean native cattle, 
13 times more pigs, and 10 
times more rice paddies and 
5 times more fields, there will 
be more serious environmental 
problems, if Saemangeum 
turns into a freshwater lake
·  Comparison between the two lakes is impossible because 
Lake Saemangeum is fundamentally different from Lake 
Sihwa in terms of several factors, including distribution of 
pollution sources, quality of inflow rivers, and circulation 
cycle of lake water
-  Water Quality : Lake Sihwa 27.5㎎/l, Mangyeong River 
7.1㎎/l, Dongjin River 2.9㎎/
-  Circulation Cycle： Lake Sihwa 10 months, Lake 
Saemangeum 2.5 months
·  Unlike Lake Sihwa, in which problems emerged 
after the final closure, measures on water quality 
were implemented before the final closure in Lake 
Saemangeum
Livestock 
Manure
 94.5-percent treatment target 
of livestock manure is not 
feasible
 94.5-percent treatment target of livestock manure from 
the Wanggung livestock complex on the upper region of 
Lake Saemangeum is similar to water quality control targets 
in Korea’s other major rivers (Nakdong River 95.9%, Geum 
River 93.9%, Yeongsan River 93.4%
Loss of 
Migratory 
Birds’ Habitat
 Loss of tidal flats will cause loss 
of migratory birds’ habitat and 
subsequently, migrant birds
 The census of winter birds conducted by the Ministry 
of Environment in 1999 showed that the top 7 most 
popular habitats out of 69 places for migratory birds were 
reclaimed lands (60.6%, 1.068 million birds)
Reduction of 
Shellfish
 Saemangeum project will 
cause 50-percent reduction of 
shellfish nationwide
 Statistical Yearbook of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
published by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries in 1999 
indicated that the volume of shellfish produced by the 
entire general fishing and aquafarming industry of North 
Jeolla Province took up a mere 3.3% of Korea’s total 
production in 1998 (Argument of 50-percent decrease 
turned out to be erroneous)
- Nationwide 319,000 tons, Northern Jeolla 11,000 tons
Loss of Tidal 
Flats
 If the Saemangeum 
project starts, tidal flats of 
Saemangeum, which are the 
treasure trove of the marine 
ecosystem, will go extinct
 Even after the seawall was formed in the Southwestern 
coastal region by tidal sedimentation, new tidal flats have 
continued to be created
-  219㎢ of tidal flats have been created in Saemangeum 
after the projects were conducted in the Okgu, Jinbong, 
and Gwanghwal regions between the 1920s and 1940s, 
the Gyehwa region in 1968
-  Tidal flats were also created in Asan, Sapgyo, lower 
region of the Geum River, and the Southern region of 
Ganghwa
(3) Persuasion Strategy on Conflicts
The government and project operators made diverse efforts to resolve the conflicts and forge 
social consensus. For the first time in Korea’s history, a public-private joint investigation team on 
environmental impact of a national project was formed and operated, and issues were publicly 
discussed through open forums. Efforts were also made to promote the project nationwide and 
persuade the public. After the project was decided to proceed, the Committee for Environmental 
Improvement of Saemangeum Project was formed and operated, leading the Saemangeum project to 
become an eco-friendly one through monitoring environmental impact and water quality.
With the Water Quality Improvement Task Force of the Prime Minister’s Office playing a key role in 
intergovernmental discussions during April 1999, the government announced the Public-Private Joint 
Investigation Plan on the Environmental Impact of Saemangeum Project on April 22nd, 1999. The Public-
Private Joint Investigation team was composed of three subcommittees, including economic feasibility, 
water quality, and marine and environment, including a total of 30 members (21 experts from the private 
sector and 9 director-generals of relevant government agencies). Of the 20 experts except the head of 
the investigation team, ten members were recommended by relevant government agencies, while the 
other ten members were recommended by environment organizations. Investigation and research plans 
of the team were approved after plenary sessions, and the results of investigation were confirmed at 
the plenary sessions after the review of subcommittee meetings. The introduction and operation of the 
Public-Private Joint Investigation team was meaningful in that it was the first system in Korea introduced 
under the aim of managing conflicts and forming social consensus over a national project.
In the process of laying out additional government measures after the completion of the public-
private joint investigation, open forums were held by multiple stakeholders, such as the National 
Assembly, academia, civil groups, and media. Between May 7th and May 11th, 2001, three rounds 
of open forums and assessment sessions were held jointly by the Office for Government Policy 
Coordination and the Commission on Sustainable Development. During the open forums, there were 
disputes among the government, private experts, environmental organizations, and North Jeolla 
residents, and intensified debates about the pros and cons of the project among the public. In result, 
there was no way of reaching an agreement through discussion.
During the two-year period of the joint investigation and open forums, the government realized 
that the halt of the seawall construction that had already proceeded for nearly ten years was causing 
soil erosion and thus a waste of budget. Moreover, the government became aware of that, if the 
disputes went unchecked, conflicts and distrust might grow and lead to division of public opinion. 
Therefore, the government made a judgement that it was urgent to make a reasonable decision based 
on investigation results and opinions collected so far. Against this backdrop, on May 25th, 2001, the 
government held the Coordinating Committee on Water Management Policy chaired by the Prime 
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Minister and decided on the policy of eco-friendly sequential development in which “the seawall will 
be completed under the condition that Dongjin waters with relatively high water quality will be among 
the first areas to be developed, whereas the development of Mangyeong waters will be postponed 
until its water quality satisfies the target standards.”
On August 6th, 2001, in accordance with government policy, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, and Northern Jeolla 
Province respectively set out their own detailed follow-up plans for the implementation of environment 
measures, and the Task Force for Environmental Measures of Saemangeum Project joined by private 
experts was set up within the Office for Government Policy Coordination to monitor and assess the 
progress of implementation of environment measures.
Policy promotions toward the general public were also actively pursued. In response to 
environmental organizations’ aggressive media manipulation, public relations placed an emphasis on 
the economic benefits of the project such as territorial expansion, securing water resources, increasing 
food production, reducing traffic, preventing floods, and promoting tourism, while raising the public 
awareness of the government determination towards environmentally friendly development such as 
the efforts to improve the water quality of Lake Saemangeum, and the need for securing farmlands in 
preparation for future food shortage. Diverse PR methods, such as media, PR materials, advertisements, 
the Internet, and field visits, were adopted to promote understanding and persuade the public.
Feature writings were heralded through holding press conferences and distributing press releases on 
each issue, concerning the construction of final closing of the Saemangeum seawall, court decisions 
on the Saemangeum lawsuit, and decisions on the land use of Saemangeum. Journalists, including 
correspondents and editorialists, were invited to the site and were encouraged to broadcast and report 
on the activities on the site and relevant interviews. Experts in the fields of civil engineering, environment, 
and tourism, and representatives from relevant institutions who supported the project contributed 
articles to newspapers and participated in open forums on TV and interview programs to highlight the 
need for the project. PR videos that filmed the progress of the project and blueprints were made and 
shown to visitors at the construction site, and pamphlets, leaflets, and brochures were also distributed. 
In addition, a TV documentary about overseas eco-friendly reclamation projects, including those in the 
Netherlands, Japan, and China, was made and broadcast, and CDs were distributed. In crisis situations 
like court ruling of suspension of execution and a defeat in the first trial, advertisements appeared in 
media featuring agricultural organizations’ statement of the approval and resumption of the project.
The government ran websites for the Saemangeum project and the Saemangeum environment-
friendly research and sent newsletters on major controversies, issues, and progress of the project to 
opinion leaders. Major stakeholders who led the public opinion, such as journalists and agricultural 
organizations, were invited to the construction sites.
4. Economic and Social Costs of Conflicts
1) Direct Costs Incurred by Delays and Changes Made to the Project Implementation
The Saemangeum project was halted twice due to various conflicts. The first suspension occurred 
for two years between June 1999 and May 2001 to hold public-private joint investigations and 
forums. The second suspension of the entire construction of seawall took place for three days after the 
Seoul Administrative Court’s ruling of suspension of execution between July 16 and July 18, 2003. The 
Korea Rural Community Corporation assessed that the two suspensions of construction have incurred 
a loss of 508.7 billion won.
First was soils washed away due to high waves in the midst of the suspension of seawall 
construction during the public-private joint investigations. The damage was done because the soil 
on the unfinished side of the already-established part of the seawall was constantly washed away by 
waves, tsunami, and wave overtopping. In August 2000 when the typhoon Prapiroon made landfall, 
the loss of dredged soil and rubble mound caused a loss of 2.5 billion won. In addition, apart from the 
typhoon, the washed-away soils incurred a loss of around 4.2 billion won because reinforcement work 
was not consistently carried out.
Second was the loss of foundation ground under water due to the increased tide speed of the 
opening section of the seawall. During the public-private joint investigations, the three opening 
sections spanning 9.6㎞ allowed the flow of 7.2 billion tons of seawater four times a day, the speed 
of which was as fast as 2-5 m/s. This incurred a loss of 7.8 billion won due to a seepage erosion of the 
foundation ground that was built with gabion under water.
Table2-5-7  The Cost of Construction Suspension of Saemangeum Project
Loss from Construction 
Suspension
Unrealized Added Value from Project Withdrawal 
(Present Value as of February, 2005)
Note
750 billion won
2 and a half years 
of suspension
Total : 5.4218 trillion won
·  Sunk cost of the project : 2.269 trillion won
·  Unrealized added value : 2.2703 trillion won
·  Unrealized project costs’ added value creation 
effect
· Additional 882.5 billion won
·  Assumed lifespan of reclaimed land 
was 60 years
·  The present value of added value 
was the average of net present 
value of 10 alternatives submitted 
by the joint Saemangeum 
investigation team
Source : Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry
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Third, over the period of a long suspension of the construction, the project was delayed and thus 
the project costs also jumped because the unit cost of construction increased with inflation, resulting 
in a loss of 23.8 billion won.
Fourth, the delay in the project caused another damage. Project costs, which was taxpayers’ money, 
were already invested in the construction but expected added value for the completion of the project 
was unrealized. According to the analysis of the public-private joint investigation team, an economic 
loss of 468.9 billion won occurred during this period because of the unrealized added value.
Fifth, the Seoul Administrative Court’s ruling of suspension of execution of seawall construction 
stopped the project for three days between July 16 and July 18, 2003 and incurred economic losses. 
Bank materials and ripraps, which were the construction materials for the seawall, were washed away 
by heavy rains in summer and waves, incurring a loss of 600 million won. Unused equipment and 
workforce resulted in a loss of 900 million won. In total, there was an economic loss of 1.5 billion won.
Meanwhile, according to the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s Study on Suspensions 
of Major National Projects and the Implications released in April 2005, the suspension of the 
Saemangeum project incurred a loss of 750 billion won over the period of two and a half years. The 
study estimated that, in the case of withdrawal of the project, over 5.4 trillion won worth of added 
values would be unrealized.
2) Indirect Costs Incurred by Social Conflicts
Indirect costs of social conflicts surrounding the Saemangeum project were enormous. These costs 
include an economic loss from the two and a half years of suspension of construction and ten years 
of constant social conflicts occurred between 1996, when issues were raised over the water quality 
of Lake Saemangeum, and March 16th, 2006, when court ruled in favor of the government. Indirect 
costs entail socio- economic losses, the amount of which is beyond assessment. They include litigation 
expenses caused by frequent recurrence of conflicts, damaged government capability for national 
management, environmental damage caused by discarded development sites, and conflicts between 
the residents of neighboring regions.
5.  Verification and Evaluation of Proponents’ and Opponents’ Arguments
In the end, major conflicts surrounding the Saemangeum reclamation project were resolved. 
However, conflicts between development and environmental conservation are expected to remain a 
challenge that should be further addressed.
1) The Need to Build Collective Prime Farmlands
To improve productivity in collective prime farmlands, experiment and research projects, including 
floriculture, arboriculture, forage crops, and landscape crops, have been carried out on exposed 
reclaimed lands in Saemangeum since 2006. Efforts are being made to develop competitive field 
ground formation technology, implement advanced agriculture technology to boost resident farmers’ 
income, and subsequently secure competence in the face of the opening of global agricultural product 
market. In collective prime farmlands, state-of-the-art technologies and high-quality export agriculture 
with global competitiveness, including mixed grain park, ecological organic park, horticulture park, 
agriculture theme park, low-carbon green-growth model park, and agriculture industry cluster, are 
being fostered.
2) Lake Saemangeum’s Water Quality Improvement Issues 
Detailed follow-up plans for the implementation of environment measures laid out under the 2001 
government measures have been faithfully carried out. The Saemangeum Committee under the Prime 
Minister’s office have been monitoring the site on a regular basis and concluded that the project had 
been normally operated until 2009. In May, 2001, an Eco-friendly Sequential Development Plan set the 
water quality target of 2011 at level Ⅳ agricultural water. Currently, however, the target has been raised 
to the degree that allows recreational activities in water, which matches the name of the “City of Water.”
In order to improve the water quality of Lake Saemangeum, the government has strengthened 
water quality standards, such as introducing chemical treatment to wastewater discharge on the 
upper side of the river, and is planning and implementing water quality improvement measures, such 
as measures on non-point pollutant sources and river-management flow securement. The water 
quality of inflow rivers such as the Mangyeong River and Dongjin River, had improved until 2003 and 
has slightly deteriorated since then. However, the causes for this seem to be the increases in pollution 
sources and changes in river-management flow, such as changes in precipitation in the upstream. 
After the final closure of seawall in 2006, the water quality has slightly deteriorated due to a reduced 
volume of seawater circulation. However, by allowing the flow of seawater through Shinsi and Garyuk 
Floodgates, the water maintained level Ⅱ-Ⅲ of the lake water quality standard until September 2010. 
Over the five year period between 2001 and 2005 before the final closing of the seawall, the water 
quality of an area designated to become Lake Saemangeum was COD 1.8-2.0 ㎎/l, T-N 0.334-0.375 ㎎
/l, and T-P 0.045 ㎎/l, which belong to level Ⅱ of the seawater quality standard.
The top priorities of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan on Saemangeum Development involve 
implementing water quality improvement measures in the upper part, such as the Mangyeong 
River and Dongjin River as well as in Saemangeum, and applying low-carbon green-growth to land 
development. Therefore, the water quality of Lake Saemangeum is expected to further improve.
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3) Saemangeum Project’s Economic Feasibility Issues 
Up to now, the estimated values of tidal flats and farmlands vary depending on the assessment 
criteria. A new economic assessment is called for, since the Draft Comprehensive Plan on Saemangeum 
Development was drawn up in January, 2010, including building a multi-function city to guarantee 
high quality and competitiveness, and the Master Plan was laid out in March, 2011. 
4) Suspension of Seawall Construction and Seawater Circulation Issues
The final stop gate for the Saemangeum seawall was successfully established on April 27th, 2006. 
After a completion ceremony in April 2010, a road was built and opened on the seawall to meet 
residents’ demand and attract tourists.
Up until now, seawater has been circulated through drainage gates in Lake Saemangeum. 
Although verification has not yet been conducted, the year 2020 will be the target year for conversion 
to a fresh water lake, on condition that an interim check will be done by the first half of 2015. Current 
target water quality of Lake Saemangeum is level Ⅳ on the agricultural water standard. The target is 
being applied differently depending on places. For farmland areas, the target is to supply agricultural 
water, while for city areas, the target has been strengthened to allow waterfront activities such as 
tourism and leisure activities.
With the aim for reducing water pollution in the future, Lake Saemangeum will be divided into 
three areas, upper region, intra-lake, and sea, and 2.89 trillion won will be invested for numerous 
tasks by 2020. In the upper region, measures are being taken such as treatment of non-point pollutant 
sources and livestock manure, and securement of channel flow for maintenance. In the intra-lake area, 
measures for reduction of pollution sources such as management of inflow water and facilities for 
phosphorus removal will be added to existing measures. In the sea area, plans for 24-hour monitoring 
of six offshore vertexes are underway.
6. Project Implementation Effects 
1)  Construction of Saemangeum Seawall Brought About Territorial Expansion and 
Revitalization of Local Economy
On April 27th, 2010, a ceremony for the completion of the Saemangeum seawall was successfully 
held at the Saemangeum Shinsi square. The ceremony was an opportunity to let the world know 
the full-scale development of the Saemangeum project and to present new hopes and visions for 
Saemangeum.
Thanks to the completion of the Saemangeum seawall, Korea’s territory expanded from 98,800 
㎢ to 10,600㎢, meaning a 10㎡ increase per capita. The project also created a tourist attraction 
that spans across Gogunsan-gundo and Byeonsan-bando, which attracted 8.8 million tourists over a 
period of one year, making great contribution to revitalization of the local economy. In particular, the 
Byeonsan-bando National Park reaped the largest economic benefit from the opening of a road on the 
Saemangeum seawall in April 2010 by attracting more tourists.23) 
2) Saemangeum Seawall Listed on Guinness World Records
The 33.9-kilometer-long Saemangeum seawall was certified by the British Guinness World Records 
as the world’s longest seawall and, on August 2nd, 2010, a certification awarding ceremony was 
successfully held. The ceremony served as an opportunity to introduce the project to the world, 
highlight the prestigious image of Saemangeum, and showcase the excellence of Korea’s reclamation 
technology to the world. The Discovery Channel, a world renowned documentary channel, also made 
and broadcast a documentary, “Revealed: Dream City of the Future,” in September 2010. As such, 
Saemangeum is currently building up its own unique brand.
3) Ensuring Status of National Strategic Project to Secure Future Growth Engines
The Saemangeum project is not merely confined to North Jeolla Province, but a national strategic 
project to secure future growth engines and is one of the major national projects that the government 
places an emphasis. The Presidential Council for Future and Vision under the Korean Presidential 
Office released the Grand Vision National Territory 2040 on June 11th, 2010 and projected that 
Saemangeum will become the global hub for future cutting-edge industries, eventually turning into 
the new cradle of civilization. 
In addition, on March 16th, 2011, the Sixth Saemangeum Development Committee reviewed and 
confirmed the Master Plan and the Comprehensive Plan for Phase Two of Water Quality Improvement 
in the Saemangeum Area. With the aim to realize Ariul, a city that opens new civilization, the 
committee set a creative, green waterfront city as the vision of the city and suggested five major 
implementation plans.24)
23)  “A Study on the Economic Spillover Effects of National Parks” published by the Korea National Park Service on March 2011 showed that the 
economic spillover effects of 12 national parks, including Mt. Sorak, Mt. Jiri, and Mt. Bukhan, Gyeongju, Hallyeohaesang, Dadohaehaesang, 
Byeonsan-bando, Mt. Wolchul, amounted to 1.2952 trillion won of production inducement effect, 233.5 billion won of added value inducement 
effect, and employment of 21,648 people. In particular, the Byeonsan-bando National Park reaped the largest economic benefit from the opening 
of a road on the Saemangeum seawall in April 2010 due to the increase in the number of tourists.
24)  It was made clear that the project aims to gain a growth engine for the future, laying out five implementation plans: ① Building a carbon-free city 
② Forming an ecological green belt network ③ Realizing a prestigious waterfront city ④ Establishing a virtuous cycle of resources ⑤ Expanding 
supply of new renewable energy
138
| Chapter 02 |  Review of Conflict Cases of Major SOC Projects
139
5. Saemangeum (Development) Project
4)  Strengthening Water Quality Improvement in Saemangeum through Measures such as 
Environmental Improvements of Wanggung Settlement Village 
The Wanggung Settlement Village is an area where issues regarding water pollution and odor from 
livestock manure and poor residential environment have been constantly raised. The village has been 
regarded as a major culprit for water quality aggravation and became a major issue at the heart of 
the conflicts over the environment. The animal waste from Wanngung takes up 3.6 percent of the 
pollution in the Mangyeong River and 2.0 percent of the pollution in Saemangeum. Due to aging of 
farmers and the falling number of livestock, however, the pollutant loading rate of livestock manure 
from Wanggung is likely to diminish. 
At present, through the Council for Environmental Improvement in Wanggung that has been 
operated since its foundation in March 2010 and consultations with experts, the Comprehensive 
Plan for Environmental Improvement in Wanggung Settlement Village was laid out in July 2010. 
It is expected to help facilitate the improvement of environment and water quality through 
the dismantlement of pens, the formation of forest belts and ecological streams. Recently, the 
Comprehensive Plan for Environmental Improvement in Wanggung Settlement Village was agreed 
upon in a conference presided over by the Prime Minister’s Office, which will make great contributions 
to the water quality improvement in Saemangeum.
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6 Seoul Ring Expressway Construction Project
1. Project Outline
Project Duration 1988~2007 (19 years)
Total Investment 5.7824 trillion won 
Project Volume
Total length : 127㎞ (8-lane roads for the entire expressway)
Phase 1 : Toegyewon-Pangyo-Ilsan, 91㎞, Phase 2 : Ilsan-Toegyewon, 36㎞
* Phase 2 Ilsan-Toegyewon section was built by private investment facilities project
Seoul Ring Expressway
Seoul
Past
Present
The Seoul Ring Expressway was proposed in order to alleviate Seoul’s traffic jam, enhance 
accessibility between regions within the metropolitan area, and prevent Seoul outskirts traffic from 
passing the downtown by traffic dispersion and detour. During the first phase, a four-lane highway 
that had been built earlier between Pangyo, Guri, and Toegyewon was extended to eight lanes. This 
was followed by a Ilsan-Pangyo project that aimed at resolving traffic jams in new towns, including 
Pyeongchon and Sanbon. In total, 91㎞ were extended during the phase one.
Phase two was a highway on the Ilsan-Toegyewon section, which was constructed as a private 
infrastructure investment project in accordance with the Private Investment Act. The Ilsan-Toegyewon 
section is an eight-lane road with the length of 36㎞. It is the final section that links the entire route 
of the Seoul Ring Expressway. The Ilsan-Toegyewon section, which spans across Northern Seoul, 
passes through rugged mountainous areas, including Mt. Nogo, Mt. Sapae, Mt. Surak, and Mt. 
Bulam. Accordingly, structures took up a large share of the construction in this section, with tunnels 
and bridges accounting for 54 percent of the total length. Major structures involve 50 bridges (7,923 
meters), five tunnels (11,820 meters), five entrance facilities (Goyang, Tongil-ro, Songchu, Uijeongbu, 
Byeollae), and six operation offices (Goyang, Tongil-ro, Yangju, Songchu, Mt. Bulam, Byeollae). Due 
to civil petitions that were filed against the passage of Mt. Sapae and other places within the Mt. 
Bukhan National Park, the Ilsan-Songchu (18.3㎞) and Uijeongbu-Toegyewon (10.5㎞) sections were 
completed in June 2006, whereas the rest of the section, the Songchu-Uijeongbu section (7.5㎞), was 
completed in December 2007 after the conflicts were resolved.
Figure2-6-1  Seoul Ring Expressway Route Map
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2. Project Background and Purpose
1) Project Background
The Seoul Ring Expressway project was undertaken along with the new town building projects 
in Bundang, Pyeongchon, Sanbon, Jungdong, and Ilsan. Since the 1960s, population in Seoul grew 
rapidly and subsequently new towns emerged on the outskirts of the city and their boundaries 
also expanded. Naturally, the traffic volume increased rapidly and resultant traffic jams not only in 
Seoul but in the neighboring areas incurred huge socio-economic costs. To resolve this problem, the 
government decided to build the Seoul Ring Expressway.
2) Project Purpose
The Seoul Ring Expressway project aimed to enhance industrial competitiveness and people’s 
convenience, and promote balanced development between regions within the Seoul metropolitan 
area by facilitating the flow of traffic and logistics within Seoul and the metropolitan area. In short, 
the Seoul Ring Expressway was a project pursued to alleviate Seoul’s traffic congestion and enhance 
accessibility between regions within the metropolitan area by preventing outskirts traffic from passing 
downtown by traffic dispersion and detour.
3) Project Content
Under the Seoul Ring Expressway project, a 127㎞-long route was divided into the following eight 
sections of which constructions were separately conducted (Table 2-6-1). Of all the sections, the Ilsan-
Toegyewon and Pangyo-Anyang sections brought about the most severe environmental disputes.
Table2-6-1  Current Status of Each Section of the Seoul Ring Expressway
Section Name Length
Number of 
Lanes
Project Duration Remark
Phase Ⅰ 91.0
Toegyewon-Pangyo 33.0 8 December 1988-December 1993
Pangyo-Anyang 15.8 8 December 1991-October 1996
Passes through 
Mt. Morak
Anyang-Jangsu 21.3 8 June 1995-December 1999
Jangsu-Seoun 6.5 8 May 1992-July 1998
Seoun-Gimpo 9.0 8 June 1995-December 1999
Gimpo-Sinpyeong 3.0 8 December 1992-October 1997
Sinpyeong-Ilsan 2.4 8 May 1997-September 2001
Phase Ⅱ 36.0
Ilsan-Toegyewon 36.0 8 June 2001-December 2007
Passes through 
Mt. Sapae
Total 127.0
4) Project Agency
Initially, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation and the Korea Expressway Corporation 
were to build the entire route of the Seoul Ring Expressway. In 1996, however, the government 
decided to allow the use of private capital in building the Ilsan-Toegyewon section in order to ease the 
burden of the project’s massive budget. Accordingly, the Ministry Of Construction and Transportation 
selected Seoul Beltway Corporation as the project agency, who was to carry out the project by a 
BTO method (Build-Transfer-Operate) in which the ownership was transferred to the nation after the 
completion of the expressway and in turn the private agency was to run the road for 30 years.
5) Project Progress
With the aim of addressing traffic jams in the Seoul metropolitan area and responding to the traffic 
demand from new towns, the government confirmed the Seoul Ring Expressway project in 1985 
under the Conceptual Plan for Comprehensive Traffic Network System in Seoul Metropolitan Area. 
The Korea Expressway Corporation began the construction in Pangyo in 1988 and then went on to 
complete the phase one southern sections, Pangyo-Toegyewon in 1993, Pangyo-Anyang in 1996, 
Gimpo-Sinpyeong in 1997, Jangsu-Seoun in 1998, Anyang-Jangsu and Seoun-Gimpo in 1999, and 
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Sinpyeong-Ilsan in 2001. The construction of the southern sections of phase one that linked five new 
towns in the metropolitan area took 13 years and cost 5.782 trillion won of state funds.
Meanwhile, in 1996, the Ministry of Planning and Budget designated the construction of the 
Northern Ilsan-Toegyewon section, which was the second phase project, as one of the private 
investment promotion projects. After the Seoul Beltway Corporation became the project agency in 
2000, the construction of the Ilsan-Toegyewon section began in 2001. The Ilsan-Toegyewon section 
was a mountainous region that passes through the Mt. Bukhan National Park. For this reason, 
environmental organizations and religious groups strongly opposed the project, worrying over 
environmental degradation. Facing the opposition, the construction had to stop in only five months 
after its kickoff. Eventually, the construction resumed two and a half years later, after the president in 
person stepped in to mediate and make compromises.
 The expressway underwent many twists and turns during the process of construction. On 
December 28th, 2007, 19 years after the first construction began in Pangyo, the entire sections of the 
expressway opened. Now the Seoul Ring Expressway is a road for the Seoul metropolitan area, which 
links major cities in Northern and Southern Gyeonggi regions around Seoul.
Table2-6-2  Progress of Seoul Ring Expressway Construction Project
Date Content
1985
 The construction plan for the Seoul Ring Expressway was confirmed under the Conceptual Plan for 
Comprehensive Traffic Network System in Metropolitan Area
1988 The construction began in Pangyo
1993 The Pangyo-Toegyewon section was completed
1996 The Pangyo-Anyang section was completed
2001 Links between 5 new towns, Toegyewon-Pangyo-Anyang-Ilsan, were completed
2007 The entire sections of the expressway opened
3. Arguments and Grounds of Proponents and Opponents 
1) Issues and Logic of Proponents and Opponents
(1) Passing through Mt. Morak
  • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 When a master plan and a feasibility study for the Pangyo-Anyang section had been 
completed and a detailed route had been decided on in March 1991, the Organization for 
Uiwang Environment Conservation and Local Development was formed, mainly by housewives 
who opposed the passage of Mt. Morak. The mountain, which kept its beautiful nature intact 
without much development in neighboring areas, was a tourist attraction that local residents 
enjoyed visiting. The local organization held signature campaigns to petition for rerouting the 
expressway and filed a petition for the alteration of the route.
 Moreover, local residents strongly protested against the construction of the Pangyo-Anyang 
and Hagui-Pyeongchon sections not only because those sections were to pass through 
densely populated residential areas but because some parts of those sections were to pass 
through a forest area that had been built only two years prior to the construction. As the 
construction began and the project proceeded ahead in December 1991, the Organization for 
Uiwang Environment Conservation and Local Development filed a lawsuit for the cancellation 
of the public notice of urban planning facilities against the Minister of Construction and 
Transportation in 1993. The construction was suspended during the process of lawsuit for 
over a year, but the project eventually resumed and was completed in 1996 after the court 
ruled against the resident group.
  • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents 
 The Korea Expressway Corporation raised issues that, if changes were made to the passage 
section on the Mt. Morak route as the residents demanded, environmental degradation would 
become more serious compared to the initial route, road curves would cause safety problems, 
new civil complaints would be raised, and massive additional construction costs would impose 
greater burden.
 While the nation was swept by social conflicts over the establishment of public facilities, 
such as nuclear waste dump sites and waste disposal sites, the court decided against 
the Organization for Uiwang Environment Conservation and Local Development. The 
court dismissed 173 Uiwang residents’ request for the cancellation of public notice of 
urban planning facilities, which was a lawsuit against the Minister of Construction and 
Transportation, citing “no grounds”. In short, the court said, “The government has no 
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obligation to listen to and reflect relevant residents’ opinion in the case of road construction 
projects that are in the interest of the entire nation.” It also said, “There are no provisions on 
the Urban Planning Act stipulating procedures to reflect residents’ opinion to urban planning 
projects led by the Minister of Construction and Transportation.” After the court decision, the 
project that was suspended for approximately a year resumed and the Pangyo-Anyang section 
was completed in 1996.
(2) Passage through Mt. Sapae
Initially, Seoul’s 1989-1999 master plan allowed the Mt. Sapae route to pass the center of the 
Mt. Bukhan National Park. Later, the Korea Expressway Corporation’s 1996-1998 implementation 
plan shifted the route to the Mt. Sapae section and made it pass through a tunnel for the reason of 
minimizing environmental damage to the national park. Accordingly, environmental organizations and 
Buddhist groups strongly protested against the passage of Mt. Sapae on the grounds of environmental 
destruction, underground water leakage, and disruption to ascetic practice. 
Amidst heated debates over the route passing through Mt. Sapae, alternatives were reviewed, 
including the routes bypassing the outskirts of the national park, and the routes entirely bypassing 
the North of Uijeongbu. Expansion and use of other roads by linking national routes no. 39, 43, 3, 
and a southern bypass were also reviewed. The government examined various alternative routes and 
concluded that, given natural landscape, ecological impact, function, accessibility, and economic 
feasibility of highway, the route that passes through Mt. Sapae Tunnel was the best option.
Table2-6-3  Initial Construction Plan vs. Alternative Bypass Routes
Classification Initially Planned Route
Alternative Bypass Routes
Outskirts of National Park Outskirts of Uijeongbu
Length
25.3㎞
27.8㎞
(A 2.5-㎞ extension)
35.3㎞
(A 10.0-㎞ extension)
Length of passage of 
national park 4.6㎞
(Tunnel 4.0㎞, 
Others 0.6㎞)
Length of passage of national 
park 7.1㎞
(Tunnel, Bridge 2.2㎞, 
Others 4.9㎞)
Bypassing Mt. Bukhan National 
Park
Size of Forest 
Destruction
1.7㎢ 
(Byeokje-Toegyewon)
2.0㎢
(An extension of 0.4㎢)
2.7㎢
(An extension of 1.1㎢)
0.16㎢ 
(Songchu-Uijeongbu)
0.54㎢
(An extension of 0.38㎢)
-
National park section 0.08㎢ National park section 0.51㎢ -
Project Cost 1.164 trillion won
1.334 trillion won 
(A 170-billion-won increase)
1.876 trillion won　
(A 712-billion-won increase)
Merits
·  Minimizing forest 
destruction
· Securing road functions
·  Maintaining investment 
efficiency
· Passes without long rail tunnel
·  Preventing damage to the Mt. 
Bukhan National Park
Demerits
·  Partial damage to the Mt. 
Bukhan National Park
·  Excessive damage to the Mt. 
Bukhan National Park  
(6.5 times)
·  Passes through densely 
populated residential areas
·  Colliding with public obstacles, 
eg. catholic cemetery park, 
Shinheung Health College, and 
Uijeongbu Art Center
·  Civil complaints from the other 
party
·  The Ministry of Environment 
and environment organizations 
opposed during the assessment 
of environmental impact
·  Road function deterioration 
(Traffic 30%, Decrease in 
user population 2.5 million → 
700,000)
·  Excessive forest destruction 
(1.6 times)
·  Lower investment efficiency
·  Increase in fees for using road 
(82 billion won/year)
·  Passes through an army base 
(ammunition battalion)
·  Passes through densely 
populated residential areas
·  Civil complaints from the other 
party
Note
· 95% of the land on initially planned route was already purchased
· Completion rate compared to the entire section as of November 2003: 27%
·  Following the agreement, the construction was suspended from April 14th, 2003, when 34% and 
91% of the excavation were completed in the Mt. Surak and Mt. Bulam Tunnels respectively.
Source : Seoul Beltway Corporation. “Resolutions to Conflicts over Public Projects.” August 2006.
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① Route and Tunnel passing through Mt. Sapae
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents argued that, building a route passing through the national park would bring 
about disruption in wildlife habitats, resulting in an enormous damage to the ecosystem. More 
specifically, forests in the national park would be destroyed, tunnel excavation would cause 
noise and vibration, and roadkill and pollution from car lights and exhaust gas would rise. 
They claimed that the Uijjeongbu Outskirts Bypass, a route passing between Uijeongbu and 
Pocheon, was a better option than the route passing through the Mt. Bukhan National Park.
 The opponents claimed that, in the short run, the alternative route might cost more than the 
initially planned route, but, in the mid to long -term, the alternative route would absorb traffic 
from Northern Gyeonggi including Pocheon and Dongducheon, which in turn would distribute 
the soaring traffic between regions around Seoul. They regarded it as a reasonable alternative 
that satisfied the purpose of the Seoul Ring Expressway because this would not only solve the 
traffic jams in Uijeongbu, but promote harmonious and balanced growth of urban areas.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The government argued that, of all the alternatives examined, the option of Mt. Sapae Tunnel 
turned out to be the best with the least damage to the environment. It stressed that, with 
the Mt. Sapae Tunnel in place, 4㎞ out of 4.6㎞ of passage area in the national park would 
become a tunnel. And therefore a direct forest destruction, would amount to a mere 0.6㎞, 
for which the most eco-friendly restoration work would be carried out.
 The government further explained that, although it was desirable not to build a tunnel inside 
the national park, it was inevitable to do so to protect a larger part of the environment. Such 
examples as the Gugi Tunnel in the Mt. Bukhan National Park, the Jungnyeong Tunnel in the 
Mt. Sobaek National Park, and the Gwanwol Tunnel in the Jōshin’etsu-kōgen National Park 
were provided.
 Meanwhile, as the government urgently needed solutions to serious traffic congestion in 
Northern Seoul and Northern Gyeonggi, it came to conclusion that the route passing through 
Mt. Sapae was essential because it was closer than Uijeongbu outskirts bypass. At that time, 
due to the traffic volume that exceeded the road capacity, traffic congestion was serious on 
the East Main Road, and the national routes no. 39 and no. 43, which were the major road 
network in Uijeongbu. Furthermore, an explosion in traffic demand was expected from the 
surrounding regions where a large-scale housing site development was underway. Therefore, 
an expansion of the highway was an urgent matter. In addition, Dobong and Nowon in 
Northern Seoul did not have main bypass networks, and the traffic from the inside and the 
inflow traffic from Northern Gyeonggi were concentrated on national route no. 3 and the East 
Main Road. This caused serious traffic jams, forcing the government to take an immediate 
action to solve the problem. (Table 2-6-4) 
 Therefore, there existed an urgent need to solve traffic congestion in Northern Seoul, 
Uijeongbu, and Northern Gyeonggi by expanding roads in surrounding areas or building 
alternative road networks. To this end, the government considered a western bypass and 
an alternative road to national route no. 3, to the north-south direction, and the Seoul Ring 
Expressway (Ilsan-Toegyewon), to the east-west direction. Meantime, residents in Dobong 
and Nowon located in Northern Seoul requested an early construction of the route passing 
through Mt. Sapae to relieve severe traffic jams in the area. (Table 2-6-5)
Table2-6-4  Traffic Situation in Surrounding Areas
Road Name Section
Traffic Volume in 
2000
(10,000/day)
No. of 
Lanes
Capacity
(No. of Cars/
hour)
Traffic 
Congestion
(V/C)
East Main 
Road
Seoul-Uijeongbu 14.1 6 12,600 1.55
National Route 
No. 3
Seoul-Uijeongbu 4.6 4 3,200 2.00
National Route 
No. 39
Daejadong-
Uijeongbu
4.9 4 3,200 2.12
National Route 
No. 43
Donggudong-
Uijeongbu
4.7 4 3,200 2.04
Source : Ministry of Construction and Transportation. “Statistical Yearbook of Traffic Volume in 2000.” 2001
Table2-6-5  Polls showed that the Majority of Respondents Expressed Support
Classification Approval Disapproval
DongA.com Survey (November 29, 2001) 70.3% 29.7%
KBS Radio Kim Jongchan Program (January 26, 2002) 87.8% 12.2%
Bulkyo News Internet Survey (January 22-29, 2003) 88.0% 12.0%
Internet Beopbo Shinmun Survey (September 19-25 2003) 81.8% 17.6%
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② Environment and Vegetation
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The assessment report on the environmental impact of the expressway construction concluded 
that natural monuments that must be protected were not found in the investigated area. 
However, environmental organizations raised issues that, because the report excluded the 
impact on natural monuments, the consequences of damage done to mobility and habitats of 
wildlife were never taken into account.
 In 2002, Crypsinus hastatus, a legally protected species designated by the Ministry of 
Environment, was found during a field investigation in the designated construction site of 
the tunnel passing the Mt. Bukhan National Park. This brought up a need for environmental 
protection measures. The opponents predicted that the Crypsinus hastatus community would 
be destroyed because it was found only 37 meters away from the designated construction site. 
Since the Crypsinus community was close to the designated entrance and exit of the tunnel, 
it meant the community would have to bear all the damage from changes in underground 
water and gas emission from a daily average of 140,000 vehicles in the case of opening of the 
road.25) The opponents argued that the discovery of the Crypsinus community was evidence to 
the poor quality of the investigation report on environmental impact. 
 Meanwhile, undermining Buddhism practices was another issue. The argument was that the 
construction of the Mt. Sapae Tunnel would result in a dismantlement and transfer of temples. 
For example, Heungbub Temple, Cheonin Temple, and Bohyun Temple would become 
deserted because the lands would be expropriated for the construction. Twenty seven other 
temples, including Cheongryong and Seongak Temple, would have to bear direct and indirect 
damages. The opponents claimed that the temples would not be able to operate normally due 
to noise, vibration, exhaust gas from vehicles, while the construction would also destroy the 
environment for Buddhism practices and living spaces.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 By the end of 2002, the National Museum of Korea conducted an additional investigation 
on the wildlife in the national park and found Crypsinus hastatus in the Anmal area, which 
was planned to become an entrance to the Mt. Sapae Tunnel. Accordingly, in February 2003, 
Seoul Beltway Corporation, the project agency, commissioned a thorough vegetation survey 
to the University of Seoul, an expert organization. The survey was carried out twice in March 
and May of 2003 on the passage area in the national park. As a result, Crypsinus hastatus 
was found in 19 places. The project agency explained that it would set out environment 
25)  Crypsinus hastatus is a protected wildlife designated by the Ministry of Environment under environment conservation law. Therefore, it is prohib-
ited to capture, collect, transplant, process, export, ship, distribute, store, destroy, and defoliate the plant, except for special purposes approved 
by the Ministry of Environment, such as academic research.
conservation plans to reduce environmental impact, to thoroughly protect the Crypsinus 
hastatus in Anmal, which the highway construction would affect most.
 Meanwhile, the proponents argued that, both of the alternative routes, bypassing the outskirts 
of the national park and Uijeongbu, would be worse in terms of environment than the initial 
route because they would incur a much larger forest destruction. The route bypassing the 
outskirts of the national park goes through the park by seven ㎞ and hence would incur 6.5 
times more destruction than the initial route, whereas the route bypassing the outskirts of 
Uijeongbu by ten ㎞ would incur 1.6 times more destruction. 
③ Leakage of Underground Water
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The construction of underground structures such as tunnels almost always entail leakage of 
underground water. The opponents argued that a massive outflow of underground water 
would deplete underground water in surrounding areas and cause a drastic decline in the 
underground water level.
 They also pointed out that, despite the requirements by the standard specifications for 
tunnels and the design standard for tunnel construction, which state that “measures 
for water depletion should be delivered in response to the impact to the ground surface 
and underground water in the surrounding areas of tunnel construction” as well as that 
“investigations should be done at least for one year for tracking seasonal changes to obtain 
three data items regarding water storage and drainage conditions under seasonal changes 
and climate changes,” the project agency carried out an investigation for only 40 days. 
Moreover, the opponents pointed out the negligence of the project agency by saying that 
“since the area penetrated by Mt. Sapae Tunnel is an area of ground water flow system within 
fractured rocks, a geological structure which consists of fracture zones that control the flow of 
the underground water, it requires a modeling based on calculations of hydraulic conductivity 
of each fracture zone and a statistical distribution interpretation based on the analysis on 
the existence and continuity of faults, spatial distribution analysis, satellite images and aerial 
photographs.” 
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 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 At the time of the work planning (December 1996-June 1998) and environmental impact 
assessment (March 1997-July 2001), the project operator conducted geological surveys 
including drilling investigation on the Mt. Sapae Tunnel and found no ground water artery. 
Based on the result, the project agency predicted that the tunnel construction’s impact on 
the changes in underground water would be minimal given the fact that the ground water 
recharge rate was ten times larger than the discharge rate.
 Following the request by the Korea National Park Service, asking a close investigation on 
changes in underground water in the case of tunnel excavation as a precondition for a 
permission for occupying and using the national park, the project operator commissioned 
to Pukyong National University a water level fluctuation analysis after it began construction. 
The water level fluctuation analysis and underground water modeling were conducted for 40 
days and used various data acquired from the work planning, including aerial photographs, 
geological maps, drilling logs, water pressure experiments. In November 2001 when the 
Buddhist circle filed for an injunction to suspend the construction, the report on the water 
level fluctuation analysis was judged credible by the Seoul Northern District Court after the 
court commissioned to an expert organization to examine the content.26)
(3)  Procedures for Approval and Permission (Environment Impact Assessment and Decision of Road 
Areas)
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents of the Mt. Sapae Tunnel pointed out that the Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation’s decision to dispose the road area was illegal because it neglected the process 
of environmental impact assessment. The Article Ⅳ of the Environment, Traffic, and Disaster 
Impact Assessment Act, and the Appendix Ⅰ of Article 2.2 of the Enforcement Ordinance 
stipulates that, in order to build a new road that exceeds four ㎞, consultations based on 
an environmental impact assessment are required before making a disposition of road area 
decisions. By pointing out that the Minister of Construction and Transportation made a 
disposition on the decision prior to the submission of a complement assessment report, the 
opponents raised an issue that it was an administrative disposition with grave procedural errors.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 Since the procedures of environmental impact assessment were supposed to be carried out 
simultaneously with consultations on the decision on road area after the completion of the 
work plan, according to the then Environment Impact Assessment Act in the 1990s, the 
26) Yonsei University conducted the analysis on May 2002.
project agency refuted the allegations made by the opponents about procedural defects 
regarding the environmental impact assessment on the Ilsan-Toegyewon section of the 
Seoul Ring Expressway. The proponents stressed that there were no problems because the 
construction was carried out after the environmental impact assessment in accordance with 
the prohibition on advance implementation of construction stipulated on the Article 27 on the 
Act. They went on to argue that, there were no procedural errors because, in accordance with 
the Article 2 on the Enforcement Ordinance, an environmental impact assessment report was 
submitted on December 15th, 1998, which was before the notice of decision on road area 
was delivered on June 24th, 1999.27)
2) Persuasion Strategy
(1) Formation and Operation of Committee for Investigation of Routes
The government laid out various measures to listen to the voices of religious, environmental, and 
residents’ organizations and to open a communication window for the Mt. Sapae Tunnel issues. In an 
attempt to end the legal disputes and physical confrontations between environmental and Buddhist 
organizations, on the one end, and the government and project operator, on the other end, regarding 
the passage through the Mt. Bukhan National Park, and to produce social consensus through dialogue, 
the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, on August 14th, 2002, forged an agreement 
between the project operator, the Korea Expressway Corporation, and the Buddhist circle on forming 
and operating the Committee for Investigation of Routes. The committee was run for more than four 
months from August 14th, 2002 to December 31st, 2002. The Buddhist circle and the project operator 
made an effort to examine the overall validity and economic feasibility of the route and address civil 
complaints through activities in the committee, but they failed to reach an agreement.
(2) Formation and Operation of Committee for Reexamination of Routes
After the inauguration of the ‘Participation Government’, President Roh Moo-hyun stressed the 
need to forge a conclusion within the first half of the year under the supervision of the Prime Minister’s 
Office through efforts of persuasion and compromise. Accordingly, on April 14th, 2003, the Ministry 
of Construction and Transportation agreed to form and operate the Committee for Reexamination of 
Routes in an attempt to produce an agreement in the shortest possible time through dialogue with 
the Buddhist circle. The committee was operated for 45 days between April 22nd to June 5th, 2003, 
but the parties involved failed to reach an agreement.
Representatives of the project operator in the committee claimed that it was only a matter of 
27)  The Environment, Traffic, and Disaster Impact Assessment Act revised in 2001 stipulates that ordering and undertaking a construction should be 
done after consultations on environmental impact assessment are finished and subsequent decisions on road areas are made. However, this did 
not apply to the Seoul Ring Expressway, which received an approval for the project before the revision.
154
| Chapter 02 |  Review of Conflict Cases of Major SOC Projects
155
6. Seoul Ring Expressway Construction Project
course to build the route in the way it was initially planned as soon as possible, given the following 
factors: the appropriateness of the initially planned routes for rearranging traffic network system in 
relatively less developed Northern Seoul and Northern Gyeonggi and user safety; minimization of costs 
for using the road due to shortest distance; and the initially planned route’s environment-friendliness 
compared to the routes passing long rail tunnels of the Mt. Bukhan National Park, Mt. Surak, and Mt. 
Bulam. They also suggested the need for a more proactive approach towards calculating the value 
of environmental damage, given the fact that both parties agreed on considering not only economic 
values, including traffic convenience in particular, but also other values, such as environment, cultural 
heritage, religion, and geomancy.
On the other hand, representatives of the Buddhist circle said that the initially planned route 
appeared to be at a disadvantage especially when focusing on the destruction done to the national 
park section. However, they mentioned a need to examine which route was more environmentally-
friendly when taking into account the total size of the forest destruction.
(3) Holding a Public Forum
In accordance with proper procedures and methods, the Prime Minister’s Office was to coordinate 
and make a decision based on the overall judgement of the report submitted by the Committee 
for Reexamination of Route, if the committee failed to reach an agreement on the final route. 
Consequently, the committee has made efforts to deliver an agreement on the optimum route by 
holding six rounds of discussions, a field investigation, and a workshop since the first meeting on 
April 22nd, 2003. Nevertheless, representatives from each party and experts from different fields 
failed to forge an agreement. In the course of coordinating and determining the final policy, the Prime 
Minister’s Office reported the content of the committee’s report to the general public and held a public 
forum to listen to relevant experts’ and citizens’ opinions. 
(4) Public Relations Aiming at Resolving Civil Complaints 
PR materials were made to inform the public of the project and the need for the resumption 
of construction, as part of an attempt to address civil complaints and minimize the loss from 
the suspension or delay of construction. In order to give correct information about the project, 
approximately 450,000 various PR materials were distributed not only to the opponents of the 
construction but to local residents and the general public who were going to benefit from the 
expressway. The PR materials had become a catalyst to form a consensus over the feasibility of the 
planned routes and the effect on local economic development, resolve the possibile misunderstanding 
of people having biased views, and expand attention and support from the local residents who called 
for the resumption of the construction.
In particular, from January to November, 2003, when the construction was halted, flyers were 
distributed and residents’ signature campaigns were held in places like mountain trails, towns, and 
public offices. Meanwhile, the heads of government agencies and local governments, local councils 
of Guri, Yangju, Goyang, and Uijeongbu, media, and academic societies were invited to the seminars 
that explained the feasibility of the project and the problems with delays in construction.
4. Economic and Social Costs From Conflicts 
1) Direct Costs
The Pangyo-Anyang section did not cause a loss because the opposition was made against the 
project during the process of design.
The Ilsan-Toegyewon section was conducted in the way of BTO, in which nine private enterprises 
were to make investment 1.684 trillion won out of the total construction fee of 2.384 trillion won and 
these enterprises would retrieve the investment by collecting tolls for 30 years. The suspension of the 
private infrastructure investment project led to additional corporate expenses. Due to the two-year 
suspension of the construction, an operating reserve of 28.8 billion won, including labor costs and 
overhead expenses, was incurred. The constructor had to sacrifice an additional 25.8 billion won for 
indirect labor costs, profits from construction, rents for temporary construction sites, etc.
2) Indirect Costs
The Pangyo-Anyang section was open roughly one year later than scheduled because of residents’ 
complaints and a lawsuit against the Minister of Construction and Transportation at the stage of 
designing. It is estimated that a social loss of 270 billion won occurred if average indirect expenses 
were calculated at 720 million won per day. 
Because the Songchu-Uijeongbu IC section, which is the Mt. Sapae Tunnel section, was open roughly 
two years later than scheduled, all vehicles on the expressway had to bypass, using the surrounding 
roads in Uijeongbu. This in turn led to social problems induced from serious traffic jams in Northern 
Gyeonggi and Uijeongbu. The government estimated that the two years and a month of construction 
suspension incurred a loss of 520 billion won in total, an average of 720 million won per day.
It turned out that the complete opening of the Ilsan-Toegyewon section reduced the driving 
distance by 10.9㎞ and the travel time by 50 minutes, compared to using the national routes no. 39 
and 43, saving 760 billion won of logistics expenses annually. Therefore, the two-year construction 
suspension was estimated to cause a loss of 1.52 trillion won to the people.28)
28) Professor Choi Chang-kyu of Myongji University. Munhwa Ilbo. December 29th, 2007.
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5.  Verification and Evaluation of Proponents’ and Opponents’ Arguments
1) Impact on Natural Ecosystem such as Noise
From 2002 to 2008, the Seoul Beltway Corporation had conducted seven rounds of monitoring 
and investigation on changes in the natural ecosystem in the upper areas of the Mt. Sapae Tunnel on 
a regular basis. As a result, changes that could be proven to be affected by the construction of the 
tunnel turned out to be insignificant. In terms of the flora, various species were found to repeat a 
cycle of presence and absence, rather than consistently dying out. In particular, the monitoring results 
of the Crypsinus Hastatus community in the Anmal Area of upper Mt. Sapae, which were conducted 
in summer and winter seasons, showed that the number of leaves in good or average growth and the 
number of new leaves revealed a repeating pattern of increase and decrease over time. There were no 
significant problems found in daytime and nighttime noise measurement results of the surrounding 
areas of Hoeryong Temple. The overall monitoring results showed that, after the construction of the 
tunnel, there had been little impact caused by a decrease in the underground water level due to 
increased dryness, noise, and vibration.
Table2-6-6  Monitoring Results of Crypsinus Hastatus Community in Anmal Area of Mt. Sapae
(Unit : Jang (Traditional Korean unit, approx. 3.03m))
Classification 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Summer 1,184 1,303 1,751 1,321 1,027 1,020
Winter 648 954 781 913 789 -
Source :  Seoul Beltway Corporation. “A Commissioned Investigation of Changes in Natural Ecosystem of the Surrounding Areas of 
the Entrance of the Seoul Ring Expressway’s Mt. Sapae Tunnel.” 2010.
Table2-6-7  Noise Measurement Results of Hoeryong Temple in Mt. Sapae
(Unit : dB)
Classification 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Daytime 57.4 45.4 44.8 45.1 46.7 46.1
Nighttime 38.9 40.3 40.2 40.1 40.8 41.3
Source :  Seoul Beltway Corporation. “Result Notification of Follow-up Investigation on Environment Impact of Construction of 
Seoul Ring Expressway Byeokje-Toegyewon Section.” 2011.
2) Building Environment-Friendly Expressway
The entire sections of the Seoul Ring Expressway was open in December 2007. The construction 
process was aimed at minimizing environmental damages. Two large electric dust collectors were 
installed at the center of the tunnel’s wall, which were state-of-the-art systems that absorbed and 
purified the dust, and released clean air back to the tunnel. 
Because the Mt. Sapae Tunnel ran through the underground of the Mt. Bukhan National Park, two 
of the dust collecting facilities were installed, one on the uphill road to Songchu direction and the other 
on the downhill road to the Uijeongbu direction, in order to prevent dusts from spreading outside the 
tunnel. Forty-five large fans with 1.5 meter diameters were installed on the ceiling of the tunnel to 
purify dust in a way that the fans spun to bring the dust inside the tunnel to electric dust collectors. 
In response to the voices against the tunnel that ran through a national park, 4㎞ out of the 4.6
㎞ that passed through the national park lied under the tunnel, significantly lowering direct forest 
destruction to 0.6㎞. This 0.6㎞ section was restored as eco-friendly as possible.
3) Efforts to Shorten Construction Duration of Mt. Sapae Tunnel
In order to catch up with the schedule delayed by the construction suspension of the Mt. Sapae 
Tunnel, the project agency firstly carried out consultation with the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute 
on how to shorten construction duration from November 2002 to March 2003. Secondly, it collected 
construction data of major overseas tunnels to draw up measures to shorten construction duration. 
Thirdly, the agency operated a task force comprised of domestic tunnel engineers in order to set out 
measures to cut construction duration from March to June 2004.
Measures to improve construction included: the excavation of both upper and lower parts 
simultaneously using the Long-Bench method; and the use of bulk emulsion explosives and super-
size jumbo drills to enhance work efficiency. These measures helped reduce construction duration. In 
addition, turning labor-intensive into mechanized constructions helped boost precision and efficiency 
of the construction. Each phase of the construction adopted various types of construction methods 
and applied them simultaneously. Pipe utility conduits building and concrete lining, which were initially 
planned to be done after excavation, were carried out concurrently with the excavation.
4) Evaluation of Proponents’ and Opponents’ Arguments
(1) Construction Work of Mutual Trust and Coexistence
Various efforts were made to overcome numerous obstacles by building trust through the events 
inviting religious and environmental organizations to the construction site, and strengthening bonds 
with local residents. The construction of the Mt. Sapae Tunnel became perceived as beneficial to all. 
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In addition, the foundation for the resumption and continuation of construction for mutual benefits 
was laid in the course of supporting local charity works and cherished projects, and parties for seniors. 
Efforts for coexistence beared fruits, such as receiving a plaque of appreciation that represented 
friendship and gratitude for conflict resolution and support from local temples that had filed civil 
complaints against the construction.
(2) Site of Social Conflict Turning into a Site of Harmony
The passage of the Mt. Sapae Tunnel became a symbol of harmony that overcame the 
confrontations and conflicts of the past. Religious and other relevant organizations, local residents, 
and those involved in the construction, who were once in conflict, had a gathering to celebrate the 
passage of the tunnel and to wish for a speedy and accident-free completion of the construction. This 
was considered as a meaningful success case that turned a site of conflict and confrontation into a site 
of harmony through efforts for coexistence. In a time when numerous national projects are mired in 
conflicts and confrontations with local residents and the concerned organizations, the case of conflict 
resolution of the Mt. Sapae Tunnel serves as an excellent model to be benchmarked. 
(3) Opening the Age of Seoul Ring Expressway
The Seoul Ring Expressway had overcome numerous obstacles, adopted state-of-the-
art construction methods, and protected the environment in surrounding areas through the 
implementation of environment-friendly construction. This enabled the expressway to become the 
most beautiful and convenient highway, leaving a message of hope for the Korean people.
6. Project Implementation Effects
Compared to national road no. 39 and 49, the opening of the Seoul Ring Expressway cut driving 
distance by 11㎞ and travel time by one hour and 50 minutes, which were translated into saving 520 
billion won in logistics costs. The improvements made to construction methods and cost reduction led 
to the saving of 66 billion won of project costs. The opening of the Mt. Sapae Tunnel reduced bypass 
distance by approximately 47 percent, compared to national road no. 39. In particular, as of 2009, 
the traffic volume of the Songchu-Dongducheon section had increased by 1.4 times more than the 
previous year, standing at 67,293 vehicles per day. In contrast, the volume to capacity ratio of national 
road no. 39 improved from 1.7 in 2007 to 1.1 in 2009. In addition, Mt. Sapae Tunnel, construction 
of which had been suspended for two years, was completed six months ahead of schedule. This led 
to the saving of construction costs, which in turn generated increased revenue and thus enabled the 
reduction of the toll fee from the initial 5,000 to 3,000 won for the benefit of users.
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7  Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
1. Project Overview
Project Volume 5.8㎞ from Taepyeong-ro, Jung-gu to Sindapcheol Bridge in Seongdong-gu
Project Duration July 1st, 2003~September 30th, 2005 (2 years and 2 months)
Project Cost 387 billion won in total
Major Specification
Dismantlement of structures, restoration of city-type stream, maintenance of drainage 
system, building roads, bridges, and water pipes
Gwanghwamun
Taepyeongno
The Dong-a Daily News
Gwanggyo
City Hall Samillo
Sewoon Shopping Mall
Donhwamun-gil
Gwangjang Market
Baeogae-gil
Dongdaemun Stadium
Hwanghak-dong
Nangyero
Wangsimni
Sindap Railway Bridge
Majang-dong
Past Present
Source : Cheonggye Stream Museum (Seoul Metropolitan Government)
Cheonggye Stream is a stream that flows from downtown Seoul to the Majang-dong, located 
in the east of Seoul. It had been covered and used as a road for a long time. A 5.8㎞ overpass was 
built on Cheonggye Stream from Majang-dong to Gwanggyo Bridge, serving as an important traffic 
function of linking downtown Seoul with Eastern Seoul. The Cheonggye Stream overpass had been a 
symbol of Korea’s struggle for development. From the 1990s, however, voices for the dismantlement 
of the overpass emerged as it became considered old and unsafe as well as an obstacle to 
development. At the same time, as people’s demand for quality of life increased with the arrival of the 
21st century, the improvement of downtown environment became an important issue. In accordance 
with the changes of the times, mayoral candidate Lee Myung-bak pledged a Cheonggye Stream 
restoration project during his election campaign for the Mayor of Seoul in 2002.
The Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project can be considered an inevitable transition in 
city development paradigm to tackle problems in downtown areas caused during the process of 
industrialization. The project also aimed to boost downtown economy by inducing redevelopment 
of surrounding areas as well as to demolish cover structures and restore the area into a stream. 
As the project proceeded ahead, disputes and conflicts among various stakeholders intensified. In 
particular, sharp confrontations and conflicts over issues regarding the restoration, such as traffic 
congestion, business loss of merchants, and restoration direction of cultural heritage, erupted. The 
Seoul Metropolitan Government succeeded in implementing the project by using diverse conflict 
management mechanisms that could help alleviate complaints from the opponents and induce policy 
compliance. The achievement of the Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project is clearly recognized 
by people from both home and abroad. Although a restored Cheonggye Stream has limitations as a 
natural stream, the project provided Seoul citizens with a water-friendly space in a clean-water stream, 
and created the city’s landmark, while revitalizing surrounding areas’ economy. 
2. Project Background and Purpose
1) Project Background
The direct background of the Cheonggye Stream restoration project was to secure the safety of 
the cover structures of the Cheonggye Stream. Cheonggye Stream’s cover structures and overpass 
were old facilities that could not be maintained only by partial repair, and the bottom of the covered 
stream was seriously polluted by heavy metals like lead, chrome, and manganese. As the corrosion 
of structures inside Cheonggye Stream caused by carbon monoxide and methane had accelerated, 
the demolition of the cover structures and overpass of Cheonggye Stream became a task that could 
no longer be delayed. The maintenance costs for the cover structure were estimated at around 100 
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billion won, so it was considered more desirable to ensure citizens’ safety and prevent deterioration 
of the surrounding areas of Cheonggye Stream through dismantlement. At the same time, one of 
the background factors of the project was the need to create a pleasant environment with a clean-
water stream that would meet citizens’ increased demand for improvements in the environment of 
downtown Seoul. Similarly important was the need to instill historical pride by restoring the cultural 
heritage of the Joseon Dynasty that had been buried underneath the covered Cheonggye Stream. 
Lastly, development disparities between Seoul’s Southern and Northern parts divided by the Han River 
were another important factor behind the project. These factors are listed in the Figure below as 
presented by the Headquarters for Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project.
Figure2-7-1  Background of Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
Deterioration of
Overpass Cover Structures
Degradation of
City Environment
Disappearance of
Historical and Cultural Heritage
Underdevelopment of
Surrounding Areas
Fundamental Solution to
Safety Problems
Creating Eco-friendly City Spaces
Restoring Historical and 
Cultural Characteristics of Seoul 
Promoting Balanced Growth
between Seoul's Northern and
Southern Parts of the Han River
Source : Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” 2006.
2) Project Purpose
 •Transforming into a Human-centered Ecological Environment City
 There had been a widespread awareness over the need to improve downtown Seoul’s environment 
that was covered by concrete as a result of a development-oriented city building after the 1960s, 
and to offer places for waterfront activities in order to improve citizens’ quality of life by restoring 
Cheonggye Stream into a clean-water stream. The expectations over the prospect of the 
Cheonggye Stream restoration project that it might become an important opportunity to restore 
such a pleasant environment served as a significant momentum for the project. 
 • Restoring Seoul’s Historical Characteristics and Creating Cultural Spaces
 One of the purposes of the Cheonggye Stream restoration project was to recover historical 
pride by restoring and protecting cultural heritage of the Joseon Dynasty remaining on 
Cheonggye Stream, such as the Gwangtong Bridge and the Supyo Bridge. Along with this, 
the project also sought to create a cultural space where citizens could have quality time.
 • Revitalization of Cheonggye Stream’s Surrounding Underdeveloped Areas in Downtown Seoul
 One of the determinations behind the Cheonggye Stream restoration project was to lay a 
foundation for the city’s economic revitalization by recovering the downtown area surrounding 
Cheonggye Stream. As a long-term goal, the project also aimed to alleviate regional disparities 
and promote balanced growth between Southern and Northern parts of the Han River 
through the revitalization of downtown Seoul.
3) Project Content
The Seoul Metropolitan Government sought to create “an urban stream surrounded by nature” 
through the Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project. The would-be restored area covered 5.8㎞ from 
Taepyeong-ro, Jung-gu via Dongdaemun to Sindapcheol Bridge in Seongdong-gu. The area was 
divided into three sections and different themes were applied to each section: history and tradition for 
the two ㎞ up to Gwangjang Market; culture and modern times for the 2.1㎞ from Cheonggye Square 
to Nangye-ro; and finally, nature and future for the 1.7㎞ from Nangye-ro to Sindap Rail Bridge. The 
project involved a demolition of the overpass and cover structures, restoration of stream; supply of 
maintenance water, sewerage maintenances, construction of roads on both sides of the stream, 
access roads, Cheonggye Stream bridges, ecological spaces and cultural facilities, and formation of 
nightscape. 
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Table2-7-1  Project Content
Classification Project Content
Dismantlement of Structures
Cover structure 5.39㎞; Overpass 5.91㎞; Intercepting sewer 5.0㎞; Sewage 
Culvert 0.30㎞
Restoration of City-type 
stream
5.7㎞
Sewerage Maintenance
16.8㎞ in total: Shifting and building intercepting sewer 6.26㎞; Pipes for 
excess overflow 10.54㎞ 
Construction of Roads and 
Bridges
Roads on both sides 5.8㎞; 22 Bridges  
(15 Road bridges, 7 Pedestrian walkways)
Water Pipe 17.4㎞ (900-1100 mm pipes)
Source : Lee In-geun. “Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project.” Korean Society of Civil Engineers 53.11 (2005): 120.
Figure2-7-2  Basic Plan for Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
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Source : “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 2.” 374.
4) Project Implementation Agency
The Seoul Metropolitan Government set up three organizations to implement the restoration 
project in an effective and systematic manner. First, it set up the Headquarter for Cheonggye Stream 
restoration, and then organized a task force for Cheonggye Stream restoration who would be in 
charge of research assistance involving feasibility assessment and the establishment of basic plans. 
Subsequently, the Citizens’ Committee for Cheonggye Stream Restoration which would take charge 
of suggesting policy directions for the restoration of Cheonggye Stream, collecting citizens’ opinion, 
and carrying out PR was organized. Experts from various fields, scholars, and civic organizations took 
part in the committee. The only problem with the committee was the fact that the participation of 
local merchants and residents of Cheonggye Stream area, whose interest was directly involved in the 
project, was limited. This was a factor that could cause disputes, but as the project proceeded ahead, 
the Council for Residents and Merchants was established to collect opinions.
Figure2-7-3  Implementation Framework of Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
Seoul Cheonggye
Stream Restoration
Project
Citizens'
Committee
Project
Headquarter
Task Force
for Restoration
Presenting Policy Direction
Collecting Opinions
Promoting to Citizens
Setting Up Action Plans
Project Execution
Cooperating with
Relevant Organizations
Research
Investigation
Planning
Source : Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” 2006. 98.
5) Project Progress
On February 11th, 2003, the Seoul Metropolitan Government announced the Draft Basic Plan on 
Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project and implemented the project accordingly. The project 
progress is as follows.
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Table2-7-2  Project Progress of Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
Date Content
July 2002 Setting up Headquarter for Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
July 2002 Formation of a task force for supporting restoration
August 2002 Formation of the 1st Committee for Protection of Cheonggye Stream Business Area
August 2002-June 2003 A Program for Citizens’ Field Observation of Cheonggye Stream
September 2002 Formation of the Citizens’ Committee for Cheonggye Stream Restoration
December 2002 Submission of the Draft Basic Plan on Cheonggye Stream Restoration
January 2003 Opening of the Council for Residents and Merchants 
February 2003 Announcement of the Draft Basic Plan on Cheonggye Stream Restoration
March 2003 The 1st Session of the Council for Residents and Merchants 
March 2003-March 2004 Distribution of PR materials for Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
April 2003 Formation of the Council for Clothing Shops
April 2003 The 2nd Session of the Council for Residents and Merchants 
April 2003
Establishment of the Plans for Maintenance of Surrounding Streams in line with 
Cheonggye Stream restoration
May 2003 The 3rd Session of the Council for Residents and Merchants 
June 2003
Agreement completed on prior environmental feasibility test of the Cheonggye Stream 
Restoration Project
June 2003 Initiation of execution design
June 2003 The 4th Session of the Council for Residents and Merchants 
July 2003 Commencement of the Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
July 2003 Confirmation of the basic plan for Cheonggye Stream restoration
August 2003 Commencement of demolition of cover structures
October 2003 Agreements reached on environmental impact assessment 
October 2003 Notice of the Basic Plan for Sewerage Maintenance 
November 2003 The 5th Session of the Council for Residents and Merchants
March 2004
Transfer of the disassembled remains of Ogan Watergate to the site of the Jungnang 
Sewage Treatment Station
April 2004 The 6th Session of the Council for Residents and Merchants
May 2004 Completion of shifting and constructing intercepting sewers 
December 2004 The 7th Session of the Council for Residents and Merchants
December 2004 Completion of the demolition of cover structures
January 2005 The 8th Session of the Council for Residents and Merchants
March 2005 Designation of the Gwangtong Bridge area as Historic Site No. 461
May 2005 Completion of waterfront facilities and Gwang Bridge
August 2005 Restoration of Gwangtong Bridge completed
September 2005
Mediation of disputes over stream water by the Central Committee for Management 
of Streams
September 2005 Conclusion of agreement on the consignment of management of Cheonggye Stream
September 2005 Completion of the construction of Cheonggye Stream restoration
October 2005 Completion ceremony, Proclamation of restoration
Source :  Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” Summary and 
Extract from Appendix No. 1. 2006.
6) Project Funding
The Seoul Metropolitan Government covered the entire project cost from the city’s general account. 
The city government covered the cost of restoration project with a budget saved through increased 
efficiency of the administration of city affairs - reduction in 100 billion won of total repair cost of 
overpass and other unnecessary projects, changes in construction methods, and introduction of 
creative ways of working.29)
 
3. Arguments and Grounds of Proponents and Opponents 
1) Issues and Logic of Proponents and Opponents
The main thrust of the opposition by interest groups and civic organizations, merchants of 
surrounding areas in particular, was not an opposition against the Cheonggye Stream Restoration 
Project itself but rather an opposition against the lack of measures for issues that could occur during 
the process of restoration. The key issues were traffic congestion, and threats against business rights 
and livelihoods of street vendors in surrounding areas. Apart from these issues, as the project had 
been kicked into high gear, issues were raised on how to restore and protect Cheonggye Stream’s 
cultural heritage. In addition, some civic groups and experts voiced their concerns that the restoration 
of Cheonggye Stream might be reduced to a creation of an artificial stream rather than a restoration 
of a natural stream.
 
(1) Merchants’ Business Loss and Livelihoods
 • Arguments of Opponents
 Many of the opponents against the restoration project argued that traffic jams would be 
unavoidable due to a reduction in roads on Cheonggye Stream, which in turn would bring a 
massive business loss to merchants who were running businesses in the surrounding areas of 
Cheonggye Stream. The Cheonggye Stream area was a large business district with roughly 
60,000 stores employing 200,000 people. They were worried that the restoration project 
might lead to a serious business loss. Alongside the stores, there were 1,500 street vendors in 
the Cheonggye Stream area, operating mainly around Hwanghak-dong. The vendors strongly 
protested against the project on grounds of threats to their livelihoods.
 
29) Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” 2006.
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• Arguments of Proponents
 A major obstacle for the Seoul Metropolitan Government in implementing the restoration 
project was the opposition from the merchants in the surrounding area of Cheonggye Stream. 
Accordingly, the city government sought measures to boost the economy of the business district 
and tackle inconveniences in operating business through active consultations and interviews 
with the stakeholders. In doing so, the city government aimed at minimizing damages to the 
merchants and vendors operating in the area, while mapping out plans for the systematic 
development of the surrounding areas of Cheonggye Stream from a long-term perspective. At 
the same time, the city government maintained its stance that potential traffic problems caused 
by the project could be prevented by delivering measures such as expansion of one-way street 
in downtown area, median bus exclusive lanes, and a self-car-free-day system.
(2) Restoration of Ecology: Natural Stream vs. Artificial Stream 
 • Arguments of Opponents
 Although the Seoul Metropolitan Government suggested the restoration of ecology and 
history as one of the project objectives of Cheonggye Stream restoration, the civil society 
consistently raised questions over whether, in reality, a restored stream would function 
as a natural stream. The opponents strongly argued that Cheonggye Stream, which was 
disconnected from stream basins and had to supply water artificially, would become a mere 
landscape facility. Some of the opponents also claimed that, given electricity and other energy 
consumption needed for pumping water, a restored Cheonggye Stream would inevitably be 
anti-ecological.30) 
 • Arguments of Proponents
 It was concluded that, although Cheonggye Stream might not be able to be restored into a 
perfectly natural stream like in the past, it could be restored into a stream that would change 
from an artificial to a natural stream gradually from the starting section to the lower section, 
as was stated in the basic plan. The proponents claimed that an ecological space with relatively 
high quality nature could be built at the heart of the city by restoring and linking the east and 
west of the 5.8-kilometer-long water-based green axis that had been disconnected for the 
past 40 years, while connecting the green axis between north and south of the Jongmyo and 
Mt. Nam as well.31)
30)  The leading arguments of the opposition involve: An Byeong-ok. “The Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project as a Nature-Gardening and Social 
Experiment.” ECO Vol.4 (2003); and Cho Myung-Rae. “Contending the Renaturalization of Cheonggye Stream in Seoul.” ECO Vol.4 (2003).
31)  Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” 2006.
(3) Restoration of History and Cultural Heritage
 • Arguments of Opponents
 Some experts voiced their concerns that, despite the fact that the  Cheonggye Stream 
Restoration Project included a restoration of historical heritage, there was high possibility of 
damages during the actual construction process. Regarding Gwangtong Bridge and Supyo 
Bridge, in particular, civic organizations and a few members of citizens’ committee sticked 
to their stance on a restoration direction in which the bridges were restored in the way of 
keeping their original form and location.
 • Arguments of Proponents 
 The city government stressed that the project would restore history through surface 
investigation, test pitting and precision excavation of cultural heritage, while taking the 
surrounding environment into consideration. However, as the restoration of historical sites 
required experts’ insights, it could not be decided solely by the city government. Accordingly, 
the city government suggested that it would follow the decision of the Cultural Heritage 
Administration, the third party.32) 
2) Persuasion Strategy
(1) Formation of Public Opinion
During the early stage of discussions and awareness building process of the Cheonggye Stream 
project, strategies to garner support from the general public were actively put in place. Through 
media, the cover structures and overpass of Cheonggye Stream were framed as a product of the 
development age that should be removed, while a pleasant environment in downtown Seoul was 
presented as a policy vision. This drew a positive response from citizens. The Seoul Metropolitan 
Government actively promoted the appropriateness of the restoration project under the slogans of 
“From Development to Environment,” “From Vehicle to People,” and “From Efficiency to Equity,” to 
secure citizens’ support and alleviate anxiety and opposition of Cheonggye Stream merchants. Such 
efforts included various events, such as programs for citizens’ field observation of Cheonggye Stream 
and a number of contests, opening the Cheonggye Stream Public Information Center, and consistently 
persuading citizens through the Internet and media.33) 
32) Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” 2006.
33) Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” 2006.
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(2) Various Committees including Citizens’ Committee
With the aim of securing credibility of policy implementation agency and resolving conflicts 
over the process of project implementation, the Seoul Metropolitan Government organized the 
Cheonggye Stream Citizens’ Committee that represented all walks of life. The committee was a 
legislative organization which had rights to investigation, research, and deliberation, andwas in charge 
of building expertise, critical review, and collecting citizens’ opinions. The city government sought 
to secure the fairness and credibility of the policy by forming the committee with members who 
were chosen based on criteria such as age, gender, expertise, and reputation. At the same time, six 
subcommittees were run to secure the project’s expertise in various fields, namely history and culture, 
nature and environment, construction and safety, traffic, city planning, and citizens’ opinion.34) Some 
criticized, however, that the committee’s role in reality was confined to giving legitimacy to the project 
despite such member arrangements.35) 
Basically, the restoration project implemented strategies of building new committees to address 
conflicts when they erupted. These committees involve the Citizens’ Committee, the Council for 
Merchants and Residents, the Advisory Council of Experts on Historical Restoration, the Experts’ 
Committee on Preservation of Cultural Heritage, and the Subcommittee of the Cultural Heritage 
Administration. Initially, the Advisory Council of Experts on Restoration of Cheonggye Stream’s 
History had been formed to address the opposition from the Citizens’ Committee against problems 
with the restoration of cultural heritage. However, the Citizens’ Committee and Cheonggye Stream 
Federation protested the idea, so the Experts’ Committee on Preservation of Cheonggye Stream’s 
Cultural Heritage was set up to proceed with the project. Despite all these efforts, the Citizens’ 
Committee and Cheonggye Stream Federation once again rejected the decision of the experts’ 
committee. Subsequently, the Subcommittee of the Cultural Heritage Administration was formed, 
and it determined policies on issues regarding cultural heritage. The opponents criticized that these 
committees were run in the way that they did not make independent decisions but were influenced 
by the city government, compromising with reality.36)
34) Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” 2006.
35)  Seong Ji-Eun. “The Study of Conflict Management Strategy in Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project.” Korean society and public administration 
15.4 (2005): 155-177.
36)  Seong Ji-Eun. “The Study of Conflict Management Strategy in Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project.” Korean society and public administration 
15.4 (2005): 155-177.
Table2-7-3   Committees regarding Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project and Characteristics of 
the Committees
Name of Committee Background of Formation Characteristics
The Citizens’ Committee 
for Cheonggye Stream 
Restoration
The need to complement the expertise 
and the function of collecting citizens’ 
opinion for the project implementation
A deliberative and legislative 
organization for the restoration project 
in charge of investigation and research, 
collecting opinions from relevant 
interest groups and citizens, and policy 
promotion
Advisory Council of 
Experts on Restoration 
of Cheonggye Stream ‘s 
History
Opposition from citizens’ committee 
on issues regarding cultural heritage 
restoration
Advisory council of experts in the field 
of restoration of cultural heritage
Experts’ Committee 
on Preservation of 
Cheonggye Stream’s 
Cultural Heritage
Opposition from citizens’ committee 
and Cheonggye Stream Federation 
against decision on cultural heritage 
restoration policy
To make major decisions on cultural 
heritage restoration projects
Subcommittee of 
the Cultural Heritage 
Administration
Opposition from citizens’ committee 
and Cheonggye Stream Federation 
against decision of experts’ committee
To make final policy decisions on 
cultural heritage restoration projects
Source :  Rearranged from Choi Geun-hee. “A Comparative Study on the Cheonggye Stream Renewal Policy of Seoul and the 
Dockland Redevelopment Policy of London.” Journal of the Korean Urban Management Association 21.3 (2008): 305.
(3) Direct Dialogue and Coordination
The restoration project not only involved a relatively thorough preparation prior to the 
implementation, but went through a process of actively collecting opinions from Cheonggye Stream 
merchants. Ever since its establishment on July 2nd, 2002, the Headquarter for Seoul Cheonggye 
Stream Restoration Project placed a heavy emphasis on collecting opinions from the stakeholders, 
including vendors. The opinions were collected and mediated through various ways involving public 
hearings, citizens’ committees, council for residents and merchants, policy councils, project seminars, 
on-site civil affairs offices, and task force for merchants. The headquarter was able to build a trust 
relationship over the one-year process of visiting stores roughly 4,000 times in person and listening 
to the opinions of merchants. It was considered a success in forming a consensus with the merchants 
and inducing their cooperation through the effort.
Specifically, the city government organized and ran the Council for Residents and Merchants in 
Cheonggye Stream Area to address the opposition from the merchants in the area, with 60 members 
from representatives of the merchants and residents in Cheonggye Stream’s surrounding areas, and 
members of the city and district councils. The council functioned as a platform to provide benefits 
within the reasonable range in which the opponents in turn supported the implementation of the 
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project and demanded partial revisions. The council, however, did not accept demands from the 
opposing parties for the compensation of business losses incurred by the restoration project. In 
particular, the city government engaged in collecting opinions and negotiations with meticulous 
preparations during the process of managing conflicts with the merchants. Propensity and demands 
of the merchants were identified through a thorough prior field investigation. There were no potential 
conflicts with owners of lands and buildings because they were expecting an increase in property 
values after the project. On the contrary, local merchants and some of the residents were likely to 
stir up conflicts. Therefore, a council for residents and merchants was set up to open an official 
communication channel. Of all the stakeholders, merchants were selected as primary negotiation 
partners, and the city government proceeded with collecting opinions from the merchants and holding 
project seminars. In the quest for conflict management with the merchants, a policy council was run 
prior to the commencement of construction whereas a task force for the merchants was operated 
after the construction began. The formal and informal negotiations with them helped make the 
restoration project a success.37) 
Prior to the commencement of the restoration project, negotiations with merchants were carried 
out through policy councils. The negotiations were held seven times, and the issues on the table 
involved those of common interest, including compensations, reaching agreements, and follow-up 
operations and management. The major negotiation issues and demands were as follows.
37) Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” 2006.
Table2-7-4  Dates of Policy Council and Negotiation Issues
Date Negotiating Party Negotiation Issues and Demands
February 
18, 2003
Seoul Metropolitan 
Government · A meeting with the policy council
· Discussions on how to operate the policy council
· Discussions on issues regarding the restoration projectMerchant 
Representatives
February 
27, 2003
Seoul Metropolitan 
Government
· Rejection to compensation for loss 
·  Effort to minimize inconveniences in doing business and boost the economy of the 
business district
· Active support for an alternative area when designated
Merchant 
Representatives
·  Measures for categorizing businesses into remaining, hoping to move, and 
impossible to operate
· Demanding for compensation for business loss
· Demanding for an alternative area
March 
13, 2003
Seoul Metropolitan 
Government
·  Impossible to delay the commencement of construction scheduled for July
· Examining measures for indirect support
Merchant 
Representatives
·  Demanding for the delay of commencement of construction scheduled for July
· Demanding for measures for indirect support
·  Demanding for blueprints for redevelopment of Cheonggye Stream’s surrounding 
areas
· Demanding for an active solution to Sky shopping mall
March 
20, 2003
Seoul Metropolitan 
Government
· Explaining about the project and collecting recommendations
Merchant 
Representatives
April 3, 
2003
Seoul Metropolitan 
Government
·  Suggesting stronger focus on producing actual measures rather than arguments 
over delay in commencement of construction and compensation for business loss
·  Agreement on dividing teams into relocating and remaining ones and having a 
meeting once a week
Merchant 
Representatives
·  Agreeing on dividing teams into relocating and remaining ones and having a 
meeting once a week
April 8, 
2003
Seoul Metropolitan 
Government ·  Merchants’ protest against putting up a banner about the introduction of traffic 
control slated for July 1st. The policy council broke downMerchant 
Representatives
Breakdown of Policy Council
June 9, 
2006
Seoul Metropolitan 
Government
· Continuing to revitalize the business district
· Examining the size of the alternative area
Merchant 
Representatives
· Continuing to revitalize the business district
·  Demanding for an additional 60,000 pyeong apart from the 90,000 pyeong 
alternative area
Source : Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” 2006. 280.
Merchants who attended the official negotiations with the city government during the policy 
council failed to go further than expressing a basic idea of the opposition against the project because 
their interests were diverse, which made it hard to reach an agreement. Accepting merchants’ 
recommendations, the city government built a council for merchants. Beginning from November 15th, 
2003, which was after the commencement of construction, 17 rounds of meetings were held. The 
dates and main contents of discussions at the Council for Merchants were as follows.
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 Table2-7-5  Dates and Main Contents of Council for Merchants
Date Main Content
December 
15, 2003
· Awarding letters of appointment
· Collecting merchants’ recommendations
·  Holding temporary and representative meetings: Cooperation for voluntary removal of obstacles on the 
streamside of Cheonggye Stream
December 
19, 2003
· Measures, including additional installation of U-turns on Cheonggye Stream-ro
· Schedule for implementation of settlement complex
· Collecting recommendations from merchants
January 16, 
2004
· Explaining about the draft plan on land use of the Munjeong District
· Plan on additional installation of U-turns on Cheonggye Stream-ro
· Issues regarding installation of street lights and planting trees on Cheonggye Stream-ro
· Plans to utilize loading zones
· Results of advertising normal operation of the stores on Cheonggye Stream
February 20, 
2004
· Problems with operating free buses in surrounding areas of Cheonggye Stream
· Normal operation of loading zones on Cheonggye Stream-ro at the earliest possible time
· A demand for a flexible application of parking violation of business vehicles
March 19, 
2004
· Issues regarding cultural heritage on Cheonggye Stream construction site
· Progresses regarding Cheonggye Stream festival and merchants’ cooperation
· Progresses in redevelopment of the surrounding areas of Seun shopping mall
· Progresses in building settlement complex
· Explanations, including progresses in the Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
April 14, 
2004
·  Issues regarding the excavation of cultural heritage during the Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
· Cooperations from merchants regarding Cheonggye Stream festival
· Progresses in construction
· Issues, including operation of loading zones 
· Collecting other recommendations
May 28-29, 
2004
· Plans for efficient operation of task force for Cheonggye Stream merchants
· Evaluation and discussions of the results of the launch of Cheonggye Stream festival
· Discussions on other measures for merchants
June 18, 
2004
· Discussions on the schedule for relocation measures and issues at hand
·  Headquarter’ final decision on the composition of a deliberative committee on candidates for relocation 
after consulting a draft basic plan with the Council for Merchants at a temporary meeting
August 20, 
2004 · Discussions on progresses in measures for the Cheonggye Stream project
September 
17, 2004
· Selection of candidates for scholarship for Cheonggye Stream merchants’s children
·  Demanding for complementing the traffic signal system on the east and west of Cheonggye Stream-ro at 
the Heunginmun-ro intersection
October 29, 
2004
· Progresses in creating the Southeastern Distribution Complex
· Explanation on recommendations for U-turn at Ogansu Bridge
· Explanation on next schedules for the transfer
· Explanation on other measures for tenant merchants in relation to redevelopment
November 
19-20, 2004
· Issues regarding the establishment of the Southeastern Distribution Complex
· Other issues at hand
December 
21, 2004
· Progresses in 2004 measures and future measures for merchants
· Collecting other recommendations
January 28, 
2005
·  Qualifications of businesses and selection standards for lines of trade that were relocating into the 
Dongnam District Shopping Mall
·  Business direction of the shopping mall (Formation of union, public development, public-private joint 
development, etc.)
February 18, 
2005
·  Explanation on the types of development project for the Dongnam District Shopping Mall - public 
development, public-private partnership, and private development
March 18, 
2005 · Explanation on progresses in deliberation of transfer candidates’ qualifications and future plans
April 8, 
2005 
· Plans for tidying up advertisements
· Planting street trees on Cheonggye Stream-ro
· Reporting on results of a deliberative committee held
Source : Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” 2006. 282.
The Seoul Metropolitan Government actively utilized unofficial negotiation channels along with the 
aforementioned official channels.38) Compared to official negotiations, unofficial negotiations were 
more effective due to less restrictions and more chances to form interactive relations. Negotiation 
teams of both the city and the merchants evaluated unofficial negotiations highly useful and valuable. 
Public Official A: Although the channels were unofficial, they were helpful in obtaining 
information.
Merchant Representative B: Unofficial channels allowed us to communicate in times of fierce 
confrontation when we could not have in-depth discussions through the official channels. 
Merchant Representative B: Official policy consultative meetings were more like a “persuasive 
meeting.” That is because the city government only explained already-established plans and 
tried to persuade us. However, during the unofficial meetings, things were different. The city 
listened to us and showed its will to reflect our ideas in the plan. The same was true for the 
merchants. We told the city that we were not opposing the plan for the sake of opposing, but 
that was our only option left. We also asked the city to find alternative measures that we can 
accept.
Source : Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 1.” 2006. 283.
(4) Establishment of Compensation System
In order to manage conflicts, the city government devised compensation measures differently 
for the public, who would feel the impact of the restoration project, and the interested parties, 
who would be directly affected by the project. The main point of the compensation measure for 
the public was preventing any damages that could incur by traffic congestion due to demolition 
of roads. The measures included ways to resolve possible traffic congestion by deterring the use of 
passenger cars and improving public transportation system.39) Meanwhile, for the interested parties, 
the city government proposed the following diverse types of measures. First, for the merchants in 
the area, various measures were proposed in order to prevent the decrease of visitors due to traffic 
inconveniences: measures regarding trucks and freight-related parking on the Cheonggye Stream-
ro; changes of bus routes around Cheonggye Stream; operation of free shuttle buses in the area; free 
parking services for store visitors in the region. Secondly, there were measures regarding compensation 
for the business losses of the merchants during the construction period. The city government said it 
38)  Seoul Metropolitan Government had 15 rounds of unofficial negotiations from April 17th to June 6th, 2003 with members of the Task Force for 
Protection of Cheonggye Stream Business Area and the Committee of Clothing Stores who opposed the Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project.
39)  Seoul Metropolitan Government carried out various measures: improving the metro’s transport capacity, extending the exclusive median bus 
lane, enhancing the capacity of exclusive roadside bus lane, operating city bus with circulation courses, and increasing downtown parking fees. 
(Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2006)
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could not compensate the business losses, but instead tried to ease merchant’s objections by providing 
measures to minimize inconveniences, vitalizing business areas through redevelopment, and providing 
relocation assistance for the merchants. The third type of measures was related to the street vendors, 
who fiercely opposed the restoration project because the implementation of the project would mean 
the loss of their livelihood. The city government initially decided not to have negotiations with the 
vendors since they were illegally operating. However, with continued resistance from the vendors’ 
organization, the city government decided to engage in negotiations with them. As a result, it decided 
to build a temporary flea market in Dongdaemun Stadium to manage conflicts. The city government 
opened the Seoul Folk Flea Market in January 2004 and carried out supportive measures including the 
expansion of accommodations in the market. 
4. Verification and Evaluation of Proponents’ and Opponents’ Arguments
1) Improving Urban Environment and Providing Water-Friendly Spaces
Most people including the opponents agree that the Cheonggye StreamRestoration Pproject 
dramatically improved city’s environment including air quality and provided resting places for the 
public. Even though the artificial stream still has room for improvement, walking paths constructed 
along both sides of the stream are welcomed by the citizens. The restored stream and nearby water-
friendly facilities emerged as Seoul’s landmark, attracting a large number of people.40)
2) Restoration of Historical Relics 
The restoration project shed new lights on the historical relics of Joseon dynasty, including 
Gwang Bridge. The Stone Revetments, which had been under the concrete covering, saw light, and 
Gwang Bridge, which had disappeared, was restored near its original location. Ogan watergate near 
Dongdaemun also came back to its original place even though its shape has changed. However, not 
every historical relic was able to be restored due to various realistic problems including the lack of 
the original forms and preservation difficulties. Supyo Bridge was not restored at its original location 
but moved to another place for preservation, and Mojeon Bridge could not be restored. As such, the 
project left room for improvement in that it left regrets in terms of the restoration of historical relics 
due to partly unsatisfied outcome.41)
 
40) Cho Myung-rae. “Accomplishments and Limits of Cheonggye Stream Restoration.” Journal of KSCE 53(11): 149-155. 2005.
41) Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol.3.” 2006.
3) Natural Stream vs. Artificial Stream
Creating eco-friendly environment in the city was one of the major purposes of the restoration 
project along with the restoration of historical relics, but they drew the strongest criticisms. It is true 
that the restored Cheonggye Stream cannot be seen as a natural stream because water is not naturally 
coming from the nearby river basin, but pumped up from the Han River. Even if water was designed 
to come directly from the river basin, it would be very difficult to manage the flow of water during the 
dry or flood seasons. However, pumping up 120,000 tons of water a day to run the stream costs huge 
amount of money because of excessive energy consumption, which is the project’s major drawback. 
It is undeniable that the design of Cheonggye Stream, which focused on water-friendliness and 
landscape, was not the most appropriate to guarantee ecological diversity. 
5. Project Implementation Effect
1) Fundamental Solution to Overpass Safety Issue
One of the most visible achievements of the restoration project is that it fundamentally solved safety 
issues of the facilities near the stream, by pulling down the concrete covering above the stream and the 
overpass. Even the opponents agree that by tearing down such facilities, instead of temporarily fixing 
them, the project brought in more economical and effective results from a long-term perspective.42)
2) Improvement of City Environment and Downtown Revitalization
Restoration of Cheonggye Stream dramatically improved the city’s environment and created 
an urban landmark. The overpass near the stream was blocking the sights and undermined the 
landscape along with other disordered buildings. In addition, by causing noise and dust, the overpass 
deteriorated the city environment. Thus, the demolition of the overpass solved such problems 
regarding the landscape and the environment.
3) Restoration of Urban Ecosystem and Provision of Water-friendly Spaces
By restoring a clean stream and creating waterfront ecological parks, the project provided water-
friendly spaces where citizens can take a rest in nature. Not even Hong Kong or other Asian mega cities 
were able to create such places in urban areas. In that sense, the restoration project can be seen as the 
biggest achievement of Seoul Metropolitan Government, as the environment was recovered and the 
quality of life was enhanced through the project thanks to improved air conditions, which resulted from 
42) Cho Myungrae. “Accomplishments and Limits of Cheonggye Stream Restoration.” Journal of KSCE 53(11): 140-155. 2005.
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reduced urban heat islands and newly created wind paths.43) However, the fact that it costs seven billion 
won annually to pump up 120,000 tons of water from Han river to flow the water in Cheonggye 
Stream 24 hours a day is the biggest drawback of the project, which still draws much criticism.
4) Urban Renewal and Revitalization of Neighbouring Areas
Another visible and direct effect of the Cheonggye Stream restoration is changes in land use of 
adjacent areas and accompanied increases in the value of land. In addition, the local economy was 
revitalized as various economic activities took place near the Cheonggye Stream. This is one of the 
great accomplishments of the project. When the aforementioned effects of the restoration project are 
analysed through the frame of social costs and benefits, total quantified costs are estimated to be 1.8 
trillion won including the project cost, traffic congestion cost, and maintenance and administration 
cost after the restoration. Quantified benefits are estimated to be 3.3 trillion won including reduced 
maintenance and administration costs for the overpass and improved environment. Total social 
benefits far surpass total social costs, when unquantified benefits such as improved air conditions and 
economic spill-over effects are added.44)
Figure2-7-4  Accomplishments of Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project
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Source : Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol. 3.” 2006.
43) Article from Times 2006. 5. 15.
44) Seoul Metropolitan Government. “A White Paper on Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project Vol.2.” 2006.
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8 Seoul Exclusive Median Bus Lane Project
1. Project Outline
Length 14 roads of 107.7㎞ (as of December 2010)
Total Cost 80.34 billion won (2005~2010)
Project 
Duration
July 2004~December 2012
*  Plans to establish and manage 19 roads of 214.7㎞; 14 roads of 124.4㎞ by 2011 and 5 additional 
roads of 90.3㎞ by 2012 
Current Status and Future Plan of Seoul Exclusive Median Bus Lanes (2004-2011)
Past
Present
As of early 2000s, Seoul’s transportation infrastructure was over-saturated as a result of 
concentration of population, businessees, and industries in Seoul. In particular, with high dependency 
on imported energy, the idea that passenger-car-oriented travel behavior should be replaced with 
energy-efficient travel behavior was gaining ground. At the time, average city bus speed was only 16
㎞ per hour, and the quality of bus service was very poor. In order to solve such problems, the Seoul 
Metropolitan Government decided to carry out extensive reforms on bus transportation system, 
including the Exclusive Median Bus Lane Project in 2004. 
From 2004, the city government has been gradually carrying out the project with an aim to 
implement 214.7 kilometer-long Exclusive Median Bus Lane in 19 roads until the end of 2012. As of 
late 2010, the exclusive lane was secured in 14 roads that run 107.7㎞.
In carrying out the Exclusive Median Bus Lane Project, various types of conflicts emerged from the 
planning phase: user inconvenience, road management efficiency and safety, and fierce confrontation 
between interested parties. However, the city government was able to create positive public opinion 
about the project by proposing project implementation effects in an objective fashion. Through 
consultation with the interested parties, direct dialogue and mediation were conducted. In addition, 
the city government was able to smoothly carry out the project with persuasion strategies including 
the appliance of new governance through a citizen’s committee. 
2. Project Background and Purpose
1) Project Background
In 2004, when the Seoul Metropolitan government introduced the Exclusive Median Bus Lane 
System, the city’s transportation infrastructure was able to handle 2 million cars while there were 2.8 
million cars in the city. In addition, about 3.15 million cars were traveling between Seoul and nearby 
cities within the metropolitan area, causing the saturation of the transportation capacity in the city. In 
particular, as oil price continued to rise, the country, with its heavy dependance on imported energy, 
needed a practical policy that could deter the further use of passenger cars. At the time, the average 
bus speed was slowing down to 16㎞ per hour, which already fell short of the average passenger car 
speed, 19.8㎞ per hour. In addition, the quality of bus service was very poor because of old vehicles 
and related facilities, which caused a further decrease in the share of bus in all transport. 
In addition, people called for improved bus service, as more people began to realize the need to 
secure the right of the socially weak groups such as the elderly, children, and the poor who could not 
freely use passenger cars as well as the need to control the use of passenger cars in order to manage 
air pollution. 
Against this backdrop, there emerged a need to improve bus service through overhauling bus 
transportation system. As a result, exclusive median bus lane was promoted.
2) Project Purpose
The purpose of the project was to enhance the speed, punctuality and capacity of bus service so as to 
reduce travel time of bus users and to strengthen public transportation user convenience at a low cost. 
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3) Project Content
The Exclusive Median Bus Lane Project was part of an effort to reform the public transportation 
system in the city. The public transportation reform project was composed of various interconnected 
projects including the introduction of Exclusive Median Bus Lane System, restructuring of bus routes, 
introduction of quasi-public management system of bus service, and fare system reform. Major 
contents of the Seoul public transportation system reform project are as follows. 
(1) Exclusive Median Bus Lane System
Under the project, the existing exclusive roadside bus lanes were to move to the center of the 
roads. Target roads were those that connect central and subcentral areas of Seoul with neighbouring 
cities. More specifically, they included: major arterial roads going through developing areas of high 
density; roads in areas with poor subway service and high bus usage demand; and roads where more 
than three lanes per direction could be secured.
Figure2-8-1 Exclusive Median Bus Lane Installation Plan
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Figure2-8-2  Example of Seoul Exclusive Median Bus Lane
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(2) Restructuring of Bus Routes
Under the restructuring project of bus routes, unreasonable city bus routes, which were long, 
redundant and curved, were reorganized and divided into a dual system of trunk lines and branch 
lines. Trunk lines were the backbone of transportation system in the city, while branch lines connected 
various transportation means. 
In designing the routes, trunk lines, which dealt with medium and long distance travel demand, 
were planned to be under public management system in order to have improved mobility, punctuality 
and service. Branch lines were designed to improve user convenience, link with trunk bus lines and 
subway by fully harnessing the existing lines, and expand the existing routes with poor services.
(3) Introduction of Quasi-Public Management System of Bus Service
Along with the introduction of the Exclusive Median Bus Lane System, the city government 
introduced a quasi-public management system with an emphasis on the public nature for bus services, 
for which up to that time private providers had operated. Under the quasi-public management system, 
the rights on most private bus routes would be owned by bus companies, but the revenues coming 
from the routes would belong to the public revenue management organization to be distributed to 
the bus operating companies, according to the operation ratio of each route. However, a bidding 
system was introduced for a number of newly created routes.
(4) Fare System Reform 
Unlike the then existing independent fare system under which the fare was charged according 
to the number of service use, the reformed fare system, largely represented as a distance-based and 
transit-fare system, was an integrated transportation fare system that would charge fare according to 
the total distance, regardless of the number of transit between transportation modes.
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The unified bus fare was maintained and was also applied to the fare of inter-city buses, which 
charged extra fare for traveling additional distances. In addition, a new transfer fare system was 
introduced: free transfer when the total distance is shorter than the basic distance of 10㎞, while extra 
charge for every 5㎞ when the total distance exceeds 10㎞. 
3. Arguments and Grounds of Proponents and Opponents 
1) Issues and Logic of Proponents and Opponents
Various types of conflicts emerged from the planning phase of the Seoul Exclusive Median Bus Lane 
Project. These conflicts are categorized into four issues: service quality in terms of user convenience, 
road management efficiency, road management safety, and the issues between interested parties. 
Opponents’ and proponents’ arguments and grounds for each issue are as follows.
(1) Service Quality Regarding User Convenience
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents argued that the introduction of the Exclusive Median Bus Lane with a system of trunk 
and branch lines would require several transfers to get to certain places, whereas a single ride would 
be sufficient by the existing bus routes and system. In addition, they claimed that the new system 
would cause inconveniences for the passengers because they needed to walk longer distance. The 
reason was explained that bus passengers might need to walk more between bus stops for trunk and 
branch lines, since only trunk line buses would be allowed to use the exclusive median lanes. Adding 
to such inconvenience, passengers would have to bear with longer travel time and larger fare due to 
transfers and waiting. 
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The Seoul Metropolitan government argued that the introduction of the exclusive median 
bus lane would resolve user inconvenience as it would improve the punctuality of the bus 
system, which had been a drawback compared to the subway. With the introduction of the 
distance-based fare system and an integrated transfer discount system, the overall fare system 
would become reasonable, as users pay only for the distance travelled. Moreover, the city 
government emphasized that the overall competitiveness of public transportation system 
would be improved by integrating bus and subway. Through such improvements including 
bus service quality, the city government expected a rise in the share of bus in all transportation 
modes, which had been declining. Moreover, the city government saw a great symbolic 
meaning, as it prioritized public transport users in road usage.
(2) Road Management Efficiency 
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The reasons for opposing the exclusive median bus lanes were spelled out that while the speed 
of some trunk line buses that use exclusive median bus lanes could improve, vehicles that 
could not use the lane such as passenger cars, taxis, trucks, branch line buses and town buses, 
would effectively have one fewer lane to use and therefore face serious traffic congestion and 
chaos. The opponents thus proposed that it would be desired to use the existing exclusive 
roadside bus lanes. They made an additional point that the introduction of the exclusive 
median bus lane system might cause traffic congestion, as it would be hard to deal with traffic 
at crossroads and in and out of alleys.
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The Seoul Metropolitan Government refuted that the existing exclusive roadside bus lanes 
were not effective because of illegal parking and stopping as well as cars using backside roads. 
The city persuaded the opponents, arguing that the introduction of the exclusive median bus 
lane system would increase bus speed, decrease travel time, and reduce traffic congestion. 
The city government added that the new system could enhance the quality of bus service by 
improving the punctuality of bus service, increase the transport share of buses, and in result 
generate huge social benefits. 
(3) Road Management Safety
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents argued that since most of the existing left-turn and u-turn sections would 
have to be abolished to build and run the exclusive median bus lane, there would be increased 
possibility of traffic accidents caused by confusions on the part of passenger cars or other 
vehicles using the lanes. 
 • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The proponents refuted that the introduction of exclusive median bus lanes would improve 
road management safety by reducing drivers’ confusion through clearly distinguishing lanes 
for passenger and other vehicles and lanes for buses.
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(4) Conflicts Between Interested Parties
 • Arguments and Grounds of Opponents
 The opponents argued that public transportation service gap between the regions with 
exclusive median bus lanes and the regions without them could be widened, causing 
regional conflicts. They predicted that, due to the restructuring of bus routes, unnecessary 
social conflicts might occur between companies that run high-profit bus routes and other 
companies. In particular, when bus routes are restructured following the implementation 
of exclusive median bus lanes, the operating stability of bus companies could decrease and 
result in poor bus service quality. The introduction of the exclusive median bus lane system 
would also decrease the number of roadside bus stops, posing potentially negative impacts 
on neighbouring business areas. The opponents argued that the exclusive median bus lane 
system should not be introduced unless the city government takes an overall traffic signal 
system reform including the introduction of a priority signal system for buses coming from 
feeder roads to the median lane.
  • Arguments and Grounds of Proponents
 The proponents stressed an opportunity of resolving potential conflicts between parties of 
different interests in the reform process of the public transportation system including the 
exclusive median bus lane system. Furthermore such a process could provide a basis of a new 
regional and public governance system regarding public projects.
2) Persuasion Strategy
In order to mitigate conflicts related to the project, the city government utilized various persuasion 
strategies: forming public opinion by informing the prospective effects of the project, having direct 
dialogue and coordination based on mutual understanding, and introducing a new governance 
scheme of participatory administration through the Citizen’s Committee on Bus Service Reform.
(1) Creating Public Opinion by Informing the Prospective Effects of Project
The Seoul Metropolitan Government reviewed the effects of the exclusive median bus lane through 
the pilot projects in 4.5㎞-long Cheonhodaero and 7.6㎞-long Hajeong-ro, where the exclusive median 
bus lanes were implemented in 1996 and 2003 respectively. Through the process, the city government 
was able to make the public recognize that the project was a well-prepared policy and that related 
problems were already taken into account. At the time, as a result of the introduction of the exclusive 
median bus lanes in Cheonhodaero and Hajeong-ro, the speed of bus during rush hours increased 
from 18.2㎞ per hour to 35.0㎞ per hour and from 20.0㎞ per hour to 29.1㎞ per hour, respectively. 
In addition, the city government told the media on the unreasonable aspects of the existing bus 
system, including the privatization of bus routes and the insolvency of small bus companies. By doing 
so, the city government concentrated on building a favorable environment and social consensus on 
the overall reform of the bus system. 
It also introduced success stories of relevant projects in other cities such as Bogota, Columbia, 
Osaka, Japan, Hong Kong, and Curitiba, Brazil to shape positive public expectations on the 
restructuring of Seoul’s public transportation system. 
(2) Direct Dialogue and Coordination Based on Mutual Understanding
During the process of shaping ideas for the bus system restructuring, the city government 
collected opinions from experts and interested parties through public hearings, discussions, and 
consultative meetings. Through the process, the city government was able to acknowledge, in 
advance, the interested parties’ diverse opinions that could result in conflicts and to prepare effective 
countermeasures. Conflicts between the parties of different interests can be divided into the following. 
First, the conflicts between the Seoul Metropolitan Government and the Seoul Bus Transport 
Union were about the introduction of a quasi-public management system of bus service. The city 
government argued for the restructuring of bus management system to enhance the public nature of 
bus. On the other hand, the Seoul Bus Transport Union claimed that the introduction of a quasi-public 
management system, which was the core of the restructuring plan, meant an infringement on private 
property rights.
Second, within the Seoul Bus Transport Union, conflicts emerged between bus companies with 
high profit routes and other companies. Third, conflicts between the city government and the National 
Police Agency emerged regarding the safety and communication issue of the target areas of exclusive 
median bus lane implementation and the establishment of plans for traffic management. The city 
government requested interested parties to submit objective reports on controversial issues so that 
all interested parties could have fact-based discussions and thus reach mutual understanding and 
agreement. For example, regarding the calculation of the transport unit cost, which was the main 
point of the quasi-public management, the city government and the Bus Transport Union submitted 
different reports and reached an agreement through numerous meetings discussing the findings of 
the reports.
(3) New Governance of Participatory Administration45): Citizen’s Committee on Bus Service Reform
The Seoul Metropolitan Government organized the Citizen’s Committee on Bus Service Reform, 
which was a policy consultative body that included all the interested parties. The committee was 
45)  New Governance : A measure in which various actors such as governments, states, markets, and civil groups create horizontal networks, interac-
tions and collaboration to minimize conflicts and to carry out policies or plans. (Pierre, 2000)
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comprised of the representatives from all parties including the Seoul City Council, the Seoul Bus 
Transport Union, the Seoul Town Bus Transport Union, the Bus Transport Labor Union, transport 
experts, civil groups, and the National Police Agency. 
Representatives from various interested parties participated in the deliberation of policies from the 
early stage, which enhanced mutual understanding in a candid atmosphere of committee meetings. 
Different interests and conflicts were successfully mitigated through direct negotiations between 
the parties in the committee. As a result, an agreement was reached based on mutual considerations 
and concessions between the parties. Thus, the effectiveness of a participatory governance was 
proved through the operation of the Citizen’s Committee on Bus Service Reform.
4. Verification and Evaluation of Proponents’ and Opponents’ Arguments
1) Improved Service Quality Regarding User Convenience
With the enhanced punctuality of buses after the implementation of the Exclusive Median Bus Lane 
System, Seoul city buses’ transport share rose from 27.6 percent in 2006 to 27.8 percent in 2009. The 
modal share gap between the bus and the subway (with a 35.2 percent share in 2009) was narrowed. 
In addition, the number of public transportation users in Seoul increased by 2.2 percent, from 
10.19 million in 2006 to 10.41 million in 2009, indicating that the exclusive median bus lane system 
improved the overall quality of public transportation service.
In particular, according to a survey on citizens’ satisfaction on public transportation, people’s 
satisfaction on bus service improved by 12.4 points from 59.2 in 2006 to 71.6 in 2009, compared to 
a mere increase from 65.6 to 69.7 of taxi satisfaction during the same period, suggesting that the 
quality of bus service dramatically improved.
2) Road Management Efficiency
The Exclusive Median Bus Lane System won Grand Prize in 2009 Local Government’s Public 
Transportation Policies. Nearby Incheon city, Gyeonggi-do, and other metropolitan governments 
began introducing the system. Indeed, in a 2009 survey on citizens regarding downtown traffic system 
improvement, 86.8 percent of the respondents answered that the exclusive median bus lane system 
was necessary for solving traffic congestion.46) 
With the implementation of the exclusive median bus lane system in the arterial roads connected 
46)  Seoul Metropolitan Government. “Comprehensive Analysis and Future Development Direction of the Exclusive Median Bus Lane System as a 
Traffic Policy in a Mega City.” 2009.
to downtown, it became easier for people from the metropolitan area to get to downtown by bus, 
mitigating the concentration of passenger cars in downtown Seoul.
In particular, the traffic speed of the roads in downtown continued to improve after the 
introduction of the system. The speed in Dobong-Miaro has increased by 81.8 percent from 11㎞ 
per hour to 20㎞ per hour, while the speed in Susaek-Sungsanro and Kyungin-ro has increased by 
51.9 percent and 35.0 percent, respectively. Likewise, the speed of city buses has increased by 28 
percent on average. In addition, the case of Hangang-ro shows that not only the speed of buses, but 
also other vehicles’ speed has increased by 10.6 percent from 24.5㎞ per hour to 27.1㎞ per hour, 
suggesting that the exclusive median bus lane system has improved the operation efficiency of the 
overall road network.
As of 2007, the benefits47) of the eight major roads with the exclusive median bus lane system were 
estimated to be 70.78 billion won per year and the B/C ratio between 2005 and 2035 was estimated 
to be 3.0-18.6, proving the efficiency of the project.
3) Road Operation Safety
The number of traffic accidents on the exclusive median bus lanes slightly increased right after the 
system was introduced, but then decreased as drivers and citizens became accustomed to the system. 
According to the Road Traffic Authority, 881 cases of traffic accidents took place in downtown Seoul 
in the first half of 2004. In the second half, the number slightly rose to 925. However, the number 
continued to decrease to 816 in the first half of 2005 and to 714 in the first half of 2006.
4) Conflicts Between Interested Parties
Seoul city organised and operated the Citizen’s Committee on Bus Service Reform in which all the 
interested parties participated. Through this participatory governance scheme, the city successfully 
implemented the quasi-public management system for the bus service, which could have gone to 
waste because of the conflicts between interested parties in the past. In addition, the city government 
made an exemplary case for the establishment of new governance system in conflicts mitigation. In 
short, the committee played a key role in the successful introduction of a quasi-public management 
system, guaranteeing fairness for both the city government and the Seoul Bus Transport Union.
47)  Project cost in 2005-2010 for eight roads is 80.34 billion won as of 2007 while the cost of the benefits (operating cost, traffic accident, travel 
time, environmental cost) is 364.3 billion won
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5. Project Implementation Effects 
According to an analysis on the operation status of the three arterial roads of Gangnamdaero, 
Susaek-Sungsanro and Dobong-Miaro, where the Exclusive Median Bus Lane System was 
implemented, the punctuality of buses has been improved by 16 percent, and bus speed by 4.5-9.8 ㎞ 
per hour, compared to the exclusive roadside bus lanes.48) 
Furthermore, the deviation of bus travel time was one to two minutes, showing that the punctuality 
of buses has greatly improved to become almost equivalent to that of the subway. The bus speed has 
increased by 30 percent on average.49) With enhanced convenience, the number of bus users50) per 
day increased by 22,000 in 2009, contributing to the improvement of demand and transport share of 
buses.
48) Seoul Development Institute. “A Case Study on Conflict Management in Bus Service Reform Process in Seoul.” 2005.
49)  Bus speed increased by four ㎞ per hour on average, minimum 12 percent and maximum 82 percent, and became equivalent to that of 
passenger-cars
50)  Number of bus users of each route increased by two to ten percent, number of bus users per day increased by 22,000 from 5.66 million in 2006 
to 5.68 million in 2009
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1. Changes of Conflicts over National Projects
1. Changes of Conflicts over National Projects 
Korea has been experiencing big and small social conflicts over national projects, as it has been 
going through the era of compressed growth and development beginning from the 1960s.
In particular, after Korea achieved political democratization through the June Uprising in 1987, 
different interests and values clashed all across the society. Korea underwent costly learning process as 
numerous events of social conflicts incurred enormous social costs. Up until the mid-1980s, the major 
cause of social conflicts was people’s demand for political democratization.
After Korea achieved democratization, it went through the era of growing pains of compressed 
conflicts, where various conflicts between private institutions and civil groups, regions, classes, 
generations, and ideologies erupted over national land development, environmental conservation, 
division of wealth among classes, and the issues of ideologies and values. Korea is still faced with big 
and small social conflicts regarding different interests and values across the society. 
Conflicts over national projects in the past showed different and distinct characteristics: some were 
oppressed or hidden, others were exposed and diffused, and more conflicts became complicated 
and diversified. As such, diverse types of conflicts can be divided into those of development era, 
democratization era, and advanced era, according to their characteristics.
Figure 3-1  Changes of Conflicts over Public Policy
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1) Conflicts over National Project in Development Era
Korea was virtually under the rule of military governments from the Third Republic to the Fifth 
Republic (1963-1988). The central government was very authoritative and, in many cases, restricted 
or reserved people’s freedom and rights. The authoritarian government, which prioritized national 
development and efficiency, wanted every national project to be carried out in perfect order from 
planning to decision-making to execution. That is why at the time, the government saw negligible 
oppositions or conflicts over national projects. In addition, any objections to national projects were 
even considered as a social evil that could cause social unrest. The government was decisive in resolving 
potential conflicts from the start with the intervention of government power. As a result, all the 
unresolved social conflicts remained hidden under the surface as a latent force for potential social unrest.
Until the Fifth Republic, all the mayors and governors of cities or provinces were public officials 
who were appointed by the central government, since the local self-governing system was not fully 
implemented. All of them were required to fully comply with the orders or decisions from the central 
government. In addition, the public had limited access to information or knowledge regarding 
complicated social issues such as large-scale national projects. That is because, at the time, expert 
groups in every social sector were weak and no tools like the Internet were available. Most experts 
were on the government’s side in developing and rationalizing government policies. The social 
environment at that time took for granted the exclusion of the public from the decision-making and 
execution processes of national projects. Meanwhile, Korea as a divided country in a cold war era 
faced sharp ideological conflicts internally, breeding potential social unrest.
2) Conflicts over National Project in Democratization Era
The June Uprising in 1987 gave people a sense of autonomy and citizenship. As a result, Korean people 
began to express their demands for all sorts of things, which have been oppressed under the authoritarian 
government in the past. Thus diverse types of social conflicts began to erupt in all corners of society.
Politically, these demands were expressed as the revision of the Constitution based on the direct 
presidential election system with a single five-year-term, the establishment of a democratic system, 
the recovery of citizen’s rights to live, and basic human rights. From then on, ruling practices and 
regulations of authoritarian governments began to change over time. With the implementation of the 
local self-governing system in the mid 1990s, people began to be conscious about the self-reliance of 
their regions and became sensitive about their regions’ interest. With complete political freedom given 
to citizens, social conflicts appeared in a fashion totally different from those of the development era, 
and these conflicts gradually permeated into larger issues of society.
Economically, people made a strong voice for fair distribution of wealth, leading to the introduction 
Synthesis of Conflict Incidences of 
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of public-ownership system of land in the early 1990s. This is also the time when full-fledged labor 
movements to protect workers’ rights began. Specifically, experts in all the fields began to organize 
numerous civil groups, which then raised new issues such as environment, region, and human rights 
as an important social value. In particular, the issue of environment came to the fore in the case of land 
development-related national projects. As social awareness on the value of environment rose, it led to the 
clash of values between environment and development, generating social conflicts over national projects.
At the same time, civil groups armed with expertise began to raise issues concerning economic 
feasibility, environmental and regional problems of large-scale SOC-related national projects. They 
often made confrontational relations with the government by claiming civic values. This was the time 
when direct clashes occurred between government’s national land development policies and civil 
groups’ values on environmental protection. As a result, the government began to accommodate 
representatives of civil groups in the decision-making processes.
3) Conflicts over National Development in Advanced Era 
Large-scale national projects such as the Incheon Airport and the high-speed railway brought about 
successful results, overcoming intense social conflicts in early stages. During the process, both the 
government and project agencies, and the civil groups in opposition, were able to accumulate valuable 
experiences from raising to resolving issues. As such, the government and civil groups, which learned 
greatly through big and small social conflicts in the democratization era when environmental values 
were cherished, began to view conflicts from a new perspective after the mid-2000s.
Both of them realized that excessive social conflicts could pose great burden to the entire nation, 
undermining national development. The analysis of Samsung Economic Research Institute in 2009 
estimated that, if the level of social conflicts in Korea drops to that of the OECD average, GDP per 
capita would increase by more than 27 percent, or 5,000 dollars more.
In addition, both sides clearly recognized that the one who does not have moral grounds or ethical values 
has no choice but to lose in the case of conflict. Therefore, the society as a whole has been working to set up 
the foundation for conflict resolution through laws and regulations and has been evolving into a mature system, 
wherein conflicts are resolved and consensus are forged rationally within the frame of laws and regulations.
In 2007, the Regulations on Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts for Public Institutions was 
enacted and, in 2009, the Presidential Committee on Social Cohesion was established as an effort to 
lower social costs by mitigating conflicts between classes, ideologies, regions and generations.
However, supplementary efforts are needed because laws and regulations and systems to prevent 
conflicts over the implementation of national projects are yet to be fully established. It should also be 
noted that conflicts tend to be multi-faceted as conflicts over national projects are intertwined with 
those over regional interests and values.
2. Characteristics of Conflicts in Each Era
1) Characteristics of Conflicts in Development Era
From the Third Republic to the Fifth Republic (1963-1988), most of the social conflicts in Korea 
were about power and ideology. The legitimacy of power was the focus of conflicts with the major 
concerns with regaining people’s rights and political democratization, which were deferred under 
the de-facto authoritarian military government. Ideological conflicts regarding anticommunism were 
another major type of social conflicts at the time.
2) Characteristics of Conflicts in Democratization Era
After achieving political democratization, civil groups grew rapidly in number and power. These 
groups raised diverse issues regarding women’s rights, human rights, and environment, which led to 
social conflicts. Balanced regional development and conflicting interests between regions became a 
socially sensitive issue as well. 
3) Characteristics of Conflicts in Advanced Era
Both the government and civil groups began to recognize positive and negative aspects of 
conflicts and placed importance on the rational management of conflicts and agreement formation. 
Sustainability and ethical values became important criteria in mitigating conflicts as people cherished 
values such as the quality of life, balancing economy and environment, and social cohesion.
3. Synthesis of Conflict Incidences of Eight Major Projects
1) Types of Opponents’ Logic 
The grounds of opponents’ arguments made during the implementation process of the eight major 
national projects including the Gyeongbu Expressway can be grouped into the following: damages 
to environment and historical relics; economic feasibility and securing financial resources; balancing 
regional development and social equity; feasibility of location and routes; lack of technologies; and 
political motivation. However, most of the issues could have been resolved through the natural process 
of recovery, the substitution of one location to another, and supplementary measures.
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(1) Damaging Environment and Historical Relics
Entering the end of the 1980s, oppositions based on environment prevailed whenever a large-scale 
national project was carried out. More specifically, this type of oppositions included potential damage 
to the habitats of rare animals and plants, increased noise, degraded water quality, and increased 
frequency of disasters. In these cases, in spite of possibilities of reducing environmental damages 
such as pollution by applying new construction methods or shortening construction duration as well 
as conducting quantifiable comparisons between alternatives, the opponents tended to completely 
ignore such possibilities.
In addition, recent conflicts based on environmental issues are unfolding in a way that does not 
accept the procedural legitimacy, the assessment outcomes of environmental impact evaluation, and 
licensing permission. Moreover, projects are often delayed for a long period, because the academia, 
religious groups, and environmental civil groups are united in conducting group actions and filing law 
suits to oppose the project.
For example, the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project was delayed for a while 
because of a lawsuit regarding the salamander habitat in Mt. Cheonseong led by Monk Ji-yool. During 
the construction of Incheon Airport, the Joint Council on Yeongjong Island New Airport Issues, which 
was comprised of civil groups and academics, opposed the project saying that the project might 
destroy the habitat for migratory birds in Yeongjong Island and pollute the ocean. In the case of Lake 
Sihwa, local civil groups called for the demolition of the seawall or seawater circulation to improve 
water quality and demanded an overhaul of the comprehensive plan including land use. As for the 
Saemangeum Development Project, Green Korea United, environmental movement union, and some 
experts opposed the project saying that Saemangeum would become the “second Lake Sihwa”, 
since reclaimed freshwater lake would fall into decay and water quality would not be able to meet 
the environmental quality standards. In the process of constructing the Seoul Ring Expressway, tunnel 
construction was ceased because civil and religious groups claimed that the project could damage the 
environment such as rare plant habitat in Mt. Sapae and interrupt the practice of asceticism in temples.
Regarding the Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project, some civil groups called for the 
restoration of the historical relics’ original forms and opposed the relocation or abandonment of 
restoring the original forms, despite the fact that relics’ restoration process should consider the 
surrounding environment.
(2) Economic Feasibility and Securing Financial Resources
On the whole, oppositions against national SOC projects were due to the obsession with 
domestic micro-circumstances from a short-term perspective, while disregarding international macro-
circumstances from a long-term perspective.
For the Gyeongbu Expressway and the Incheon Airport, the opposition groups in and around 
political circles questioned the economic feasibility of these projects, arguing that they were too big 
to handle and were not in urgent need. Such oppositions were raised because the opponents did not 
expect a rapid increase of domestic and international transportation demand resulting from increased 
income and leisure activities.
In addition, in the case of national projects that required huge amount of project cost, the 
opponents frequently argued that the resources were insufficient and such projects could interrupt 
other projects. However, the opponents did not recognize that the national budget would increase 
along with national development. In addition, they underestimated the capacity of re-investing the 
operating profits after the completion of the projects.
For example, on November 7th, 1967 the government and the leaders of the ruling party decided 
to launch the Gyeongbu Expressway Construction Project in a joint meeting. However, even the ruling 
Republican party, Economic Planning Board, and the Ministry of Finance opposed the project, saying 
that the total project cost of 43 billion won accounted for 23.5 percent of the national budget and 
would pose great burden on national fiscal management. The Federation of Korean Industries officially 
recommended that the government review the project, since only 36 trillion won could be secured, 
while it would cost a total of 69 trillion won for the SOC investment for the next decade. 
In addition, in the case of Incheon Airport, the opponents argued that the airport site of 56.10 
million square meters was too big as it was five times larger than the London Heathrow Airport and 
Japan’s Kansai Airport, and that its construction costs exceeded 10 trillion won. Questioning the 
capacity of the baggage handling system, the media also made remarked that the opening of the 
airport should be delayed.
(3) Balanced Regional Development and Social Equity
Some of the opponents of the Gyeongbu Expressway and the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway 
projects argued that the construction of key national transport infrastructure along the Gyeongbu axis 
would result in unbalanced regional development by intensifying the concentration of the population 
and industries in the regions along the axis. In the case of Incheon Airport, the opponents stressed 
that the lack of transport linkages with local cities away from Seoul would result in low accessibility 
from those cities to the airport and thus pose difficulties in nurturing new growth industries in them.
In addition, some expressed opinions that since the major funding source of national projects were 
people’s taxes, the benefits of those projects were supposed not to be confined to particular social 
classes. Some, who opposed the Gyeongbu Expressway, criticized that the project would benefit only 
the rich in a country where most people could barely afford to eat.
In addition, some of the opponents raised an issue with the efficiency of the projects, bringing 
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the location or routes of national projects into question. Along with the route selection issues of the 
Gyeongbu Expressway and the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway, there were oppositions against the 
Incheon Airport, stating that the project would not be able to result in the intended effects because 
inadequate location was selected in terms of geography, meteorology and accessibility.
More specifically, in the case of the Gyeongbu Expressway, some politicians argued that prioritizing 
the project was a discriminative policy, despite the fact that the single-track Honam railway was 
dilapidated. They expressed strong concerns with the implications of the Gyeongbu project on 
imbalanced regional development and proposed instead the priority of the east-west road connections. 
Regarding the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Construction Project, the opponents repeated the same 
arguments that the Express Railway project would result in the vicious cycle of population and industry 
concentration and environmental degradation in national land management, considering an already 
heavy concentration of industries along the Gyeongbu axis. The project, argued by the opponents, 
would further aggravate the concentration in the Seoul metropolitan area, worsening imbalanced 
regional development in the future. Opposing the Incheon Airport Construction Project, the opponent 
groups argued that Yeongjong Island was not a suitable location for an airport because of bird strikes, 
fogs, and ground subsidence due to heavy loads during take-off and landing. A further argument 
was added that Incheon Airport, like Gimpo Airport, could not function as a convenient international 
airport for the users across the country due to its location in the north-western corner of the country.
With regards to the Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project, local merchants opposed the project as 
it was directly related to their livelihood as well as social equity. In the Cheonggye Stream area, there 
were about 60,000 stores employing more than 20,000 persons. The merchants who had business 
there worried about the possible business loss due to the restoration project. In addition, 1,500 street 
vendors in the area strongly opposed the restoration project because of their livelihood.
(4) Lack of Technology
With respect to national projects requiring the introduction of new technology, some opponents 
expressed their concerns with the ineffectiveness of new technology in achieving intended functions 
when combined with the low level of domestic technology. A related argument was also made that 
the newly introduced technologies for the project would not remain as cutting-edge technologies 
after the completion of the project due to rapid technology development. In the case of the Gyeongbu 
High-Speed Railway, some experts in the opposing group worried about technology dependence on 
France for the high-speed railway and stated that French technology based on wheel-type would 
be outdated by the time of opening since new technologies such as magnetic levitation train were 
almost ready to apply. There was also a strong opposition against tunnel construction for the reason of 
potential tunnel collapse in certain sections due to the existence of active fault zones.
Regarding the Seoul Exclusive Median Bus Lane Project, the opponents strongly opposed the 
project, arguing that it would not be successful without an overall reform of Seoul’s traffic signal 
system including a priority signal system for buses coming from the feeder roads.
(5) Political Interests
In the past, some politicians opposed national projects according to their political interests, 
downgrading the national projects as pork-barrel projects or ones favoring specific classes or regions. 
In the case of the Incheon Airport Construction Project, politicians criticized the political aspect of the 
project and demanded modifications in the project’s size and period, claiming that the project would 
undermine balanced national development. Some of the opponents argued that it was premature to 
carry out the project without objective evidence on the project effects, disregarding the long-terms 
effects of such large-scale national projects. As for large-scale transportation projects, the opponents 
tended to insist that the expansion of national roads and railways would be sufficient enough to meet 
the demands at the initial period of the concerned project, while ignoring the future demand for high-
speed transportation arising from economic development and increased income.
The Gyeongbu Expressway is the case in point. The opponents claimed that building an expressway, 
which was not a part of the Second Five-year Economic Development Plan (1967-1971), was a pork 
barrel to win more votes for the next presidential election. As such, they downgraded an important 
national project to a pork barrel for election. 
Some opponents regarded the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway as premature for the country. 
Even some transport experts suggested  postponing the project by 5 to ten 10 years, because the 
preparatory period of the project from planning to designing to the ground breaking was too short 
and the project feasibility was low. In the case of Incheon Airport, the opponents even claimed that 
the construction of a new airport would benefit only some chaebols and thus recommended that the 
project be passed onto the next administration in order to avoid suspicions over raising political funds 
at the end of the administration at that time.
2) Types of Persuasion Strategy
When national projects faced strong opposition and resulted in social conflicts, the government 
or project agencies utilized the following persuasion strategies: providing objective and scientific data 
and supplementary measures; forming multilateral consultative bodies that include major interested 
parties; enhancing PR activities to persuade the public and form consensus; direct responses from the 
government official in charge and the recovery of delayed process; and resuming suspended projects 
based on active responses to lawsuits. Such persuasion strategies were sincerely and consistently 
carried out and in many cases, various strategies were utilized simultaneously.
202
| Chapter 03 |  Synthesis of Conflicts over National Projects and Policy Implications
203
3. Synthesis of Conflict Incidences of Eight Major Projects
(1) Provision of Objective and Scientific Persuasion Data and Supplementary Measures
In order to persuade the opponents or refute their logic, the government and project agencies 
provided empirical data for persuasion including the need for national projects, funding plans, 
economic feasibility, and measures to lower environmental impact based on the case studies of 
advanced nations and the government’s own investigation.
For example, in the Saemangeum Development Project, the project agency provided the results of 
detailed analysis on such items as expanding land, securing water resources, managing water quality, 
increasing food production, preventing flood damages and effects on tourism as well the case studies of 
systematic management of lakes and swamps in advanced nations, including the Netherlands and Japan. 
Regarding the soft ground in the Incheon Airport Construction Project, the agency presented detailed 
measurement data compared with other airports abroad in order to prove safety. To refute the argument 
that the wider gap between adjacent runways would be necessary to increase the runway’s capacity, the 
project agency presented an evidence suggesting the low effectiveness of such wider-gap runways.
With respect to environmental deterioration issues, the government and project agencies 
conducted detailed investigations and analyses and developed additional supplementary measures to 
resolve problems. As for the Seoul Ring Expressway, two detailed investigations on vegetation were 
conducted and a preservation plan was established, responding to the objections that the colony of 
Crypsinus hastus, a protected plant near Mt. Sapae would be damaged by the project. Similarly, a 
reexamination report by experts based on the detailed investigation on the changes of nature was 
submitted in response to the issues raised over the environmental impact evaluation result of the Mt. 
Cheonseong passageway in the second phase of Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway Project. 
(2) Formation of Multilateral Consultative Bodies that Include Major Interested Parties
In order to persuade the opponents, the government and project agencies organized a multilateral 
consultative body which included citizens who would be directly affected by the project, civil groups, 
experts, and government agencies. By doing so, they succeeded in broadening mutual understanding 
on the projects and achieved agreements on the project implementation period, volume, and 
methods. 
For example, the Sihwa Sustainable Development Committee was established in 2004, wherein the 
related central government agencies, three local governments, local residents, civil groups, and experts 
participated. Through this committee, a reasonably acceptable agreement was made including the 
roadmap for improvement measures for water and air quality in Sihwa area, the development plan for 
the southern part of Lake Sihwa, a tidal power plant, and Sihwa MTV Development Project.
In some cases, a joint committee comprised of a project agency and interested parties was 
created in order to find measures to reach an agreement. In the case of the Seoul Ring Expressway 
Construction Project, the project operator and the Korea Expressway Corporation established the 
Committee for Investigation of Routes with the Buddhist community in 2002 and operated the 
Committee for Reexamination of Routes in 2003 in order to resolve serious conflicts over the tunnel 
construction at Mt. Sapae in northern Seoul.
As for the Saemangeum project, a public-private joint investigation task force was organized and 
operated to mitigate conflicts surrounding the problems of environmental impact, water pollution and 
economic feasibility by joint deliberation of investigation results in an objective manner.
For the Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project, the Citizen’s Committee on Cheonggye 
Stream Restoration comprised of experts, academia, and civil groups was created. As the committee 
was allowed to collect people’s opinion, promote the project, and make policy decisions, conflicts 
were mitigated and trust was earned from the citizens. Regarding the local merchants whose interests 
were at stake, the project agency secured their support and collected their opinions through numerous 
policy consultative meetings and merchants’ countermeasure task force meetings.
In the case of the Seoul Exclusive Median Bus Lane Construction Project, the city government, 
civil groups, expert groups, and bus companies, who were the direct stakeholders of the project, 
established the Committee on Bus Service Reform to resolve expected conflicts in advance.
(3) Enhanced Activities to Persuade the Public and Residents and Forming Consensus
In some cases, the government and project agencies led the local governments to persuade the 
public and carry out a signature collection movement in order to raise people’s awareness and support 
on the project. With respect to the Cheonggye Stream Project, efforts to persuade the public were 
constantly carried out including various events such as Cheonggye Stream Citizen’s Observation 
Program, and contests and persuasion schemes such as the establishment of a public information 
center and the utilization of the Internet and media.
For most of the national projects including the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway, Saemangeum, 
and Lake Sihwa, public promotion was actively pursued through the media such as newspapers, 
magazines, and broadcasting. More specifically, the government in collaboration with experts made 
and distributed press release materials based on scientific evidence to refute logically and respond 
sincerely to the opponents‘ claims. To provide easily understandable information on the projects, the 
government made and distributed videos or pamphlets as well as operated public information centers 
and the Internet webpage.
In addition, public hearings, discussions, information sessions for residents were held focusing 
on controversial issues. Expert symposiums and international conferences with foreign experts on 
environment, city development, and technology issues were held in order to promote the project and 
to supplement it through discussions.
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(4) Direct Responses From the Government Official in Charge and the Recovery of Delayed Process
In some cases, the conflicts over the implementation of national projects were not resolved despite 
the establishment of a public-private consultative body. Then the government official in charge 
directly engaged in conflict resolution. As for the Mt. Sapae Tunnel construction in the Seoul Ring 
Expressway, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation and the Buddhist community established 
the Committee for Reexamination of Routes and reviewed alternative routes, but they failed to reach 
an agreement. Thereafter, the president himself visited the Jogye Order to ask their support for the 
construction and in return the Buddhist community agreed to support government policies. As a 
result, the construction was able to resume after it had been halted for two years and one month.
The government also put various efforts including the introduction of new technologies in order to 
shorten the delayed construction schedule in national projects, which were halted for a long time due 
to social conflicts.
(5) Resumption of Suspended Projects Based on Active Responses to Lawsuits
In some cases, the government actively responded to the lawsuits filed by the opponents, which 
called for the cancellation or suspension of projects. By winning these lawsuits, the government was 
able to secure the legitimacy of projects and thus to smoothly carried them out. With regards to the 
Saemangeum project, environment groups and some local fishermen filed a lawsuit to cancel the 
reclamation license of the project. Then, the government appealed to the Seoul High Court to repeal 
the suspended execution on the seawall construction from the Seoul Administrative Court. The Seoul 
High Court then dismissed the application for injunction by the environment groups and thus the 
project was able to be carried out without problems. But it took four years and seven months. In the 
case of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway, the Supreme Court dismissed the application for injunction 
on the prohibition of beginning the construction in Wonhyo Tunnel at Mt. Cheonseong, which was 
filed by temples located at Mt. Cheonseong and civil groups. Consequently, the government was able 
to carry out the construction as scheduled. It took 96 days since the lawsuit was filed.
3) Project Outcomes and Verification on Opponents’ Arguments
The outcomes of the aforementioned eight national projects were reviewed by verifying the 
opponents’ arguments regarding the projects’ contribution to national economic development, 
regional development, the improvement of environmental issues, the accumulated capacity of core 
technologies, and the achievement of world-class technological prowess.
(1)  Remarkable Contribution To National Economic and Regional Development and Improvement of 
Quality of Life
Contrary to the concerns and objections expressed by the opponents with the low economic feasibility 
compared to investment volumes of the Gyeongbu Expressway, the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway and 
the Incheon Airport project at the initial stage, these projects made a big contribution to the development 
of logistics, tourism, and the economy, and in result greatly improved people’s quality of life.
·  Gyeongbu Expressway : There were oppositions to excessive project cost, but it laid the 
foundation for economic development dubbed the “Miracle on the Han River” by opening an 
era of expressways and dramatically compressing the national space
·  Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway : Reduced travel time between regions making one-day 
business trips and half-day life zones a reality. Seoul-Busan: 4 hrs 10 mins (2003) ⇨ 2 hrs 18 
mins (2010), Seoul-Dajeon: 1 hr 31 mins (2003) ⇨ 49 mins (2010), Busan-East Daegu: 1 hr 5 
mins (2004) ⇨ 39 mins (2010)
·  Incheon International Airport : Became Northeast Asia’s hub airport housing 68 international 
airlines with flights to 171 cities in 53 countries as of September 2010, and 200 million 
accumulated users as of March 2009. Additional expansion is planned due to increasing flight 
demands
·  Lake Sihwa, Saemangeum : Number of visitors to the Lake Sihwa reed wetland increased 
by more than 9-fold from 38,000 in 2002 to 320,000 in 2009. 88 million people visited the 
Saemangeum Seawall in 2010 alone when the construction was completed.
·  Seoul Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project : Creation of water-friendly spaces in urban 
areas led to partial recovery of nature and improved urban air conditions including reduction 
of heat islands and creation of wind path, which improved people’s quality of life
·  Seoul Exclusive Median Bus Lane Project : Operation punctuality of buses increased by 
16%, and the operation speed increased by 30% or 4.5-9.8㎞/h and the number of bus 
users increased by an average of 22,000 a day in 2009 compared to 2006, thereby greatly 
improving bus users’ satisfaction
In particular, there were fierce oppositions on the grounds that the Gyeongbu Expressway, Incheon 
Airport and Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway projects have very low economic feasibility and they 
would aggravate unbalanced regional development during the early stages of the projects. However, 
those projects have now become the nation’s key infrastructures, not only securing international 
competitiveness but also drastically changing the nation’s logistics system and people’s mobility patterns.
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In addition, for some national projects, there were strong oppositions that the projects’ locations 
and routes were not appropriate regarding topography, meteorology, accessibility and balanced 
regional development. However, those criticisms were inconsequential as these facilities are now 
being utilized nation-wide, enhancing accessibility to transportation for most people and contributing 
to regional development. Meanwhile, most of the alternative routes and locations proposed by the 
opponents turned out to have low economic feasibility due to extra construction costs and low 
environment improvement effects.
·  Gyeongbu Expressway : Compared to the alternative Seoul-Gangneung road axis, and other 
east-west roads, it generated significant economic growth and regional development
·  Incheon International Airport : Contrary to the opponents claim that the airport location is 
not appropriate to be an international airport due to its low accessibility nationwide, the 
airport equipped with a nation-wide transport network accounts for 72% of the national 
total inbound and out bound passengers in 2009 and 24% of total trade volume, or 164.1 
billion dollars
·  Seoul Ring Expressway : New towns and housing sites developments have been continuing 
nearby Pyeongchon, Bucheon, Songnae, Gimpo, Ilsan, and Goyang, and the opening of the 
road enabled large-scale housing site developments in Uijeongbu, Yangju, and Namyangju
(2)  Dispelling Concerns over Environmental Issues by Establishing Eco-friendly Foundations for 
National Projects
Whenever national projects to build expressways, high-speed railways or airports were proposed, 
potential environmental deterioration was the key reason taken by the opposition groups. These 
concerns or allegations, however, lacked scientific evidence and were often exaggerated. For 
example, most of the arguments regarding the destruction of rare animal and plant habitats, ground 
subsidence, water pollution, and obstacles to improvements turned out to be nothing more than mere 
worries, when monitored after the completion of projects.
However, the opponents’ concerns and opinions provided an opportunity for the government 
to lay the foundation for eco-friendly projects. Furthermore, those concerns and opinions made 
the government or project agencies devise improvement measures, especially when environmental 
issues were not fully considered in the process of government’s environmental impact assessment or 
environment problems were developed during the construction phase.
·  Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway : There were oppositions that the project might damage the 
environment and ecosystem in Mt. Cheonseong including the habitat for Korean salamanders. 
However, according to the monitoring results after the completion of the project, no changes 
have occurred in the ecosystem near Mt. Cheonseong
·  Lake Sihwa Project : The lake is becoming a repository of ecosystem, home to wild animals 
including birds and fish. With the seawater circulation, the water quality of the lake improved 
from COD 17 ppm in 1998 to 3.7 ppm in 2008
·  Saemangeum (Development) Project : There were strong oppositions that Saemangeum 
would become the “second Lake Sihwa.” However, the water quality of Mangyeong river, 
and Dongjin river is 4-5 and 3-4 grade, respectively. In order to secure clear water that fits the 
vision of creating a “City of Water”, measures to improve water quality with an upgraded 
aim are being implemented
(3) Securing Export Capacity through the Accumulation of Core Technologies
When the plan for Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway construction was proposed, some of the 
opponents argued that because of the low level of domestic technology regarding KTX, Korea might 
become dependent on foreign companies and eventually controlled by them. Additional concerns 
that the technologies to be introduced at the time would be obsolete at the time of completion 
turned out to be incorrect and ungrounded. Today, Korea’s KTX-related technologies are world-class 
in terms of safety and punctuality, enabling the country to export these technologies abroad. This was 
possible through the accumulation of technologies, which were dependent on foreign counties in the 
beginning but independently developed by Korea in later periods.
·  Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway : There was criticism that the project ignored the development 
of domestic technology. However, the world-class level of technologies are already secured 
with the development and operation of KTX, along with the possibility of exporting to Brazil. 
The project led the development of railway related industries
·  Incheon International Airport : 10 years after the completion of the project, the risk level of 
ground subsidence remains at a stable level of 28-64% of management standards. There are 
barely any cases of aircraft damages and flight cancellation due to bird strikes or fog
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(4) Creating Success Stories by Overcoming Criticisms 
There were criticisms that most projects in the beginning phase were quixotic ones that ignored the 
reality. Now, most of the infrastructure established by national projects boast the world-class service 
and competitiveness.
For example, the investment priority of the Gyeongbu Expressway, the initiative of Incheon Airport 
as a Northeast Asian hub airport and the investment efficiency of the Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway 
drew much cynicism and opposition from both home and abroad in their beginning. However, these 
projects produced unequivocal outcomes that no one can dispute.
For many projects, because of the lack of domestic technologies, it was inevitable to import core 
construction technologies and operating knowhow at the time of construction. However, with the 
acquisition and development of the technologies, Korea now has its own technology comparable to 
that of advanced nations. Incheon Airport won first place in ASQ by ACI for six consecutive years from 
2005, and its construction and operation strategies are being benchmarked by major airports around 
the world. In addition, exporting the technologies of high-speed railways to Brazil is underway.
The Cheonggye Stream Restoration Project is evaluated as a success story of urban redevelopment 
by many countries, as it demolished the Cheonggye Stream overpass and concrete coverings and 
created a clean stream and water-friendly spaces despite various controversies over traffic chaos and 
business losses of local merchants.
·  Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway : In 2009, the number of daily railway users reached 102,000. 
As an eco-friendly transportation mode, the railway boasts the world highest record of 98.3% 
in punctuality. Technology exports to USA and Brazil are under way
·  Incheon International Airport : The airport has grown into Northeast Asia’s hub airport with 
a capacity of 44 million annual users, and 4.5 million tons of cargo. The airport was awarded 
first place at ASQ by ACI for six consecutive years, and won the World’s Best Airport Award 
from Global Traveler for five consecutive years from 2006
·  Cheonggye Stream : With the demolition of overpass and the recovery of an ecosystem near 
the stream in downtown, the project is evaluated as an exemplary case of environmental 
improvement and urban renewal. Moreover, the U.S. Harvard Design School included the case 
in their textbooks
4. Policy Implications
1) Establishing Social Atmosphere for Objectivity and Responsibility
The conflict-driven delay of major large-scale national projects including Saemangeum, Seoul Ring 
Expressway, Gyeongbu High-Speed Railway incurred immense social and economic costs. Therefore, 
any arguments regarding the implementation of future national projects should be based on objective 
logic and accurate facts. Also, the proponents and opponents concerned should be responsible for 
their perspectives of the arguments.
2) Establishing Elaborate and Convincing Communication Strategies for National Projects
Even though most objections over national projects in the past turn out to be unfounded worries, 
it is true that project agencies did not have elaborate strategies and sufficient efforts to convince the 
opponents during the planning phase of the project. Therefore, the government needs to develop a 
logical framework that can persuade the public about the necessity of the project by fully explaining 
the potential effects on people’s quality of life, national economic development, job creation and 
technology accumulation. Meanwhile, the government should constantly make efforts to persuade 
the leaders of opponent groups so that they can broaden their understanding on the project. In 
addition, the government needs to strengthen communications through a town-meeting like format 
so as to induce the soft landing of national projects.
3) Promoting the ‘Prosumer-type’ National Projects with Nationwide Participation
Every one in the nation is a consumer as well as a producer of national projects. Therefore, the 
government should remind people of such dual roles by constantly communicating with them. In order 
to make national projects take root in people’s lives, a “Prosumer Approach”, where the government 
and people create and implement the national projects together, is important. To strengthen the 
prosumer approach in national projects, the government needs to establish various communication 
channels so as to incorporate people’s diverse views, while making the projects more persuasive. 
4) On-time Promotion of National Projects to Preemptively Respond to Global Trend
As the G20 member countries established a global coordination system and took joint steps after 
the global economic crisis in 2008, the global economy has been recovering gradually. Korea needs 
to prepare strategies for another set of major national projects, which can guarantee the country’s 
rapid development around 2020, when the global economy is expected to reach its peak. Following 
those precedents of national projects, which were embarked on in the 1990s and have recently 
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been producing returns, Korea needs to identify and promote national projects for new growth 
engines.51) Based on the convergence of information communication technology, nano technology, 
bio technology, energy technology, and cultural content technology, which are the new global growth 
engines, Korea should pursue new national projects so that it can become an IT powerhouse in 
the world. Specifically, green growth projects such as the construction of high-speed railways and 
renewable energy projects need to be promoted in earnest so as to raise public awareness about the 
importance of green growth from both perspectives of global and domestic development.
5) Prioritizing National Projects Creating Quality Jobs
Conflicts and oppositions over national projects can be significantly reduced if the public feels that 
national projects lead to job creation. Therefore, a future emphasis should be placed on those national 
projects that create quality jobs with high income and stable employment opportunity. In particular, 
the government needs to pay more policy attention on local employment and local outsourcing to 
maximize the spillover effects of national projects on the localities where they are located.
6) Creating Global Exemplary Development Agenda, Achievement of G20 Seoul Summit
At the G20 Seoul Summit, which was successfully hosted in Seoul in November 2010, “Seoul 
Development Consensus for Shared Growth” was adopted as a development agenda for 
developing countries. In order to carry out the development agenda, Korea needs to actively support 
underdeveloped countries to apply Korea’s national development experience accumulated over various 
national projects in a way that fits their nations’ circumstances and contributes to their economic 
development. If Korea’s experiences of overcoming conflicts and successfully carrying out projects 
can be passed onto developing countries, it will be recorded as an international exemplary case of 
practicing development agenda for developing countries.
7)  Demonstrating Creative Leadership and Promoting Social Integration Based on the 
Principle of “Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis-Thesis+”
Most of Korea’s major national projects went through the process of “thesis-antithesis-synthesis-
thesis+” like Hegelian dialectic.52) At the time of the government’s announcement on the promotion 
of a national project, the project enters the phase of thesis. When the project faces opposition by 
51)  Otto Hieronymi argued in his book that “what we need to do is to maintain and expand the existing facilities and to establish a new system that 
meets future demand on time.” Otto Hieronymi. “Policy Decisions for SOC Investment: Environmental and Planning Issues.” OECD International 
Futures Programme, 1993.
52)  Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831), who completed idealism in German philosophy, tried to explain movements of objects with a 
basic principle of contradiction and confrontation, unlike formal logic that is based on the law of identity. In a word, he argued that the entire 
world of nature, history, and mind goes through constant changes and developments, and these processes can be explained with a principle of 
dialectic that has its base on “thesis-antithesis and thesis-antithesis-synthesis”
local residents, experts or civil groups, then it moves into the phase of antithesis. By that time on, 
social conflicts develop over the project. However, if the government provides objective evidence, 
incorporates opponents’ reasonable opinions in the project, and takes constant efforts to persuade 
the opponents for a favorable foundation of the project, the project transforms into the phase of 
synthesis. When national projects take a smooth landing and are successfully implemented, they begin 
to produce visible economic and social outcomes that satisfy the people. Then, these projects finally 
reach the phase of thesis+, where they shape the backbone of future national development. Based on 
the accumulated experiences from economic growth and national development, and the principle of 
“thesis-antithesis-synthesis-thesis+” of national projects, the government needs to develop a grand 
vision on the long-term national projects and demonstrate creative leadership to implement national 
projects in cooperation with people. To do so, the government should first present a future vision of 
society and then strive for the identification of policies and projects that can realize the vision, perhaps 
emphasizing the value of national development with social integration.
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